XHXiuli He

Xiuli He

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Xiuli He has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Research on Logistics Cooperation Strategy of the Retailer and the Platform Based on Paid Membership System

    by Jiang Wu, Linxiu Hu, Xiuli He, Xi Zheng

    E-commerce platforms have widely embraced the paid membership system as a sustainable and effective customer management method to increase repurchase rates and offer value-added services to loyal consumers. As a common means of member benefits and a crucial link for interaction with direct consumers, logistics service is related to the platform’s sustainable operation. In this context, this paper studies retailers’ and e-commerce platforms’ cooperation strategies regarding logistics services under paid membership systems, and analyzes the impact of paid membership system on optimal outcomes. The results indicate that, in the case of the basic-service contract, sales profits decrease but membership fees increase as membership service quality increases. In accordance with the terms of the full-service contract, the platform would lower the commission fee and membership fee as the membership service quality improves. The retailer and the platform tend to sign basic-service contracts when the third-party logistics fee is low-cost, since there is a win–win interval. We also extend the logistics plan to include self-delivery and switch to centralized decision making, and we find that the basic-service contract’s win–win interval persisted. Our results reveal the fundamental connection between paid membership systems and logistics cooperation strategy, serving as a theoretical guide for the decision makers.


  • Equilibrium decisions on pricing and innovation that impact reference price dynamics

    by Shaokun Tao, Xianjin Du, Suresh P. Sethi, Xiuli He, Yu Li

    Previous studies have confirmed that reference prices play an essential role in consumer purchasing decisions, and some researchers have suggested that reference prices are positively influenced by innovation. Therefore, we construct an interactive effect of innovation and reference price to study their combined impact on supply chain decisions. We model a supply chain, where a manufacturer determines the innovation level and the wholesale price while the retailer controls the retail price, as a dynamic Stackelberg game. We show that the interactive effect causes the steady-state wholesale and retail prices to increase, thus motivating the manufacturer to increase innovation investment. We see that the retail price and the level of innovation increase in reference price effect whereas they decrease in consumer memory. The centralized firm has a higher steady-state innovation level and innovation/price ratio and lower steady-state retail price compared to the decentralized supply chain. Consumers also benefit from the interactive effect as well as from centralization. Finally, we use numerical analysis to demonstrate our results and offer some managerial implications.


  • Peer-induced fairness and personalized pricing in a channel

    by Jianqiang Zhang, Xiuli He, Yueyun Zhang

    Consumers incur utility loss when they find that their peers pay different prices for the same product, which seemingly poses a threat to firms practising personalized pricing. This paper studies the interaction between peer-induced fairness and personalized pricing in a distribution channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. While consumers are fair-minded, the retailer can apply personalized prices. Using a game-theoretic approach, we find that consumer fairness concern compels the retailer to reduce prices. However, the retailer will reduce the price toward high-valued consumers by a larger amount than the price toward low-valued consumers. This drives the manufacturer to offer a much lower wholesale price. As a result, the retailer using personalized pricing is better off in the presence of consumer fairness concern. This finding still holds when the capability of personalized pricing is endogenous, when social comparison may increase a consumer’s utility, and when the degree of fairness concern depends on the size of population. These effects are unique to peer-induced fairness, while related emotions such as distributional fairness concern cannot improve the retailer’s profit.


  • Competitor referral by platforms

    by Jianqiang Zhang, Qingning Cao, Xiuli He


  • Co‐Op Advertising in Dynamic Retail Oligopolies

    by Xiuli He, Anand Krishnamoorthy, Ashutosh Prasad, Suresh P. Sethi

    We study a supply chain in which a consumer goods manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. The retailer undertakes promotional expenditures, such as advertising, to increase sales and to compete against other retailer(s). The manufacturer supports the retailer’s promotional expenditure through a cooperative advertising program by reimbursing a portion (called the subsidy rate) of the retailer’s promotional expenditure. To determine the subsidy rate, we formulate a Stackelberg differential game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and a Nash differential subgame between the retailer and the competing retailer(s). We derive the optimal feedback promotional expenditures of the retailers and the optimal feedback subsidy rate of the manufacturer, and show how they are influenced by market parameters. An important finding is that the manufacturer should support its retailer only when a subsidy threshold is crossed. The impact of competition on this threshold is nonmonotone. Specifically, the manufacturer offers more support when its retailer competes with one other retailer but its support starts decreasing with the presence of additional retailers. In the case where the manufacturer sells through all retailers, we show under certain assumptions that it should support only one dominant retailer. We also describe how we can incorporate retail price competition into the model.


  • Life‐Cycle Channel Coordination Issues in Launching an Innovative Durable Product

    by Genaro J. Gutierrez, Xiuli He

    We analyze the dynamic strategic interactions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a decentralized distribution channel used to launch an innovative durable product (IDP). The underlying retail demand for the IDP is influenced by word‐of‐mouth from past adopters and follows a Bass‐type diffusion process. The word‐of‐mouth influence creates a trade‐off between immediate and future sales and profits, resulting in a multi‐period dynamic supply chain coordination problem. Our analysis shows that while in some environments, the manufacturer is better off with a far‐sighted retailer, there are also environments in which the manufacturer is better off with a myopic retailer. We characterize equilibrium dynamic pricing strategies and the resulting sales and profit trajectories. We demonstrate that revenue‐sharing contracts can coordinate the IDP's supply chain with both far‐sighted and myopic retailers throughout the entire planning horizon and arbitrarily allocate the channel profit.


  • Cooperative Advertising and Pricing in a Dynamic Stochastic Supply Chain: Feedback Stackelberg Strategies

    by Xiuli He, Ashutosh Prasad, Suresh P. Sethi

    Cooperative (co‐op) advertising is an important instrument for aligning manufacturer and retailer decisions in supply chains. In this, the manufacturer announces a co‐op advertising policy, i.e., a participation rate that specifies the percentage of the retailer's advertising expenditure that it will provide. In addition, it also announces the wholesale price. In response, the retailer chooses its optimal advertising and pricing policies. We model this supply chain problem as a stochastic Stackelberg differential game whose dynamics follows Sethi's stochastic sales‐advertising model. We obtain the condition when offering co‐op advertising is optimal for the manufacturer. We provide in feedback form the optimal advertising and pricing policies for the manufacturer and the retailer. We contrast the results with the advertising and price decisions of the vertically integrated channel, and suggest a method for coordinating the channel.