Tania Lombrozo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Tania Lombrozo has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel A. Wilkenfeld
University of Pittsburgh School of Nursing
3 shared publications - Edouard Machery
Department of History and Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh Pennsylvania USA
2 shared publications - Joshua Knobe
Yale University
2 shared publications - Adriane M. Soehner
Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, USA
1 shared publication - Allison G. Harvey
University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, USA
1 shared publication Anastasia Thanukos
University of California
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 197 (6) , 2565-2592
Explanation classification depends on understanding: extending the epistemic side-effect effect
- 6 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 197 (6) , 2565-2592
Explanation classification depends on understanding: extending the epistemic side-effect effect
- 1 February 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Cognition and Development
- Vol. 19 (2) , 220-232
Young children’s learning and generalization of teleological and mechanistic explanations
Young children often endorse explanations of the natural world that appeal to functions or purpose—for example, that rocks are pointy so animals can scratch on them. By contrast, most Western-educated adults reject such explanations. What accounts for this change? We investigated 4- to 5-year-old children’s ability to generalize the form of an explanation from examples by presenting them with novel teleological explanations, novel mechanistic explanations, or no explanations for 5 nonliving natural objects. We then asked children to explain novel instances of the same objects and novel kinds of objects. We found that children were able to learn and generalize explanations of both types, suggesting an ability to draw generalizations over the form of an explanation. We also found that teleological and mechanistic explanations were learned and generalized equally well, suggesting that if a domain-general teleological bias exists, it does not manifest as a bias in learning or generalization.
- 1 February 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Cognition and Development
- Vol. 19 (2) , 220-232
Young children’s learning and generalization of teleological and mechanistic explanations
Young children often endorse explanations of the natural world that appeal to functions or purpose—for example, that rocks are pointy so animals can scratch on them. By contrast, most Western-educated adults reject such explanations. What accounts for this change? We investigated 4- to 5-year-old children’s ability to generalize the form of an explanation from examples by presenting them with novel teleological explanations, novel mechanistic explanations, or no explanations for 5 nonliving natural objects. We then asked children to explain novel instances of the same objects and novel kinds of objects. We found that children were able to learn and generalize explanations of both types, suggesting an ability to draw generalizations over the form of an explanation. We also found that teleological and mechanistic explanations were learned and generalized equally well, suggesting that if a domain-general teleological bias exists, it does not manifest as a bias in learning or generalization.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 October 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 20 (10) , 748-759
Explanatory Preferences Shape Learning and Inference
- 1 October 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 20 (10) , 748-759
Top Cited PapersExplanatory Preferences Shape Learning and Inference
- 8 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Science & Education
- Vol. 24 (9-10) , 1059-1077
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) Versus Explaining for the Best Inference (EBI)
- 8 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Science & Education
- Vol. 24 (9-10) , 1059-1077
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) Versus Explaining for the Best Inference (EBI)
- Open Access
- 11 September 2014
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Vol. 8, 700
Explanation and inference: mechanistic and functional explanations guide property generalization
The ability to generalize from the known to the unknown is central to learning and inference. Two experiments explore the relationship between how a property is explained and how that property is generalized to novel species and artifacts. The experiments contrast the consequences of explaining a property mechanistically, by appeal to parts and processes, with the consequences of explaining the property functionally, by appeal to functions and goals. The findings suggest that properties that are explained functionally are more likely to be generalized on the basis of shared functions, with a weaker relationship between mechanistic explanations and generalization on the basis of shared parts and processes. The influence of explanation type on generalization holds even though all participants are provided with the same mechanistic and functional information, and whether an explanation type is freely generated (Experiment 1), experimentally provided (Experiment 2), or experimentally induced (Experiment 2). The experiments also demonstrate that explanations and generalizations of a particular type (mechanistic or functional) can be experimentally induced by providing sample explanations of that type, with a comparable effect when the sample explanations come from the same domain or from a different domains. These results suggest that explanations serve as a guide to generalization, and contribute to a growing body of work supporting the value of distinguishing mechanistic and functional explanations.
- 11 September 2014
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Vol. 8, 700
Open AccessExplanation and inference: mechanistic and functional explanations guide property generalization
The ability to generalize from the known to the unknown is central to learning and inference. Two experiments explore the relationship between how a property is explained and how that property is generalized to novel species and artifacts. The experiments contrast the consequences of explaining a property mechanistically, by appeal to parts and processes, with the consequences of explaining the property functionally, by appeal to functions and goals. The findings suggest that properties that are explained functionally are more likely to be generalized on the basis of shared functions, with a weaker relationship between mechanistic explanations and generalization on the basis of shared parts and processes. The influence of explanation type on generalization holds even though all participants are provided with the same mechanistic and functional information, and whether an explanation type is freely generated (Experiment 1), experimentally provided (Experiment 2), or experimentally induced (Experiment 2). The experiments also demonstrate that explanations and generalizations of a particular type (mechanistic or functional) can be experimentally induced by providing sample explanations of that type, with a comparable effect when the sample explanations come from the same domain or from a different domains. These results suggest that explanations serve as a guide to generalization, and contribute to a growing body of work supporting the value of distinguishing mechanistic and functional explanations.
- Open Access
Evaluating computational models of explanation using human judgments
We evaluate four computational models of explanation in Bayesian networks by comparing model predictions to human judgments. In two experiments, we present human participants with causal structures for which the models make divergent predictions and either solicit the best explanation for an observed event (Experiment 1) or have participants rate provided explanations for an observed event (Experiment 2). Across two versions of two causal structures and across both experiments, we find that the Causal Explanation Tree and Most Relevant Explanation models provide better fits to human data than either Most Probable Explanation or Explanation Tree models. We identify strengths and shortcomings of these models and what they can reveal about human explanation. We conclude by suggesting the value of pursuing computational and psychological investigations of explanation in parallel.
Open AccessEvaluating computational models of explanation using human judgments
We evaluate four computational models of explanation in Bayesian networks by comparing model predictions to human judgments. In two experiments, we present human participants with causal structures for which the models make divergent predictions and either solicit the best explanation for an observed event (Experiment 1) or have participants rate provided explanations for an observed event (Experiment 2). Across two versions of two causal structures and across both experiments, we find that the Causal Explanation Tree and Most Relevant Explanation models provide better fits to human data than either Most Probable Explanation or Explanation Tree models. We identify strengths and shortcomings of these models and what they can reveal about human explanation. We conclude by suggesting the value of pursuing computational and psychological investigations of explanation in parallel.
- 23 May 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Cognitive Therapy and Research
- Vol. 37 (5) , 1048-1057
‘Folk Theories’ About the Causes of Insomnia
The present study investigates ‘folk theories’ about the causes of insomnia. Participants with insomnia (n = 69) completed a qualitative and quantitative assessment of their folk theories. The qualitative assessment was to speak aloud for 1 min in response to: ‘What do you think causes your insomnia?’. The quantitative assessment involved completing the ‘Causal Attributions of My Insomnia Questionnaire’ (CAM-I), developed for this study. The three most common folk theories for both the causes of one’s own insomnia as well as insomnia in others were ‘emotions’, ‘thinking patterns’ and ‘sleep-related emotions’. Interventions targeting these factors were also perceived as most likely to be viable treatments. Seventy-five percent of the folk theories of insomnia investigated with the CAM-I were rated as more likely to be alleviated by a psychological versus a biological treatment. The results are consistent with research highlighting that folk theories are generally coherent and inform a range of judgments. Future research should focus on congruence of ‘folk theories’ between treatment providers and patients, and the role of folk theories in treatment choice, engagement, compliance and outcome.
- 23 May 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Cognitive Therapy and Research
- Vol. 37 (5) , 1048-1057
‘Folk Theories’ About the Causes of Insomnia
The present study investigates ‘folk theories’ about the causes of insomnia. Participants with insomnia (n = 69) completed a qualitative and quantitative assessment of their folk theories. The qualitative assessment was to speak aloud for 1 min in response to: ‘What do you think causes your insomnia?’. The quantitative assessment involved completing the ‘Causal Attributions of My Insomnia Questionnaire’ (CAM-I), developed for this study. The three most common folk theories for both the causes of one’s own insomnia as well as insomnia in others were ‘emotions’, ‘thinking patterns’ and ‘sleep-related emotions’. Interventions targeting these factors were also perceived as most likely to be viable treatments. Seventy-five percent of the folk theories of insomnia investigated with the CAM-I were rated as more likely to be alleviated by a psychological versus a biological treatment. The results are consistent with research highlighting that folk theories are generally coherent and inform a range of judgments. Future research should focus on congruence of ‘folk theories’ between treatment providers and patients, and the role of folk theories in treatment choice, engagement, compliance and outcome.
- 1 December 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 65 (4) , 457-485
Functions in biological kind classification
- 1 December 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 65 (4) , 457-485
Functions in biological kind classification
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 December 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 61 (4) , 303-332
Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions
- 1 December 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 61 (4) , 303-332
Top Cited PapersCausal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions