Guttorm Schjelderup
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Guttorm Schjelderup has a total of 45 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dirk Schindler
Erasmus School of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
17 shared publications- Hans Jarle Kind
NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway
13 shared publications Andreas Haufler
Department of Economics, University of Munich, Munich, Germany
6 shared publications- Frank Stähler
University of Tübingen
6 shared publications Marko Koethenbuerger
ETH Zurich - Department of Management, Technology and Economics; KOF Swiss Economic Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
6 shared publicationsJarle Moen
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 May 2026
- Published by Cappelen Damm AS - Cappelen Damm Akademisk in Magma
- Vol. 29 (2)
Formuesskatten i Norge
Artikkelen analyserer formuesskattens rolle i det norske skattesystemet med vekt på fordeling, verdsettelse og økonomisk effektivitet. Offisiell inntektsstatistikk utelater tilbakeholdte eierinntekter og undervurderer dermed ulikheten. Videre viser statistikken at formue er langt mer konsentrert enn inntekt, slik at fordelingspolitikk er mer effektiv når den er knyttet til formue enn til inntekt. Artikkelen belyser verdsettelsesreglene i formuesskatten, som fører til en systematisk undervurdering av unoterte aksjer. Videre analyseres hvordan formuesskatt og skatt på kapitalgevinst påvirker verdsettelsen av børsnoterte aksjer. Avslutningsvis drøftes fordelingsvirkningene av formuesskatt sammenlignet med alternative former for kapitalbeskatning.
- 27 May 2026
- Published by Cappelen Damm AS - Cappelen Damm Akademisk in Magma
- Vol. 29 (2)
Open AccessFormuesskatten i Norge
Artikkelen analyserer formuesskattens rolle i det norske skattesystemet med vekt på fordeling, verdsettelse og økonomisk effektivitet. Offisiell inntektsstatistikk utelater tilbakeholdte eierinntekter og undervurderer dermed ulikheten. Videre viser statistikken at formue er langt mer konsentrert enn inntekt, slik at fordelingspolitikk er mer effektiv når den er knyttet til formue enn til inntekt. Artikkelen belyser verdsettelsesreglene i formuesskatten, som fører til en systematisk undervurdering av unoterte aksjer. Videre analyseres hvordan formuesskatt og skatt på kapitalgevinst påvirker verdsettelsen av børsnoterte aksjer. Avslutningsvis drøftes fordelingsvirkningene av formuesskatt sammenlignet med alternative former for kapitalbeskatning.
- Open Access
- 30 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 32 (3) , 895-915
Taxation and multi-sided platforms: a review
Many of the largest and most influential industries in the global economy operate digitally as multi-sided platforms, catering to different groups who are connected through intergroup network effects. This paper provides a survey of the literature on the effects of taxing these firms via indirect and corporate taxes. It seeks to establish an understanding of why traditional insights from taxation in one-sided markets may not apply to firms in multi-sided markets. Indeed, governments risk implementing counterproductive tax policies in multi-sided markets if they base their strategies on what constitutes efficient taxation in traditional markets.
- 30 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 32 (3) , 895-915
Open AccessTaxation and multi-sided platforms: a review
Many of the largest and most influential industries in the global economy operate digitally as multi-sided platforms, catering to different groups who are connected through intergroup network effects. This paper provides a survey of the literature on the effects of taxing these firms via indirect and corporate taxes. It seeks to establish an understanding of why traditional insights from taxation in one-sided markets may not apply to firms in multi-sided markets. Indeed, governments risk implementing counterproductive tax policies in multi-sided markets if they base their strategies on what constitutes efficient taxation in traditional markets.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Nordic Tax Journal
- Vol. 2024 (s1) , 72-82
The Taxation of Norway’s Richest 1
The purpose of this article is to reconcile findings from Aaberge et al. (2020), which show that the Norwegian tax system is regressive at the top (1 percent richest) of the income distribution. We approach this through the example of an investor who exclusively owns stocks and earns only capital income. Our study examines how various aspects of the Norwegian tax code might contribute to the low average effective tax rate among the wealthiest individuals. Key elements of our analysis include the wealth tax, the tax on distributed dividends, the effective average corporate tax rate, and the type of stocks (listed or nonlisted) the investor holds. We find that, throughout the period from 2004 to 2018, the average effective tax rate for Norwegian investors ranged from 14 to 21 percent, varying based on their efforts to minimize tax payments. Our study confirms that the Norwegian tax system is regressive at the top of the income distribution.
- 1 December 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Nordic Tax Journal
- Vol. 2024 (s1) , 72-82
Open AccessThe Taxation of Norway’s Richest 1
The purpose of this article is to reconcile findings from Aaberge et al. (2020), which show that the Norwegian tax system is regressive at the top (1 percent richest) of the income distribution. We approach this through the example of an investor who exclusively owns stocks and earns only capital income. Our study examines how various aspects of the Norwegian tax code might contribute to the low average effective tax rate among the wealthiest individuals. Key elements of our analysis include the wealth tax, the tax on distributed dividends, the effective average corporate tax rate, and the type of stocks (listed or nonlisted) the investor holds. We find that, throughout the period from 2004 to 2018, the average effective tax rate for Norwegian investors ranged from 14 to 21 percent, varying based on their efforts to minimize tax payments. Our study confirms that the Norwegian tax system is regressive at the top of the income distribution.
- Open Access
- 31 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 145, 103837
The global minimum tax raises more revenues than you think, or much less
- 31 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 145, 103837
Open AccessThe global minimum tax raises more revenues than you think, or much less
- Open Access
- 15 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 31 (4) , 935-952
The economics of the global minimum tax
This paper shows that OECD’s Pillar Two may increase employment and investment in low-tax countries due to the Substance-based Income Exclusion (SBIE). The SBIE allows to tax-deduct payroll costs and user costs of tangible assets twice from the tax base of the top-up tax owed by subsidiaries in low-tax countries. Consequently, it implies that a 15% minimum corporate tax for low-taxed subsidiaries is not achieved if the SBIE is positive. We show that Pillar Two dampens tax-motivated transfer pricing, but changes the employment, investment and import incentives, and that for a sufficiently large cost share of labor and/or capital, the SBIE is equivalent to a production subsidy.
- 15 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 31 (4) , 935-952
Open AccessThe economics of the global minimum tax
This paper shows that OECD’s Pillar Two may increase employment and investment in low-tax countries due to the Substance-based Income Exclusion (SBIE). The SBIE allows to tax-deduct payroll costs and user costs of tangible assets twice from the tax base of the top-up tax owed by subsidiaries in low-tax countries. Consequently, it implies that a 15% minimum corporate tax for low-taxed subsidiaries is not achieved if the SBIE is positive. We show that Pillar Two dampens tax-motivated transfer pricing, but changes the employment, investment and import incentives, and that for a sufficiently large cost share of labor and/or capital, the SBIE is equivalent to a production subsidy.
- 9 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 31 (1) , 243-261
Transfer pricing under global adoption of destination-based cash-flow taxation
- 9 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 31 (1) , 243-261
Transfer pricing under global adoption of destination-based cash-flow taxation
- Open Access
- 3 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
The Economics of the Global Minimum Tax1
This paper shows that the OECD inclusive framework of Pillar Two fails to implement the claimed 15% minimum corporate tax for subsidiaries of multinational corporations. The reason is that the Substance-based Income Exclusion of Pillar Two allows to tax-deduct payroll costs and user costs of intangible assets twice from the tax base of the top-up tax. Employing a standard multinational firm model, we show that Pillar Two dampens tax motivated transfer pricing, but changes the employment, investment and import incentives. For a sufficiently large cost share of labor and/or capital, the Substance-based Income Exclusion is equivalent to a production subsidy. Keywords: Corporate taxation, BEPS, Pillar~Two, minimum tax. JEL Classification: F23, F55, H25, H73.
- 3 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessThe Economics of the Global Minimum Tax1
This paper shows that the OECD inclusive framework of Pillar Two fails to implement the claimed 15% minimum corporate tax for subsidiaries of multinational corporations. The reason is that the Substance-based Income Exclusion of Pillar Two allows to tax-deduct payroll costs and user costs of intangible assets twice from the tax base of the top-up tax. Employing a standard multinational firm model, we show that Pillar Two dampens tax motivated transfer pricing, but changes the employment, investment and import incentives. For a sufficiently large cost share of labor and/or capital, the Substance-based Income Exclusion is equivalent to a production subsidy. Keywords: Corporate taxation, BEPS, Pillar~Two, minimum tax. JEL Classification: F23, F55, H25, H73.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Economics of the Global Minimum Tax
This paper shows that the OECD inclusive framework of Pillar Two fails to implement the claimed 15% minimum corporate tax for all subsidiaries of multinational corporations that are not shell companies. The reason is that the Substance-based Income Exclusion of Pillar Two allows to tax-deduct payroll costs and user costs of intangible assets twice from the tax base of the top-up tax. Employing a standard multinational firm model, we show that Pillar Two changes the employment, investment and import incentives. For a sufficiently large cost share of labor and/or capital, the Substance-based Income Exclusion is equivalent to a production subsidy.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Economics of the Global Minimum Tax
This paper shows that the OECD inclusive framework of Pillar Two fails to implement the claimed 15% minimum corporate tax for all subsidiaries of multinational corporations that are not shell companies. The reason is that the Substance-based Income Exclusion of Pillar Two allows to tax-deduct payroll costs and user costs of intangible assets twice from the tax base of the top-up tax. Employing a standard multinational firm model, we show that Pillar Two changes the employment, investment and import incentives. For a sufficiently large cost share of labor and/or capital, the Substance-based Income Exclusion is equivalent to a production subsidy.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Global Minimum Tax Raises More Revenues than You Think, or Much Less
The OECD’s proposal for a global minimum tax (GMT) of 15% aims for a reversal of a decades-long race to the bottom of corporate tax rates driven by competition over real investments and profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. We study the revenue effects of the GMT by focusing on the induced strategic tax setting effects. The direct effect of the GMT is a reduction in profit shifting, which has a positive effect on revenues in high-tax countries as their tax base grows, and makes higher taxes attractive. A secondary effect, however, is that the value of attracting real foreign investments increases, which intensifies tax competition. We argue that the revenue effects of the GMT depend on the instruments governments use to attract firms. With endogenous corporate tax rates, revenues in non-havens increase if initially tax competition among non-havens is fierce. By contrast, when governments compete via lump sum subsidies, the revenue gains from less profit shifting are exactly offset by higher subsidies.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Global Minimum Tax Raises More Revenues than You Think, or Much Less
The OECD’s proposal for a global minimum tax (GMT) of 15% aims for a reversal of a decades-long race to the bottom of corporate tax rates driven by competition over real investments and profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. We study the revenue effects of the GMT by focusing on the induced strategic tax setting effects. The direct effect of the GMT is a reduction in profit shifting, which has a positive effect on revenues in high-tax countries as their tax base grows, and makes higher taxes attractive. A secondary effect, however, is that the value of attracting real foreign investments increases, which intensifies tax competition. We argue that the revenue effects of the GMT depend on the instruments governments use to attract firms. With endogenous corporate tax rates, revenues in non-havens increase if initially tax competition among non-havens is fierce. By contrast, when governments compete via lump sum subsidies, the revenue gains from less profit shifting are exactly offset by higher subsidies.
- Open Access
- 14 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 29 (4) , 873-889
Investor asset valuation under a wealth tax and a capital income tax
We study how a capital income tax and a wealth tax affect an investor's valuation of a company's stock in an efficient international capital market. Using a one-period model, a model of infinite horizon where the asset generates a future cash flow that is a martingale, and a finite horizon model where we abandon the martingale assumption, we find that a wealth tax and/or a capital income tax do not lead investors to value an investment differently from untaxed investors. Investors who seek a higher pre-tax rate of return due to capital taxes harm their own wealth.
- 14 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 29 (4) , 873-889
Open AccessInvestor asset valuation under a wealth tax and a capital income tax
We study how a capital income tax and a wealth tax affect an investor's valuation of a company's stock in an efficient international capital market. Using a one-period model, a model of infinite horizon where the asset generates a future cash flow that is a martingale, and a finite horizon model where we abandon the martingale assumption, we find that a wealth tax and/or a capital income tax do not lead investors to value an investment differently from untaxed investors. Investors who seek a higher pre-tax rate of return due to capital taxes harm their own wealth.