TNThomas Nadelhoffer

Thomas Nadelhoffer

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Thomas Nadelhoffer has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Moral Responsibility: An Introduction

    by Thomas Nadelhoffer, Andrew Monroe

    ExtractThomas Nadelhoffer Andrew Monroe There is a storied history in philosophy of looking to science to shed light on philosophical problems. Those working in experimental philosophy take this interdisciplinary approach one step further. Rather than merely appealing to the data collected by scientists, experimental philosophers also actively take part in the collection and analysis of data and then try to show that their findings are philosophically probative. One need not be a professional philosopher to be an experimental philosopher — as evidenced by the work of many of the esteemed contributors to this volume who are professional psychologists. One need only play a hand both in running the studies and in using the findings to contribute to a philosophical debate. In this way, experimental philosophy has helpfully blurred the line between philosophy and science. The work at these interdisciplinary cross-roads has been both fruitful and illuminating. Since the beginning of the...


  • Intuitions About Free Will and the Failure to Comprehend Determinism

    by Thomas Nadelhoffer, Samuel Murray, Elise Murry


  • Piercing the Smoke Screen: Dualism, Free Will, and Christianity

    by Samuel Murray, Elise Murray, Thomas Nadelhoffer

    Research on the folk psychology of free will suggests that people believe free will is incompatible with determinism and that human decision-making cannot be exhaustively characterized by physical processes. Some suggest that certain elements of Western cultural history, especially Christianity, have helped to entrench these beliefs in the folk conceptual economy. Thus, on the basis of this explanation, one should expect to find three things: (1) a significant correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free will, (2) that people with predominantly incompatibilist commitments are likely to exhibit stronger dualist beliefs than people with predominantly compatibilist commitments, and (3) people who self-identify as Christians are more likely to be dualists and incompatibilists than people who do not self-identify as Christians. We present the results of two studies (n = 378) that challenge two of these expectations. While we do find a significant correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free will, we found no significant difference in dualist tendencies between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Moreover, we found that self-identifying as Christian did not significantly predict preference for a particular metaphysical conception of free will. This calls into question assumptions about the relationship between beliefs about free will, dualism, and Christianity.


  • Folk psychology and proximal intentions

    by Alfred Mele, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Maria Khoudary

    There is a longstanding debate in philosophy concerning the relationship between intention and intentional action. According to the Single Phenomenon View, while one need not intend to A in order to A intentionally, one nevertheless needs to have an A-relevant intention. This view has recently come under criticism by those who think that one can A intentionally without any relevant intention at all. On this view, neither distal nor proximal intentions are necessary for intentional action. In this paper we present the results of two studies that explore folk ascriptions of proximal intentions and intentional actions in garden-variety, non-moral cases. Our findings suggest a very tight relationship between the two. We argue that the results from these two studies cohere with the Single Phenomenon View and give theorists who reject this view on conceptual grounds reason to worry.


  • Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will

    by Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Shepard, Damien L. Crone, Jim A.C. Everett, Brian D. Earp, Neil Levy


  • Folk intuitions and the conditional ability to do otherwise

    by Thomas Nadelhoffer, Siyuan Yin, Rose Graves

    In a series of preregistered studies, we explore (a) the difference between people’s intuitions about indeterministic scenarios and their intuitions about deterministic scenarios; (b) the difference between people’s intuitions about indeterministic scenarios and their intuitions about neuro-deterministic scenarios (i.e., scenarios where the determinism is described at the neurological level); (c) the difference between people’s intuitions about neutral scenarios (e.g., walking a dog in the park) and their intuitions about negatively valenced scenarios (e.g., murdering a stranger); and (d) the difference between people’s intuitions about free will and responsibility in response to first-person scenarios and third-person scenarios. We predicted that once we focused participants’ attention on the two different abilities to do otherwise, available to agents in indeterministic and deterministic scenarios, their intuitions would support natural incompatibilism – the view that laypersons tend to judge that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. This prediction is borne out by our findings.


  • Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

    by Thomas Nadelhoffer, David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter, Shaun Nichols

    The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re‐examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.


  • Response to Schrader & Tangney and Snow Commentaries

    by Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jennifer Cole Wright

    Philosophers have discussed virtue and character since Socrates, but many traditional views have been challenged by recent findings in psychology and neuroscien...

  • Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the Stage

    by Thomas Nadelhoffer, Stephanos Bibas, Scott Grafton, Kent A. Kiehl, Andrew Mansfield, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Gazzaniga

    In this paper, our goal is to (a) survey some of the legal contexts within which violence risk assessment already plays a prominent role, (b) explore whether developments in neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our ability to predict violence, and (c) discuss whether neuropredictive models of violence create any unique legal or moral problems above and beyond the well worn problems already associated with prediction more generally. In “Violence Risk Assessment and the Law”, we briefly examine the role currently played by predictions of violence in three high stakes legal contexts: capital sentencing (“Violence Risk Assessment and Capital Sentencing”), civil commitment hearings (“Violence Risk Assessment and Civil Commitment”), and “sexual predator” statutes (“Violence Risk Assessment and Sexual Predator Statutes”). In “Clinical vs. Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment”, we briefly examine the distinction between traditional clinical methods of predicting violence and more recently developed actuarial methods, exemplified by the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) software created by John Monahan and colleagues as part of the MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence [1]. In “The Neural Correlates of Psychopathy”, we explore what neuroscience currently tells us about the neural correlates of violence, using the recent neuroscientific research on psychopathy as our focus. We also discuss some recent advances in both data collection (“Cutting-Edge Data Collection: Genetically Informed Neuroimaging”) and data analysis (“Cutting-Edge Data Analysis: Pattern Classification”) that we believe will play an important role when it comes to future neuroscientific research on violence. In “The Potential Promise of Neuroprediction”, we discuss whether neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our ability to predict future violence. Finally, in “The Potential Perils of Neuroprediction”, we explore some potential evidentiary (“Evidentiary Issues”), constitutional (“Constitutional Issues”), and moral (“Moral Issues”) issues that may arise in the context of the neuroprediction of violence.