Daniel Parker
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Latest Publications
- 1 December 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 78 (5) , 1058-1069
On Jaynes's Unbelievably Short Proof of the Second Law
This article investigates Jaynes's “unbelievably short proof” of the second law of thermodynamics. It assesses published criticisms of the proof and concludes that these criticisms miss the mark by demanding results that either import expectations of a proof not consistent with an information-theoretic approach or would require assumptions not employed in the proof itself, as it looks only to establish a weaker conclusion. Finally, a weakness in the proof is identified and illustrated. This weakness stems from the fact the Jaynes's assumption of unitary evolution is too strong given his perspective, rather than too weak to provide the desired results.
- 1 December 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 78 (5) , 1058-1069
On Jaynes's Unbelievably Short Proof of the Second Law
This article investigates Jaynes's “unbelievably short proof” of the second law of thermodynamics. It assesses published criticisms of the proof and concludes that these criticisms miss the mark by demanding results that either import expectations of a proof not consistent with an information-theoretic approach or would require assumptions not employed in the proof itself, as it looks only to establish a weaker conclusion. Finally, a weakness in the proof is identified and illustrated. This weakness stems from the fact the Jaynes's assumption of unitary evolution is too strong given his perspective, rather than too weak to provide the desired results.
- Open Access
- 10 August 2011
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 62 (4) , 831-856
Information-Theoretic Statistical Mechanics without Landauer’s Principle
This article distinguishes two different senses of information-theoretic approaches to statistical mechanics that are often conflated in the literature: those relating to the thermodynamic cost of computational processes and those that offer an interpretation of statistical mechanics where the probabilities are treated as epistemic. This distinction is then investigated through Earman and Norton’s ([1999]) ‘sound’ and ‘profound’ dilemma for information-theoretic exorcisms of Maxwell’s demon. It is argued that Earman and Norton fail to countenance a ‘sound’ information-theoretic interpretation and this paper describes how the latter inferential interpretations can escape the criticisms of Earman and Norton ([1999]) and Norton ([2005]) by adopting this ‘sound’ horn. This article considers a standard model of Maxwell’s demon to illustrate how one might adopt an information-theoretic approach to statistical mechanics without a reliance on Landauer’s principle, where the incompressibility of the probability distribution due to Liouville’s theorem is taken as the central feature of such an interpretation.
- 10 August 2011
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 62 (4) , 831-856
Open AccessInformation-Theoretic Statistical Mechanics without Landauer’s Principle
This article distinguishes two different senses of information-theoretic approaches to statistical mechanics that are often conflated in the literature: those relating to the thermodynamic cost of computational processes and those that offer an interpretation of statistical mechanics where the probabilities are treated as epistemic. This distinction is then investigated through Earman and Norton’s ([1999]) ‘sound’ and ‘profound’ dilemma for information-theoretic exorcisms of Maxwell’s demon. It is argued that Earman and Norton fail to countenance a ‘sound’ information-theoretic interpretation and this paper describes how the latter inferential interpretations can escape the criticisms of Earman and Norton ([1999]) and Norton ([2005]) by adopting this ‘sound’ horn. This article considers a standard model of Maxwell’s demon to illustrate how one might adopt an information-theoretic approach to statistical mechanics without a reliance on Landauer’s principle, where the incompressibility of the probability distribution due to Liouville’s theorem is taken as the central feature of such an interpretation.
- 30 October 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
- Vol. 41 (4) , 362-365
The Ashgate Companion to Philosophy of Physics, D. Rickles (Ed.), Ashgate, Aldershot (2008), 386 pp., Price: $124.95, £65, € 74.60, ISBN: 9780754655183
- 30 October 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
- Vol. 41 (4) , 362-365
The Ashgate Companion to Philosophy of Physics, D. Rickles (Ed.), Ashgate, Aldershot (2008), 386 pp., Price: $124.95, £65, € 74.60, ISBN: 9780754655183
- 1 December 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 72 (5) , 751-763
Thermodynamic Irreversibility: Does the Big Bang Explain What It Purports to Explain?
In this paper I examine Albert’s (2000) claim that the low entropy state of the early universe is sufficient to explain irreversible thermodynamic phenomena. In particular, I argue that conditionalizing on the initial state of the universe does not have the explanatory power it is presumed to have. I present several arguments to the effect that Albert’s ‘past hypothesis’ alone cannot justify the belief in past nonequilibrium conditions or ground the veracity of records of the past.
- 1 December 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 72 (5) , 751-763
Thermodynamic Irreversibility: Does the Big Bang Explain What It Purports to Explain?
In this paper I examine Albert’s (2000) claim that the low entropy state of the early universe is sufficient to explain irreversible thermodynamic phenomena. In particular, I argue that conditionalizing on the initial state of the universe does not have the explanatory power it is presumed to have. I present several arguments to the effect that Albert’s ‘past hypothesis’ alone cannot justify the belief in past nonequilibrium conditions or ground the veracity of records of the past.