Martha C. Nussbaum
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Martha C. Nussbaum has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Rachel Nussbaum Wichert
Government Affairs Attorney, Friends of Animals, Denver, CO, USA
1 shared publication- Rachel Nussbaum Wichert
Friends of Animals
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 33-50
Liberal Education and Global Responsibility
- Open Access
- 14 May 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Politics
- p. 1-7
Author’s Response
Cochrane presses me to clarify my position about animal citizenship. He says that I leave essential questions unclear, in particular whether citizenship belongs only to companion animals or also to wild animals. Actually, my position on this matter is utterly clear, though at a high level of generality. Chapters 5 and 12 argue that all sentient animals are subjects of the "virtual constitution" supplied by the capabilities norms for each species, and therefore all have rights that must be legally enforced. My argument for rights follows Korsgaard (113-14). I later conclude: "Rights and law, I argued in chapter 5, are conceptually interdependent. And rights mean that, where those structures do not yet exist, all humans, having the monopoly of lawmaking in this world, have a collective duty to create them as best we can" (279). If to have enforceable rights is to be a citizen, then all sentient animals are citizens. Whose citizens? A rough answer is, "Citizens of our world." And this ironclad commitment of mine makes clear the fact that I firmly reject the exclusion of wild animals from citizenship proposed by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka. But, as I go on to say, going further presents huge practical problems, especially given the weakness and inadequacy of international treaty law as it presently exists (for humans too). The CA is a theory about defensible goals, not (for humans either) a theory of political structure. There is a division of labor, and I do not feel ready to offer a knock-down argument for or against the nation state as a site of justice, although I believe that Grotius is correct: It is the largest existing entity that gives autonomy to creatures (autonomy being defined as self-given law), and that is responsive to the voices of the affected. All forms of international
- 14 May 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Politics
- p. 1-7
Open AccessAuthor’s Response
Cochrane presses me to clarify my position about animal citizenship. He says that I leave essential questions unclear, in particular whether citizenship belongs only to companion animals or also to wild animals. Actually, my position on this matter is utterly clear, though at a high level of generality. Chapters 5 and 12 argue that all sentient animals are subjects of the "virtual constitution" supplied by the capabilities norms for each species, and therefore all have rights that must be legally enforced. My argument for rights follows Korsgaard (113-14). I later conclude: "Rights and law, I argued in chapter 5, are conceptually interdependent. And rights mean that, where those structures do not yet exist, all humans, having the monopoly of lawmaking in this world, have a collective duty to create them as best we can" (279). If to have enforceable rights is to be a citizen, then all sentient animals are citizens. Whose citizens? A rough answer is, "Citizens of our world." And this ironclad commitment of mine makes clear the fact that I firmly reject the exclusion of wild animals from citizenship proposed by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka. But, as I go on to say, going further presents huge practical problems, especially given the weakness and inadequacy of international treaty law as it presently exists (for humans too). The CA is a theory about defensible goals, not (for humans either) a theory of political structure. There is a division of labor, and I do not feel ready to offer a knock-down argument for or against the nation state as a site of justice, although I believe that Grotius is correct: It is the largest existing entity that gives autonomy to creatures (autonomy being defined as self-given law), and that is responsive to the voices of the affected. All forms of international
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Editorial Universidad de Sevilla in Thémata
- No. 68,p. 13-45
Equilibrio: escepticismo e inmersión en la deliberación política.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Editorial Universidad de Sevilla in Thémata
- No. 68,p. 13-45
Equilibrio: escepticismo e inmersión en la deliberación política.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Project MUSE in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
- Vol. 66 (1) , 15-28
Amicus Brief
This brief argues that the law requires reformation to protect our modern scientific and philosophical understanding that many animals can live their own meaningful lives and that the Court should reform the law in this case.1 Modern science demonstrates that elephants are complex beings that can form a conception of the self, as observed by Judge Fahey, form strong social and emotional bonds among themselves and others, and that the Zoo's conduct harms Happy in both physical and intangible ways.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Project MUSE in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
- Vol. 66 (1) , 15-28
Amicus Brief
This brief argues that the law requires reformation to protect our modern scientific and philosophical understanding that many animals can live their own meaningful lives and that the Court should reform the law in this case.1 Modern science demonstrates that elephants are complex beings that can form a conception of the self, as observed by Judge Fahey, form strong social and emotional bonds among themselves and others, and that the Zoo's conduct harms Happy in both physical and intangible ways.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 104 (3) , 777-783
The Utility of a Psychoanalytic Theory of Law
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 104 (3) , 777-783
Open AccessThe Utility of a Psychoanalytic Theory of Law
- 3 April 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Human Development and Capabilities
- Vol. 20 (2) , 124-126
Preface: Amartya Sen and the HDCA
(2019). Preface: Amartya Sen and the HDCA. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities: Vol. 20, In celebration of Amartya Sen’s 85th birthday, pp. 124-126.
- 3 April 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Human Development and Capabilities
- Vol. 20 (2) , 124-126
Preface: Amartya Sen and the HDCA
(2019). Preface: Amartya Sen and the HDCA. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities: Vol. 20, In celebration of Amartya Sen’s 85th birthday, pp. 124-126.
- 2 January 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Human Development and Capabilities
- Vol. 19 (1) , 2-18
Working with and for Animals: Getting the Theoretical Framework Right
Two common approaches to the ethics of animal welfare are profoundly defective. One, an anthropocentric approach that orders forms of life by their likeness to human life, fails to grasp the variety and complexity of animal lives. A second, the Utilitarian approach, does better by seeing that pain is ubiquitously bad, but it does not articulate the diverse ways in which animal lives can be thwarted. I argue that a version of the Capabilities approach does much better, directing law and policy well. I develop this approach and confront it with a number of difficult questions.
- 2 January 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Human Development and Capabilities
- Vol. 19 (1) , 2-18
Working with and for Animals: Getting the Theoretical Framework Right
Two common approaches to the ethics of animal welfare are profoundly defective. One, an anthropocentric approach that orders forms of life by their likeness to human life, fails to grasp the variety and complexity of animal lives. A second, the Utilitarian approach, does better by seeing that pain is ubiquitously bad, but it does not articulate the diverse ways in which animal lives can be thwarted. I argue that a version of the Capabilities approach does much better, directing law and policy well. I develop this approach and confront it with a number of difficult questions.
- 3 July 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Human Development and Capabilities
- Vol. 18 (3) , 356-369
Scientific Whaling? The Scientific Research Exception and the Future of the International Whaling Commission
Whales are complex creatures with diverse capacities for intelligence, playfulness, esthetic expression, and social learning. And yet they have not been granted legal “standing” as beings with rights to this species-specific form of life. For this reason, whales continue to be hunted and killed for both commercial and “scientific” purposes. This paper examines the whaling industry and its impact on whales’ species-specific form of life, and presents a theoretical framework for reconciling the conflicting claims of whales and human scientists. We pay particular attention to the International Whaling Commission’s 1982 moratorium on commercial whaling and the controversial “scientific” exception built into this moratorium, which allows the killing of whales for vaguely defined scientific purposes. We also focus on the 2014 International Court of Justice ruling that Japan’s program of scientific whaling in the Antarctic violated international law; Japan’s decision to continue a revised form of the program despite the ruling; and the resistance that this program has met from marine activists. Finally we argue that any theoretical framework that does justice to whale life must go beyond a utilitarian or rights-based approach, and instead must focus on the distinct capabilities of whales as they live their lives unencumbered by human killing. This approach enables us to protect spheres of choice and characteristic life-activities for whales, while also articulating what a contemporary scientific inquiry into whale life should and should not include. With this framework developed, we present policy recommendations for the International Whaling Commission, anti-whaling activists, and individual nations interested in protecting the rights of whales.
- 3 July 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Human Development and Capabilities
- Vol. 18 (3) , 356-369
Scientific Whaling? The Scientific Research Exception and the Future of the International Whaling Commission
Whales are complex creatures with diverse capacities for intelligence, playfulness, esthetic expression, and social learning. And yet they have not been granted legal “standing” as beings with rights to this species-specific form of life. For this reason, whales continue to be hunted and killed for both commercial and “scientific” purposes. This paper examines the whaling industry and its impact on whales’ species-specific form of life, and presents a theoretical framework for reconciling the conflicting claims of whales and human scientists. We pay particular attention to the International Whaling Commission’s 1982 moratorium on commercial whaling and the controversial “scientific” exception built into this moratorium, which allows the killing of whales for vaguely defined scientific purposes. We also focus on the 2014 International Court of Justice ruling that Japan’s program of scientific whaling in the Antarctic violated international law; Japan’s decision to continue a revised form of the program despite the ruling; and the resistance that this program has met from marine activists. Finally we argue that any theoretical framework that does justice to whale life must go beyond a utilitarian or rights-based approach, and instead must focus on the distinct capabilities of whales as they live their lives unencumbered by human killing. This approach enables us to protect spheres of choice and characteristic life-activities for whales, while also articulating what a contemporary scientific inquiry into whale life should and should not include. With this framework developed, we present policy recommendations for the International Whaling Commission, anti-whaling activists, and individual nations interested in protecting the rights of whales.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Human Development and Capabilities
- Vol. 18 (3) , 317-321
Human Capabilities and Animal Lives: Conflict, Wonder, Law: A Symposium
(2017). Human Capabilities and Animal Lives: Conflict, Wonder, Law: A Symposium. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities: Vol. 18, Includes Symposium Articles: The Capabilities of Different Beings, pp. 317-321.
- 3 July 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Human Development and Capabilities
- Vol. 18 (3) , 317-321
Open AccessHuman Capabilities and Animal Lives: Conflict, Wonder, Law: A Symposium
(2017). Human Capabilities and Animal Lives: Conflict, Wonder, Law: A Symposium. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities: Vol. 18, Includes Symposium Articles: The Capabilities of Different Beings, pp. 317-321.