Christophe Crombez

In this article, we present a game-theoretical model of political (dis)integration, and the incentives voters and politicians face during integration processes. We apply the model to the European Union. Preference homogeneity and economies of scale do not suffice to explain European integration. Rather, integration decisions are taken within an institutional setting that involves politicians with interests that may diverge from those of the voters they represent. Such politicians may take integration decisions that are not in line with their voters’ interests as a result. We show that voters can in some circumstances prevent integration by strategically electing representatives who are farther away from them. The model provides novel insights into the process of European (dis)integration and the voter–politician dynamics that determine it. In addition, our model offers an alternative explanation for the relative success of extremist parties in the European Union.

The boundaries of geographical indication (GI) areas represent the core of GI specifications. Theory suggests that smaller areas result in higher prices due to quantity restrictions and higher quality. However, empirical evidence on the importance of GI areas for using places as brands is scarce. Our regressions using newly coded data of GI areas in km² of 22 hams provide direct empirical evidence that larger areas are associated with lower prices. Subsample regressions suggest that areas affect prices through both quantity and (perceived) quality. Thus, our findings indicate that GI areas are a non-negligible factor in establishing collective regional brands.

This article presents a political economic analysis of exit from federations. After the federation has formed, members’ benefits from it may be different than expected. If a member ends up not benefitting, it may wish to secede i.e. exit the federation. Based on formal models, we show how state-contingent exit penalties can induce socially efficient exit decisions: they force the secessionist member to take into account the lost benefits of the federation for the other. Even if ex-ante specified exit penalties cannot be made state-contingent, they may still enhance social welfare by preventing forceful exit. Empirical evidence concerning Montenegro, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and the EU is compatible with these claims. In spite of the simplifications inherent to any modeling exercise, we hope that our results stimulate more research into exit clauses as a means to mitigate the problem of violent secessionism.

This review evaluates the use of spatial models for the analysis of policy making. First, we examine spatial theory and its applications in a variety of institutional settings. We discuss how the preferences of the actors involved in political processes, the steps in those processes, and the locations of the reversion policies affect the policies that emerge from the processes. To illustrate this and analyze how the rights of political actors determine the extent of policy reform and the occurrence of gridlock, we use a spatial model of European Union (EU) policy making. We apply the model to major EU reforms in two resource policy areas: the Common Agricultural Policy reforms of the past two decades and the recent reforms of the Emissions Trading System. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Resource Economics Volume 11 is October 4, 2019. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game‐theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more likely to express dissent. However, when they do express dissent, they vote ‘No’ more often. Parliamentary control depends on the presence of formal oversight institutions as well as the motivation of parliamentarians to hold their governments accountable. Empirical support is found in an analysis of votes on 1,387 legislative proposals that represent more than a decade of Council decision making in the period 2004–2014. This article contributes to the discussion on the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs, and clearly distinguishes the different forms of dissent in Council decision making.

This paper examines the Trio Presidency and its impact on voting behavior in the Council of the European Union. Trios of Member States cooperate for 18-month periods, with each member holding the Presidency for six months. We study whether belonging to the Trio increases the probability that a Member State votes in favor of a measure. We analyze roll call votes on 1038 legislative acts from January 2007 till June 2014. Conducting probit analyses we present evidence that Member States are indeed more likely to vote in favor during their participation in Trios. We show that this results mainly from the Trio’s agenda-setting powers. Moreover, holding the Presidency itself does not further increase the probability of voting in favor.

We present a game-theoretical analysis of Commission appointment in the European Union. In the model, the European Parliament and the member states look ahead and consider the outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. In contrast to earlier work, we assume the European Parliament and the member states have incomplete information on the consequences of policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information. We find that the increased use of codecision gives the Council an incentive to appoint a Commission that is closer to the European Parliament, because the European Parliament then trusts the Commission more and the Commission is more informative as a result. Thus, we shed new light on the Spitzenkandidaten Coup that preceded the appointment of the Juncker Commission.

A large literature is focused on governments’ fiscal policy making under the disciplining force of fiscal rules. That literature is devoted to map governments’ incentives for (non)compliance, but widely ignores the role of fiscal rule enforcement. This is remarkable, given the situation in the European Union, where we observe frequent breaches of the fiscal rules in the absence of sanctions. This paper focuses therefore on the incentives of the European Commission as enforcer of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and on how individual governments take these incentives into account. Based on actual cases and literature on international agreements we distinguish rationales which make the Commission lenient. Accordingly, we present a game theoretical model to map the interaction between the Commission and governments under incomplete information. We find that unforeseen fiscal needs stemming from crises or other contingencies enhance enforcement costs for the Commission. Given that crises require additional public expenditures, our model shows that some enforcement costs are welfare enhancing. We also find that governments have an incentive to emphasize the fiscal impact of crises to increase the Commission’s enforcement costs. Moreover, governments might even overstate crises’ fiscal impact to hide other expenditures. In doing so, governments exploit their informational advantage over their budget allocation and crisis solving costs. Finally, we provide examples related to Europe’s migrant crisis and national security to support our theoretical findings.

This paper presents a game-theoretical spatial analysis of Commission appointment in the European Union (EU). In the model the European Parliament (EP) and the member states in the Council look ahead and consider the policy outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. In contrast to earlier work we assume that the EP and the member states have incomplete information on the consequences of EU policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information on the link between policies and outcomes. As a result, we generate new insights in the Commission’s appointment. In particular, we find that the increased use of co-decision in the legislative process gives the Council an incentive to appoint a Commission that is closer to the EP, because the EP then trusts the Commission more. Thus this theory sheds new light on the so-called Spitzenkandidaten Coup that preceded the appointment of the Juncker Commission in 2014.