Héctor Jasso-Fuentes
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Héctor Jasso-Fuentes has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Onésimo Hernández-Lerma
Mathematics Department CINVESTAV-IPN A. Postal 14-740 07000 Mexico City Mexico
5 shared publications - Gladys Denisse Salgado Suárez
Department of Mathematics, CINVESTAV-IPN, Mexico City, Mexico
4 shared publications - Beatris Adriana Escobedo-Trujillo
Universidad Veracruzana
3 shared publications - José Daniel López-Barrientos
Facultad de Ciencias Actuariales, Universidad Anáhuac México, Naucalpan de Juárez 52786, Mexico
3 shared publications - Alain Bensoussan
International Center for Decision and Risk Analysis Naveen Jindal School of Management University of Texas at Dallas
2 shared publications Armando F. Mendoza-Pérez
Facultad de Ciencias en Física y Matemáticas, UNACH, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Mexico
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Control
- Vol. 92
Some extensions on Markov decision processes with discounted AVaR criterion
- 2 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Control
- Vol. 92
Open AccessSome extensions on Markov decision processes with discounted AVaR criterion
- 2 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 743-759
Potential Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution
- 2 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 743-759
Potential Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution
- Open Access
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- p. 1-32
Infinite Horizon Potential Difference Games
This paper concerns a class of deterministic infinite-horizon noncooperative difference (or discrete-time) games with discounted payoffs. Our main objective is to give conditions under which these are potential games . Hence, for each game in this class, there is an optimal control problem (OCP) whose optimal solutions are Nash equilibria for the given game. To this end, we propose an algorithm that provides first-order and separability conditions on the payoff’s stage reward functions, guaranteeing that a given function, which determines the corresponding OCP, is a potential function for the game. We show that for some difference games, these first-order conditions guarantee that the open-loop structure of the game’s Nash equilibria is contained in the open-loop structure of optimal solutions of the OCP determined by the potential. We also show that considering feedback controls instead of open-loop policies significantly reduces the classes of games that can be shown to be potential.
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- p. 1-32
Open AccessInfinite Horizon Potential Difference Games
This paper concerns a class of deterministic infinite-horizon noncooperative difference (or discrete-time) games with discounted payoffs. Our main objective is to give conditions under which these are potential games . Hence, for each game in this class, there is an optimal control problem (OCP) whose optimal solutions are Nash equilibria for the given game. To this end, we propose an algorithm that provides first-order and separability conditions on the payoff’s stage reward functions, guaranteeing that a given function, which determines the corresponding OCP, is a potential function for the game. We show that for some difference games, these first-order conditions guarantee that the open-loop structure of the game’s Nash equilibria is contained in the open-loop structure of optimal solutions of the OCP determined by the potential. We also show that considering feedback controls instead of open-loop policies significantly reduces the classes of games that can be shown to be potential.
- 26 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Finance
- Vol. 22 (1) , 7
Group survival probability under contagion in microlending
- 26 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Finance
- Vol. 22 (1) , 7
Group survival probability under contagion in microlending
- 1 January 2026
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Mathematical Control and Related Fields
- Vol. 20, 50-93
Discrete-time minimax hybrid control with cost constraints
This paper addresses a discrete-time optimal control problem under the worst-case scenario for the controller, where its control policies are subject to specific restrictions at defined costs. The system dynamics follows a hybrid evolution, incorporating both regular and impulsive sub-dynamics that drive the state through time. The goal is to minimize a total cost criterion in the worst-case scenario, with costs discounted over time by a state-action-dependent discount factor that can reach the values of zero or one at certain points. The problem is approached through an auxiliary family of unrestricted minimax control problems, each indexed by a particular parameter. For each member of this family, we determine the optimal solution, and then seek the "best" parameter that aligns the unrestricted problem with the original one. This alignment ensures that the optimal solutions for the unrestricted problems also apply to the restricted version. To illustrate our theory, we provide an example based on a transboundary pollution accumulation problem.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Mathematical Control and Related Fields
- Vol. 20, 50-93
Discrete-time minimax hybrid control with cost constraints
This paper addresses a discrete-time optimal control problem under the worst-case scenario for the controller, where its control policies are subject to specific restrictions at defined costs. The system dynamics follows a hybrid evolution, incorporating both regular and impulsive sub-dynamics that drive the state through time. The goal is to minimize a total cost criterion in the worst-case scenario, with costs discounted over time by a state-action-dependent discount factor that can reach the values of zero or one at certain points. The problem is approached through an auxiliary family of unrestricted minimax control problems, each indexed by a particular parameter. For each member of this family, we determine the optimal solution, and then seek the "best" parameter that aligns the unrestricted problem with the original one. This alignment ensures that the optimal solutions for the unrestricted problems also apply to the restricted version. To illustrate our theory, we provide an example based on a transboundary pollution accumulation problem.
- Open Access
- 21 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 16 (4) , 1-36
Minimax Equilibria of Discrete-Time Hybrid Markov Games
This paper studies a discrete-time dynamic stochastic game featuring two players: a Leader (Player 1) and a Follower (Player 2), distinguished by its hybrid nature. Specifically, the system’s dynamics adhere to a Markovian-like property, further divided into two sub-dynamics: one regular and the other impulsive, both exerting influence on state evolution. Moreover, players are equipped with two action types: regular and impulsive. The activation of each sub-dynamics depends on the chosen action type. The follower seeks a strategy, conceptualized as a sequence of actions, aimed at maximizing a specified infinite-horizon discounted payoff criterion, where the discount factor is contingent upon the history of state-action pairs. Conversely, the leader aims to minimize such a payoff through its strategy, giving rise to the concept of a minimax equilibrium. Our analysis hinges upon the dynamic programming method, which enables us to (i) characterize the optimal value function as a solution to certain dynamic programming equations and (ii) establish the existence of an optimal minimax equilibrium. We conclude by presenting the application of our findings through a pollution management scenario involving multiple contingency levels often encountered by foreign industries or companies (followers) operating within a particular country (leader).
- 21 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 16 (4) , 1-36
Open AccessMinimax Equilibria of Discrete-Time Hybrid Markov Games
This paper studies a discrete-time dynamic stochastic game featuring two players: a Leader (Player 1) and a Follower (Player 2), distinguished by its hybrid nature. Specifically, the system’s dynamics adhere to a Markovian-like property, further divided into two sub-dynamics: one regular and the other impulsive, both exerting influence on state evolution. Moreover, players are equipped with two action types: regular and impulsive. The activation of each sub-dynamics depends on the chosen action type. The follower seeks a strategy, conceptualized as a sequence of actions, aimed at maximizing a specified infinite-horizon discounted payoff criterion, where the discount factor is contingent upon the history of state-action pairs. Conversely, the leader aims to minimize such a payoff through its strategy, giving rise to the concept of a minimax equilibrium. Our analysis hinges upon the dynamic programming method, which enables us to (i) characterize the optimal value function as a solution to certain dynamic programming equations and (ii) establish the existence of an optimal minimax equilibrium. We conclude by presenting the application of our findings through a pollution management scenario involving multiple contingency levels often encountered by foreign industries or companies (followers) operating within a particular country (leader).
- Open Access
- 24 June 2025
- Published by EDP Sciences in ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations
- Vol. 31, 53
Optimal stopping problems with constraints for continuous-time general Markov processes
In this work, we consider an optimal stopping time problem with a restriction that requires the stopping times to occur only when a given signal is observed. The dynamic of the stopping problem evolves as a continuous-time Markov process whose state space is a subset of a Polish space, whereas the signal is modeled by a piecewise deterministic Markov process, both processes are assumed to be independent of each other. To solve the problem, we employ the well-known discrete-time optimal control theory. In particular, we characterize the value function as the solution of a certain dynamic programming equation related to the discrete-time model and demonstrate the existence of an optimal stopping time through this equation. Our technique extends previous works that use more restrictive conditions on the state space of the process. As a byproduct, we intend to solve optimal stopping problems for a wider family of Markov processes.
- 24 June 2025
- Published by EDP Sciences in ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations
- Vol. 31, 53
Open AccessOptimal stopping problems with constraints for continuous-time general Markov processes
In this work, we consider an optimal stopping time problem with a restriction that requires the stopping times to occur only when a given signal is observed. The dynamic of the stopping problem evolves as a continuous-time Markov process whose state space is a subset of a Polish space, whereas the signal is modeled by a piecewise deterministic Markov process, both processes are assumed to be independent of each other. To solve the problem, we employ the well-known discrete-time optimal control theory. In particular, we characterize the value function as the solution of a certain dynamic programming equation related to the discrete-time model and demonstrate the existence of an optimal stopping time through this equation. Our technique extends previous works that use more restrictive conditions on the state space of the process. As a byproduct, we intend to solve optimal stopping problems for a wider family of Markov processes.
- Open Access
- 31 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-17
Potential Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution
- 31 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-17
Open AccessPotential Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution
- Open Access
- 25 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Applied Mathematics & Optimization
- Vol. 90 (3) , 1-40
Discrete-Time Hybrid Control Processes with Unbounded Costs
This paper extends the results provided in Jasso-Fuentes et al. (Appl Math Optim 81(2):409–441, 2020b) and Jasso-Fuentes et al. (Pure Appl Funct Anal 9(3):675–704, 2024) regarding the study of discrete-time hybrid stochastic models with general spaces and total discounted payoffs. This extension incorporates the handling of negative and/or unbounded costs per stage. In particular, it encompasses interesting applications, such as scenarios where the controller optimizes net costs, social welfare costs, or distances between points. These situations arise when assumptions of both non-negativeness and boundedness on the cost per stage do not apply. Our proposal relies on Lyapunov-like conditions, enabling, among other aspects, the finiteness of the value function and the existence of solutions to the associated dynamic programming equation. This equation is crucial for deriving optimal control policies. To illustrate our theory, we include an example in inventory-manufacturing management, highlighting its evident hybrid nature.
- 25 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Applied Mathematics & Optimization
- Vol. 90 (3) , 1-40
Open AccessDiscrete-Time Hybrid Control Processes with Unbounded Costs
This paper extends the results provided in Jasso-Fuentes et al. (Appl Math Optim 81(2):409–441, 2020b) and Jasso-Fuentes et al. (Pure Appl Funct Anal 9(3):675–704, 2024) regarding the study of discrete-time hybrid stochastic models with general spaces and total discounted payoffs. This extension incorporates the handling of negative and/or unbounded costs per stage. In particular, it encompasses interesting applications, such as scenarios where the controller optimizes net costs, social welfare costs, or distances between points. These situations arise when assumptions of both non-negativeness and boundedness on the cost per stage do not apply. Our proposal relies on Lyapunov-like conditions, enabling, among other aspects, the finiteness of the value function and the existence of solutions to the associated dynamic programming equation. This equation is crucial for deriving optimal control policies. To illustrate our theory, we include an example in inventory-manufacturing management, highlighting its evident hybrid nature.
- Open Access
- 21 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Discrete Event Dynamic Systems
- Vol. 34 (4) , 659-687
Discrete-time hybrid control with risk-sensitive discounted costs
This paper studies discrete-time hybrid control problems where the controller’s payoff function follows a risk-sensitive discounted model. The associated discount factor can depend on state and action variables, which can even take values of zero or one. We prove the existence of optimal control policies under two different hypotheses. The following technique is the dynamic programming method, where we characterize the minimum cost as the solution of the so-called dynamic programming equations and find the above optimal policies through these equations. We illustrate our theory with practical examples involving inventory-manufacturing systems, and pollution management.
- 21 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Discrete Event Dynamic Systems
- Vol. 34 (4) , 659-687
Open AccessDiscrete-time hybrid control with risk-sensitive discounted costs
This paper studies discrete-time hybrid control problems where the controller’s payoff function follows a risk-sensitive discounted model. The associated discount factor can depend on state and action variables, which can even take values of zero or one. We prove the existence of optimal control policies under two different hypotheses. The following technique is the dynamic programming method, where we characterize the minimum cost as the solution of the so-called dynamic programming equations and find the above optimal policies through these equations. We illustrate our theory with practical examples involving inventory-manufacturing systems, and pollution management.