Nina Smith
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Nina Smith has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Leif Husted
Institute of Local Government Studies and CIM, København V, Denmark
2 shared publications - Nabanita Datta Gupta
The Danish National Centre for Social Research
2 shared publications - Helena Skyt Nielsen
Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
1 shared publication - Helena Skyt Nielsen
CIM and Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Aarhus C, Denmark
1 shared publication - Leslie S. Stratton
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, USA
1 shared publication - Mette Verner
University of Aarhus
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 4 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economics of the Household
- Vol. 6 (1) , 65-89
PERSPECTIVE ARTICLE: The impact of Nordic countries’ family friendly policies on employment, wages, and children
- 4 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economics of the Household
- Vol. 6 (1) , 65-89
PERSPECTIVE ARTICLE: The impact of Nordic countries’ family friendly policies on employment, wages, and children
- 1 October 2007
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 74 (2) , 412-433
Is Marriage Poisonous? Are Relationships Taxing? An Analysis of the Male Marital Wage Differential in Denmark
Differences in the pattern of marriage, cohabitation, childbirth, and intrahousehold specialization between the United States and Denmark, as well as a rich, register‐based panel sample of about 35,000 young Danish men, are exploited to shed light on the nature of the male marital wage differential. The results indicate that failing to control for cohabitation can seriously bias estimates of the marital wage differential, that marriage is a more selective state than cohabitation, and that specialization may explain some of the marital wage differential in the United States but not in Denmark. In Denmark, by contrast, there is evidence that fatherhood has a significant impact on earnings.
- 1 October 2007
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 74 (2) , 412-433
Is Marriage Poisonous? Are Relationships Taxing? An Analysis of the Male Marital Wage Differential in Denmark
Differences in the pattern of marriage, cohabitation, childbirth, and intrahousehold specialization between the United States and Denmark, as well as a rich, register‐based panel sample of about 35,000 young Danish men, are exploited to shed light on the nature of the male marital wage differential. The results indicate that failing to control for cohabitation can seriously bias estimates of the marital wage differential, that marriage is a more selective state than cohabitation, and that specialization may explain some of the marital wage differential in the United States but not in Denmark. In Denmark, by contrast, there is evidence that fatherhood has a significant impact on earnings.
- 1 December 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 29 (4) , 855-883
Qualifications, discrimination, or assimilation? An extended framework for analysing immigrant wage gaps
- 1 December 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 29 (4) , 855-883
Qualifications, discrimination, or assimilation? An extended framework for analysing immigrant wage gaps
- 1 November 2003
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 755-786
The school-to-work transition of 2 nd generation immigrants in Denmark
- 1 November 2003
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 755-786
The school-to-work transition of 2 nd generation immigrants in Denmark
- Open Access
- 1 September 2002
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Sociological Review
- Vol. 18 (3) , 271-288
Unemployment Traps: Do Financial Disincentives Matter?
This paper analyses the importance of financial disincentives for workers in Denmark. Based on a panel survey which is merged to a number of administrative registers it is possible to calculate precise measures of the economic incentives for labour‐force participants between employment in a full time job and being on unemployment insurance benefits and considering also the fixed costs of work. The results indicate large disincentive effects for some groups, especially low paid women. In 1996, 6 per cent of Danish men and 13 per cent of the women had a lower disposable net income if working in a full‐time job compared to being on unemployment benefits. The effect of these financial disincentives is analysed in simple reduced form models of on‐the‐job search, unemployed search behaviour, unemployment risk, and transitions out of the labour force. We find that the net compensation rate in unemployment has a significant impact on women's propensity to leave the labour force, on measures of search intensity, on the risk of being hit by unemployment, and on one of our flexibility measures, i .e. the maximum acceptable commuting time to a job. The net compensation rate has no impact on the willingness to move to another place to get a job. However, here we find a significant impact from measures related to job attitude. We end the paper reporting the results from including attitude variables along with economic variables. We find a number of significant effects from attitude variables. However, the main conclusion is that economic incentives dominate the present analysis of unemployment traps.
- 1 September 2002
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Sociological Review
- Vol. 18 (3) , 271-288
Open AccessUnemployment Traps: Do Financial Disincentives Matter?
This paper analyses the importance of financial disincentives for workers in Denmark. Based on a panel survey which is merged to a number of administrative registers it is possible to calculate precise measures of the economic incentives for labour‐force participants between employment in a full time job and being on unemployment insurance benefits and considering also the fixed costs of work. The results indicate large disincentive effects for some groups, especially low paid women. In 1996, 6 per cent of Danish men and 13 per cent of the women had a lower disposable net income if working in a full‐time job compared to being on unemployment benefits. The effect of these financial disincentives is analysed in simple reduced form models of on‐the‐job search, unemployed search behaviour, unemployment risk, and transitions out of the labour force. We find that the net compensation rate in unemployment has a significant impact on women's propensity to leave the labour force, on measures of search intensity, on the risk of being hit by unemployment, and on one of our flexibility measures, i .e. the maximum acceptable commuting time to a job. The net compensation rate has no impact on the willingness to move to another place to get a job. However, here we find a significant impact from measures related to job attitude. We end the paper reporting the results from including attitude variables along with economic variables. We find a number of significant effects from attitude variables. However, the main conclusion is that economic incentives dominate the present analysis of unemployment traps.