Dermot Hodson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Dermot Hodson has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Imelda Maher
University College Dublin
23 shared publications - David Howarth
Department of Social Sciences, University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
20 shared publications - Lukas Spielberger
Department of Social Sciences, University of Luxembourg – Belval Campus , Esch-sur-Alzette , Luxembourg
19 shared publications Iacopo Mugnai
18 shared publicationsIain Begg
London School of Economics
12 shared publicationsBrian Ardy
London South Bank University
11 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Political Economy
- p. 1-20
The Bank for International Settlements innovation hub: infrastructural power or innovation theatre?
‘The question, when we see all these technological developments across the world, is whether central banks should just observe or be more active and actually influence developments’. Cecilia Skings...
- 9 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Political Economy
- p. 1-20
Open AccessThe Bank for International Settlements innovation hub: infrastructural power or innovation theatre?
‘The question, when we see all these technological developments across the world, is whether central banks should just observe or be more active and actually influence developments’. Cecilia Skings...
- 25 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Political Economy
- p. 1-18
Introduction: five vectors of FinTech disruption
- 25 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Political Economy
- p. 1-18
Introduction: five vectors of FinTech disruption
- Open Access
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 92-109
The EIB
The European Investment Bank (EIB) went from being a small regional development bank in the 1960s to the world’s largest multilateral lender by the 2020s. In so doing, it shifted its focus from less developed regions to projects focused on energy and the environment, and stepped up support for small and medium-sized enterprises. Member states with high borrowing costs pushed the EIB to do more during this period, but all shareholders were at pains to ensure that the Bank was adequately capitalized, including after Brexit. This chapter describes the EIB’s evolution as the product of layering, conversion, and displacement, as well as intergovernmental bargaining over successive capital increases. From the 1990s, it notes, empowering the EIB, proved much less contentious than extending the Commission’s borrowing powers.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 92-109
Open AccessThe EIB
The European Investment Bank (EIB) went from being a small regional development bank in the 1960s to the world’s largest multilateral lender by the 2020s. In so doing, it shifted its focus from less developed regions to projects focused on energy and the environment, and stepped up support for small and medium-sized enterprises. Member states with high borrowing costs pushed the EIB to do more during this period, but all shareholders were at pains to ensure that the Bank was adequately capitalized, including after Brexit. This chapter describes the EIB’s evolution as the product of layering, conversion, and displacement, as well as intergovernmental bargaining over successive capital increases. From the 1990s, it notes, empowering the EIB, proved much less contentious than extending the Commission’s borrowing powers.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 38-54
The European Community’s First Borrowing Instruments (1954‒69)
This chapter explores the European Community’s early borrowing activities. It shows how institutional memory over the League of Nations loans and discussions over a European Investment Fund within the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation left their mark on the design of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. It explores Jean Monnet’s efforts as president of the High Authority to raise a loan from the Export-Import Bank of Washington, the European Investment Bank’s initial focus on regional development in Italy, and attempts to unlock American financing for the construction of nuclear power plants in Western Europe. This foundational period for European-level borrowing was driven by layering and a delicate intergovernmental bargain between member states with high and low borrowing costs.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 38-54
Open AccessThe European Community’s First Borrowing Instruments (1954‒69)
This chapter explores the European Community’s early borrowing activities. It shows how institutional memory over the League of Nations loans and discussions over a European Investment Fund within the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation left their mark on the design of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. It explores Jean Monnet’s efforts as president of the High Authority to raise a loan from the Export-Import Bank of Washington, the European Investment Bank’s initial focus on regional development in Italy, and attempts to unlock American financing for the construction of nuclear power plants in Western Europe. This foundational period for European-level borrowing was driven by layering and a delicate intergovernmental bargain between member states with high and low borrowing costs.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 129-145
Borrowing Before and After the COVID-19 Pandemic
The EU’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was heralded as a ‘Hamiltonian moment’ for the EU. However, such accounts overlook the extent to which the European instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility built on earlier borrowing instruments. Member states with high borrowing costs urged the EU to raise funds at scale to contain the economic effects of the coronavirus and member states with low borrowing costs preferred this arrangement to bilateral support or higher contributions to the Union’s budget. Eurosceptic sentiment towards the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) saw member states turn to the Commission as a borrower but only on the understanding that the Recovery and Resilience Facility would be strictly temporary and subject to proportional guarantees rather than joint and several liability.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 129-145
Open AccessBorrowing Before and After the COVID-19 Pandemic
The EU’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was heralded as a ‘Hamiltonian moment’ for the EU. However, such accounts overlook the extent to which the European instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility built on earlier borrowing instruments. Member states with high borrowing costs urged the EU to raise funds at scale to contain the economic effects of the coronavirus and member states with low borrowing costs preferred this arrangement to bilateral support or higher contributions to the Union’s budget. Eurosceptic sentiment towards the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) saw member states turn to the Commission as a borrower but only on the understanding that the Recovery and Resilience Facility would be strictly temporary and subject to proportional guarantees rather than joint and several liability.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 179-197
Conclusion
The EU’s evolution as a borrower has been driven by a process of gradual institutional change and hard bargaining between member states with high and low borrowing costs. Since the 1990s, the design of European-level borrowing instruments and institutions has also been shaped by concerns over the EU’s legitimacy. This chapter puts forward a range of ideas for strengthening the accountability of European-level borrowers, including a parliamentary charter for European-level borrowers and more robust complaints mechanisms, and argues that the EU, though it is not bound by past institutional choices, is likely to borrow at scale in the coming years.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 179-197
Open AccessConclusion
The EU’s evolution as a borrower has been driven by a process of gradual institutional change and hard bargaining between member states with high and low borrowing costs. Since the 1990s, the design of European-level borrowing instruments and institutions has also been shaped by concerns over the EU’s legitimacy. This chapter puts forward a range of ideas for strengthening the accountability of European-level borrowers, including a parliamentary charter for European-level borrowers and more robust complaints mechanisms, and argues that the EU, though it is not bound by past institutional choices, is likely to borrow at scale in the coming years.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 55-72
The Rise and Fall of Commission Borrowing
During the 1970s, the European Commission was given responsibility for three new borrowing instruments: the Community Loan Mechanism, the Euratom Loan Facility, and the New Community Instrument. Although these instruments played a key part in the European Community’s response to the first and second oil shocks, member states had second thoughts in the early 1990s about empowering the Commission as a borrower. This chapter finds evidence of layering, displacement, and drift in relation to supranational borrowing alongside hard bargaining between member states with high and low borrowing costs. It also observes a growing reluctance to delegate powers to the Commission as the permissive consensus over European integration faded.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 55-72
Open AccessThe Rise and Fall of Commission Borrowing
During the 1970s, the European Commission was given responsibility for three new borrowing instruments: the Community Loan Mechanism, the Euratom Loan Facility, and the New Community Instrument. Although these instruments played a key part in the European Community’s response to the first and second oil shocks, member states had second thoughts in the early 1990s about empowering the Commission as a borrower. This chapter finds evidence of layering, displacement, and drift in relation to supranational borrowing alongside hard bargaining between member states with high and low borrowing costs. It also observes a growing reluctance to delegate powers to the Commission as the permissive consensus over European integration faded.