Masahiko Aoki
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 11 March 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Institutional Economics
- Vol. 11 (3) , 485-488
Why is the equilibrium notion essential for a unified institutional theory? A friendly remark on the article by Hindriks and Guala
This short commentary basically supports the unified approach to institutions of Hindriks and Guala (2014). First, using a flow diagram over the two-by-two boxes in the space spanned by the collective-individual dimension and the behavior (play)-cognitive (belief) dimension, it argues that the classical game theory and the so-called institution-as-rule theory are both incomplete and that they should be regarded as complementary for an integrated theory of institution as a process. However, the substantive forms of institutions ought to be linguistic representations (i.e. rules and ideas) that summarize equilibrium states of play of the societal game so as to mediate them to be incorporated into minds of players as collective intentionality (i.e. shared beliefs). From this perspective this note also supports the authors’ argument to unpack the ‘Y’ term in Searle's notion of constitutive rule (that is, the regulative rule) and submit it to be based on a neo-Hegelian notion of mutual recognition (i.e. equilibrium).
- 11 March 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Institutional Economics
- Vol. 11 (3) , 485-488
Why is the equilibrium notion essential for a unified institutional theory? A friendly remark on the article by Hindriks and Guala
This short commentary basically supports the unified approach to institutions of Hindriks and Guala (2014). First, using a flow diagram over the two-by-two boxes in the space spanned by the collective-individual dimension and the behavior (play)-cognitive (belief) dimension, it argues that the classical game theory and the so-called institution-as-rule theory are both incomplete and that they should be regarded as complementary for an integrated theory of institution as a process. However, the substantive forms of institutions ought to be linguistic representations (i.e. rules and ideas) that summarize equilibrium states of play of the societal game so as to mediate them to be incorporated into minds of players as collective intentionality (i.e. shared beliefs). From this perspective this note also supports the authors’ argument to unpack the ‘Y’ term in Searle's notion of constitutive rule (that is, the regulative rule) and submit it to be based on a neo-Hegelian notion of mutual recognition (i.e. equilibrium).
- 4 February 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Socio-Economic Review
- Vol. 11 (2) , 233-263
Historical sources of institutional trajectories in economic development: China, Japan and Korea compared
This article first provides a game-theoretic, endogenous view of institutions and then applies the idea to identify the sources of institutional trajectories of economies development in China, Japan, and Korea. It stylises the Malthusian phase of the East Asian economies as a peasant-based economies in which small conjugal families self-managed their working times between farming on small plots—leased or owned—and handcrafting for personal consumption and markets. It then compares institutional arrangements across these economies that sustained otherwise similar economies. It characterises the varied nature of the political states of Qing China, Tokugawa Japan and Yi Korea by focusing on the way agricultural taxes were enforced. It also identifies different patterns of social norms of trust that were institutional complements to, or substitutes for, the political states. Finally, it traces the path-dependent transformations of these state-norm combinations along subsequent transitions to post-Malthusian phases of economic growth in the respective economies.
- 4 February 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Socio-Economic Review
- Vol. 11 (2) , 233-263
Historical sources of institutional trajectories in economic development: China, Japan and Korea compared
This article first provides a game-theoretic, endogenous view of institutions and then applies the idea to identify the sources of institutional trajectories of economies development in China, Japan, and Korea. It stylises the Malthusian phase of the East Asian economies as a peasant-based economies in which small conjugal families self-managed their working times between farming on small plots—leased or owned—and handcrafting for personal consumption and markets. It then compares institutional arrangements across these economies that sustained otherwise similar economies. It characterises the varied nature of the political states of Qing China, Tokugawa Japan and Yi Korea by focusing on the way agricultural taxes were enforced. It also identifies different patterns of social norms of trust that were institutional complements to, or substitutes for, the political states. Finally, it traces the path-dependent transformations of these state-norm combinations along subsequent transitions to post-Malthusian phases of economic growth in the respective economies.
- 1 December 2004
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Industrial and Corporate Change
- Vol. 13 (6) , 967-981
An organizational architecture of T-form: Silicon Valley clustering and its institutional coherence
Commenting on the present author’s comparison of the J-model versus A-model, Williamson suggested the possibility of a third model of organizational architecture, referred to as the T-form, where T denotes temporary, transitional or timeliness. This paper formulates such a form from an information systemic point of view. Then it characterizes the Silicon Valley clustering of entrepreneurial firms as an example of nesting this form and analyzes how unique values (option value and tournament value) can be created in this form because of its temporariness. Finally, using a game-theoretic framework, it illustrates the institutional coherency of the Silicon Valley clustering and suggests a way to extend the Williamsonian institution-analytic framework.
- 1 December 2004
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Industrial and Corporate Change
- Vol. 13 (6) , 967-981
An organizational architecture of T-form: Silicon Valley clustering and its institutional coherence
Commenting on the present author’s comparison of the J-model versus A-model, Williamson suggested the possibility of a third model of organizational architecture, referred to as the T-form, where T denotes temporary, transitional or timeliness. This paper formulates such a form from an information systemic point of view. Then it characterizes the Silicon Valley clustering of entrepreneurial firms as an example of nesting this form and analyzes how unique values (option value and tournament value) can be created in this form because of its temporariness. Finally, using a game-theoretic framework, it illustrates the institutional coherency of the Silicon Valley clustering and suggests a way to extend the Williamsonian institution-analytic framework.