KSKjetil Storesletten

Kjetil Storesletten

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Kjetil Storesletten has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Presidential Address 2019: How Should Tax Progressivity Respond to Rising Income Inequality?

    by Jonathan Heathcote, Kjetil Storesletten, Giovanni L Violante

    We address the question in the title in a heterogeneous-agent incomplete-market model featuring exogenous idiosyncratic risk, endogenous skill investment, and flexible labor supply. The tax and transfer schedule is restricted to being log-linear in income, a good description of the US system. Rising inequality is modeled as a combination of skill-biased technical change and growth in residual wage dispersion. When facing shifts in the income distribution like those observed in the United States, a utilitarian planner chooses higher progressivity in response to larger residual inequality but lower progressivity in response to widening skill price dispersion reflecting technical change. Overall, optimal progressivity is approximately unchanged between 1980 and 2016. We document that the progressivity of the actual US tax and transfer system has similarly changed little since 1980, in line with the model prescription.


  • THE POLITICAL COLOR OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

    by Andreas Müller, Kjetil Storesletten, Fabrizio Zilibotti


  • The urban pension system

    by Zheng Song, Kjetil Storesletten, Yikai Wang, Fabrizio Zilibotti

    This chapter examines China’s pension reform. China implemented a public pension system in the early 1990s. The system consists of two pillars. The first pillar, funded by 17 per cent wage taxes paid by enterprises, guarantees a replacement rate of 20 per cent of local average wage for retirees with a minimum of fifteen years of contribution. The second pillar provides pensions from individual accounts financed by a contribution of 3 per cent and 8 per cent wage taxes paid by enterprises and workers, respectively. More recently, a new reform was implemented, which adjusted the proportion of taxes paid by enterprises and individuals and the proportion of contribution for individual accounts. Individual accounts are now funded by a wage tax of 8 per cent paid by workers only. The rural pension system is also discussed.

  • Advances in Economics and Econometrics

    by Daron Acemoglu, Manuel Arellano, Eddie Dekel, Markus K. Brunnermeier, Thomas M. Eisenbach, Yuliy Sannikov, James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, Andrea Prat, David Strömberg, et al.

    This is the second of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and commentaries presented at invited symposium sessions of the Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in Shanghai in August 2010. The papers summarize and interpret key developments in economics and econometrics, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics, covering both theory and application. Written by the leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline. The first volume primarily addresses economic theory, with specific focuses on nonstandard markets, contracts, decision theory, communication and organizations, epistemics and calibration, and patents.

  • Dynamic Political Choice in Macroeconomics

    by John Hassler, Kjetil Storesletten, Fabrizio Zilibotti

    We analyze positive theories of redistribution, social insurance and public good provision in a dynamic macroeconomic framework. Political outcomes are determined via repeated voting and driven by a conflict of interests between agents. Voters and politicians rationally forecast the impact of current political choices on future political and economic outcomes. The theory is consistent with large differences in the size of governments across societies. These need not rely on intrinsic differences in preferences or technology, but may be driven by self-fulfilling expectations about the robustness of the welfare state