Sophie Meunier
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Sophie Meunier has a total of 42 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Wade Jacoby
4 shared publications- Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt
Technical University of Munich
3 shared publications - Anna Vlasiuk Nibe
Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark https://dx.doi.org/6174 6400 Sønderborg Denmark
2 shared publications - Christilla Roederer-Rynning
Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
2 shared publications - Erik Jones
European University Institute
2 shared publications - Jean-Frédéric Morin
Université Laval
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Law & Geoeconomics
- Vol. -1 (aop) , 1-19
Mind the Gaps: Failing Forward, Muddling Through, and the Reform of EU Investment Screening
This research note investigates the causes of the 2024–2026 reform of the European Union’s investment screening framework by probing two competing explanations: “failing forward” and “muddling through.” We show that Regulation (EU) 2019/452 was a lowest-common-denominator outcome whose design gaps were apparent from adoption. We compare the two explanations along three dimensions on which they generate divergent expectations: the nature of the crisis catalyst; institutional lock-in; and the seeds of the next failure embedded in the new framework. Reading Regulation (EU) 2026/1386, adopted on 17 June 2026, against these dimensions, we argue that the reform is better characterised as muddling through than failing forward. It was triggered by a mandated statutory review and exogenous geopolitical shocks rather than by an endogenous governance crisis, and it reproduces the core sovereignty constraint of 2019, with the Commission obtaining no override powers. We discuss the implications for economic security governance more broadly.
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Law & Geoeconomics
- Vol. -1 (aop) , 1-19
Mind the Gaps: Failing Forward, Muddling Through, and the Reform of EU Investment Screening
This research note investigates the causes of the 2024–2026 reform of the European Union’s investment screening framework by probing two competing explanations: “failing forward” and “muddling through.” We show that Regulation (EU) 2019/452 was a lowest-common-denominator outcome whose design gaps were apparent from adoption. We compare the two explanations along three dimensions on which they generate divergent expectations: the nature of the crisis catalyst; institutional lock-in; and the seeds of the next failure embedded in the new framework. Reading Regulation (EU) 2026/1386, adopted on 17 June 2026, against these dimensions, we argue that the reform is better characterised as muddling through than failing forward. It was triggered by a mandated statutory review and exogenous geopolitical shocks rather than by an endogenous governance crisis, and it reproduces the core sovereignty constraint of 2019, with the Commission obtaining no override powers. We discuss the implications for economic security governance more broadly.
- Open Access
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 48 (6) , 901-921
The EU’s Global Gateway initiative: the geopoliticization of development aid and foreign economic policy
On 12 July 2021, the Foreign Affairs Council invited the European Commission to prepare a global connectivity strategy, as a new geopolitical instrument to advance the development aid and foreign e...
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 48 (6) , 901-921
Open AccessThe EU’s Global Gateway initiative: the geopoliticization of development aid and foreign economic policy
On 12 July 2021, the Foreign Affairs Council invited the European Commission to prepare a global connectivity strategy, as a new geopolitical instrument to advance the development aid and foreign e...
- Open Access
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 48 (6) , 1011-1031
Team europe goes Global Gateway: how China’s geopolitical rise affects EU governance in development and infrastructure financing
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 48 (6) , 1011-1031
Open AccessTeam europe goes Global Gateway: how China’s geopolitical rise affects EU governance in development and infrastructure financing
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- p. 1-30
The EU as a global actor in the geoeconomic age: power and weakness in and through trade
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- p. 1-30
The EU as a global actor in the geoeconomic age: power and weakness in and through trade
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 10 February 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (10) , 1-29
How EU industrial policy got its groove back: securitisation and governance shifts in the geoeconomic era
- 10 February 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (10) , 1-29
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessHow EU industrial policy got its groove back: securitisation and governance shifts in the geoeconomic era
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Law & Geoeconomics
- Vol. 1 (2) , 297-308
Global-ism: The Implications of Investment Screening Mechanisms on the Politics of Globalization
Investment Screening Mechanisms ( ISM s) have proliferated across advanced economies, transforming from a niche regulatory tool into a key instrument of geoeconomic strategy. While prior research has examined the causes behind this trend, the consequences of ISM s on foreign direct investment ( FDI ) flows and economic governance remain underexplored. This commentary engages with the ISM Restrictiveness Index presented by Faubert and Bencivelli at a 2024 Law & Geoeconomics workshop and extends the debate by analyzing the political implications of ISM s. It explores how ISM s challenge traditional models of International Political Economy, serve as tools for economic competition, and risk political capture. Additionally, ISM s are contextualized within the broader geoeconomic toolkit, reshaping globalization and state-market relations. As states recalibrate economic openness against security concerns, ISM s symbolize a broader shift toward strategic economic governance, raising critical questions about the future of global investment flows and the evolving political economy of globalization.
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Law & Geoeconomics
- Vol. 1 (2) , 297-308
Global-ism: The Implications of Investment Screening Mechanisms on the Politics of Globalization
Investment Screening Mechanisms ( ISM s) have proliferated across advanced economies, transforming from a niche regulatory tool into a key instrument of geoeconomic strategy. While prior research has examined the causes behind this trend, the consequences of ISM s on foreign direct investment ( FDI ) flows and economic governance remain underexplored. This commentary engages with the ISM Restrictiveness Index presented by Faubert and Bencivelli at a 2024 Law & Geoeconomics workshop and extends the debate by analyzing the political implications of ISM s. It explores how ISM s challenge traditional models of International Political Economy, serve as tools for economic competition, and risk political capture. Additionally, ISM s are contextualized within the broader geoeconomic toolkit, reshaping globalization and state-market relations. As states recalibrate economic openness against security concerns, ISM s symbolize a broader shift toward strategic economic governance, raising critical questions about the future of global investment flows and the evolving political economy of globalization.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 3 March 2024
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 62 (4) , 1097-1115
The EU's Geoeconomic Turn: From Policy Laggard to Institutional Innovator
Heightened geopolitical tensions and the growing securitization of economic exchange over the past decade have prompted many countries to adopt new geoeconomic tools. Long resistant to this geoeconomic turn, the European Union (EU) has since 2017 created a panoply of innovative policy tools that blend trade and investment with essential security concerns. This article asks why and how the EU has been able to operate the doctrinal and policy changes necessary to put economic tools at the service of geopolitics. After introducing a typology of the defensive and offensive geoeconomic tools deployed by advanced industrial economies, we present the novel geoeconomic toolkit quickly assembled by the EU, which we explain by the confluence of external factors that triggered European leaders' beliefs that change was necessary and internal factors that made such change institutionally and politically possible, a trend reinforced by the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
- 3 March 2024
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 62 (4) , 1097-1115
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe EU's Geoeconomic Turn: From Policy Laggard to Institutional Innovator
Heightened geopolitical tensions and the growing securitization of economic exchange over the past decade have prompted many countries to adopt new geoeconomic tools. Long resistant to this geoeconomic turn, the European Union (EU) has since 2017 created a panoply of innovative policy tools that blend trade and investment with essential security concerns. This article asks why and how the EU has been able to operate the doctrinal and policy changes necessary to put economic tools at the service of geopolitics. After introducing a typology of the defensive and offensive geoeconomic tools deployed by advanced industrial economies, we present the novel geoeconomic toolkit quickly assembled by the EU, which we explain by the confluence of external factors that triggered European leaders' beliefs that change was necessary and internal factors that made such change institutionally and politically possible, a trend reinforced by the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 27 February 2024
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 62 (4) , 1063-1079
When Foreign Policy Becomes Trade Policy: The EU's Anti‐Coercion Instrument
The European Union (EU) has taken a geoeconomic turn since 2017 by creating a series of new unilateral instruments designed to preserve European autonomy and adjust to the progressive unravelling of the liberal international economic order. The most controversial of these instruments is the 2023 Anti‐Coercion Instrument (ACI), designed to deter third countries from targeting the EU and its member states with economic coercion through measures affecting trade or investment. This article analyses why this new policy instrument was created, traces its institutional genesis and explores its implications by asking whether the ACI represents an intentional attempt to transform the foreign policy issue of coercion into a commercial one. Using process tracing based on interviews and primary and secondary materials, we argue that ‘foreign policy becoming trade policy’ through the ACI was an unintended consequence both of external pressures to institutionalise the trade–security nexus and of the EU's uneven internal competence base.
- 27 February 2024
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 62 (4) , 1063-1079
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessWhen Foreign Policy Becomes Trade Policy: The EU's Anti‐Coercion Instrument
The European Union (EU) has taken a geoeconomic turn since 2017 by creating a series of new unilateral instruments designed to preserve European autonomy and adjust to the progressive unravelling of the liberal international economic order. The most controversial of these instruments is the 2023 Anti‐Coercion Instrument (ACI), designed to deter third countries from targeting the EU and its member states with economic coercion through measures affecting trade or investment. This article analyses why this new policy instrument was created, traces its institutional genesis and explores its implications by asking whether the ACI represents an intentional attempt to transform the foreign policy issue of coercion into a commercial one. Using process tracing based on interviews and primary and secondary materials, we argue that ‘foreign policy becoming trade policy’ through the ACI was an unintended consequence both of external pressures to institutionalise the trade–security nexus and of the EU's uneven internal competence base.
- 15 September 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 31 (1) , 182-211
Pre-emptive depoliticisation: the European Commission and the EU foreign investment screening regulation
- 15 September 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 31 (1) , 182-211
Pre-emptive depoliticisation: the European Commission and the EU foreign investment screening regulation
- Top Cited Papers
- 14 March 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 67 (2)
Mapping the Characteristics of Foreign Investment Screening Mechanisms: The New PRISM Dataset
Since the 2008 financial crisis, many advanced industrialized economies, while eager to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), have also implemented or tightened investment screening mechanisms (ISMs), which empower governments to restrict foreign takeovers. ISMs, at the nexus between international political economy and international security, are an understudied phenomenon, although they have recently gained in policy prominence worldwide as a result of emerging technological risks and new threat actors. This research note introduces the Politics and Regulation of Investment Screening Mechanisms dataset, a newly coded dataset on ISMs in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 2007 to 2021, examining the evolution of seven key features of investment screening over time. Based on these novel data, we then describe patterns in the evolution of foreign investment screening policies. Next, we consider likely applications of the dataset to answer questions about the politics of investment as well as broader questions of economic exchange and institutional design in an age of great power competition—including by providing some initial statistical exercises on the relationship between Chinese FDI and R&D spending on ISM features. Finally, we suggest how investment screening fits within the new arsenal of unilateral instruments of economic statecraft currently being developed by liberal democracies.
- 14 March 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 67 (2)
Top Cited PapersMapping the Characteristics of Foreign Investment Screening Mechanisms: The New PRISM Dataset
Since the 2008 financial crisis, many advanced industrialized economies, while eager to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), have also implemented or tightened investment screening mechanisms (ISMs), which empower governments to restrict foreign takeovers. ISMs, at the nexus between international political economy and international security, are an understudied phenomenon, although they have recently gained in policy prominence worldwide as a result of emerging technological risks and new threat actors. This research note introduces the Politics and Regulation of Investment Screening Mechanisms dataset, a newly coded dataset on ISMs in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 2007 to 2021, examining the evolution of seven key features of investment screening over time. Based on these novel data, we then describe patterns in the evolution of foreign investment screening policies. Next, we consider likely applications of the dataset to answer questions about the politics of investment as well as broader questions of economic exchange and institutional design in an age of great power competition—including by providing some initial statistical exercises on the relationship between Chinese FDI and R&D spending on ISM features. Finally, we suggest how investment screening fits within the new arsenal of unilateral instruments of economic statecraft currently being developed by liberal democracies.