Dorothée Legrand
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Dorothée Legrand has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Perrine Ruby
2 shared publications- Joel Krueger
Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
1 shared publication - Susanne Ravn
University of Southern Denmark
1 shared publication - Thor Grünbaum
Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 February 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Neuropsychologia
- Vol. 48 (3) , 726-737
Subjective and physical dimensions of bodily self-consciousness, and their dis-integration in anorexia nervosa
- 1 February 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Neuropsychologia
- Vol. 48 (3) , 726-737
Subjective and physical dimensions of bodily self-consciousness, and their dis-integration in anorexia nervosa
- 5 August 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 8 (3) , 279-283
Dimensions of bodily subjectivity
- 5 August 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 8 (3) , 279-283
Dimensions of bodily subjectivity
- Top Cited Papers
- 16 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 8 (3) , 389-408
Perceiving subjectivity in bodily movement: The case of dancers
- 16 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 8 (3) , 389-408
Top Cited PapersPerceiving subjectivity in bodily movement: The case of dancers
- 1 January 2009
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
- Vol. 116 (1) , 252-282
What is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results.
The authors propose a paradigm shift in the investigation of the self. Synthesizing neuroimaging results from studies investigating the self, the authors first demonstrate that self-relatedness evaluation involves a wide cerebral network, labeled E-network, comprising the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, temporoparietal junction, and temporal poles. They further show that this E-network is also recruited during resting state, others' mind reading, memory recall, and reasoning. According to these data, (a) the profile of activation of the E-network demonstrates no preference for the self, and (b) the authors suggest that activity in this network can be explained by the involvement of cognitive processes common to all the tasks recruiting it: inferential processing and memory recall. On this basis, they conclude that standard ways to tackle the self by considering self-evaluation do not target the self in its specificity. Instead, they argue that self-specificity characterizes the subjective perspective, which is not intrinsically self-evaluative but rather relates any represented object to the representing subject. They further propose that such self-specific subject-object relation is anchored to the sensorimotor integration of efference with reafference (i.e., the motor command of the subject's action and its sensory consequence in the external world).
- 1 January 2009
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
- Vol. 116 (1) , 252-282
What is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results.
The authors propose a paradigm shift in the investigation of the self. Synthesizing neuroimaging results from studies investigating the self, the authors first demonstrate that self-relatedness evaluation involves a wide cerebral network, labeled E-network, comprising the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, temporoparietal junction, and temporal poles. They further show that this E-network is also recruited during resting state, others' mind reading, memory recall, and reasoning. According to these data, (a) the profile of activation of the E-network demonstrates no preference for the self, and (b) the authors suggest that activity in this network can be explained by the involvement of cognitive processes common to all the tasks recruiting it: inferential processing and memory recall. On this basis, they conclude that standard ways to tackle the self by considering self-evaluation do not target the self in its specificity. Instead, they argue that self-specificity characterizes the subjective perspective, which is not intrinsically self-evaluative but rather relates any represented object to the representing subject. They further propose that such self-specific subject-object relation is anchored to the sensorimotor integration of efference with reafference (i.e., the motor command of the subject's action and its sensory consequence in the external world).
- 21 November 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 8 (1) , 89-94
Two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’
- 21 November 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 8 (1) , 89-94
Two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’
- 29 July 1993
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 292-317
Neuro imaging the self?
This chapter examines the results of neuroimaging studies which investigated the cerebral correlates of ‘self’, ‘other’ representation, the resting state, reasoning, and memory recall. The results reveal that processing self-related contents, reading others' minds, and resting state recruit a wide common cortical network including the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and temporal poles. This chapter proposes that the self is primarily characterized by its first-person perspective and functionally determined by self-specifying processes.
- 29 July 1993
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 292-317
Neuro imaging the self?
This chapter examines the results of neuroimaging studies which investigated the cerebral correlates of ‘self’, ‘other’ representation, the resting state, reasoning, and memory recall. The results reveal that processing self-related contents, reading others' minds, and resting state recruit a wide common cortical network including the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and temporal poles. This chapter proposes that the self is primarily characterized by its first-person perspective and functionally determined by self-specifying processes.