Chris Reed
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Chris Reed has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Humberto Rolando Carrasco Blanc
Universidad Católica del Norte
2 shared publications Javier Maestre-Rodríguez
Maestre Abogados
2 shared publicationsJosé Sánchez-Oyarzún
Universidad Católica del Norte
2 shared publications- Kathryn A. Kleiman
American University
2 shared publications Margarita Valdés-Cortés
Universidad de Chile
2 shared publications- Clarice Marinho Martins
Communication Department, Catholic University of Pernambuco (UNICAP), Recife, Brasil
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 March 2026
- Published by Universidad Catolica del Norte - Chile
The Uniform domain name dispute resolution policy (UDRP): A comprehensive analysis of how it works and has a practical impact
This work provides a systematic examination of the international administrative framework designed to address abusive domain name registrations within the global Internet ecosystem. It analyzes the historical context of its creation, the collaborative governance model involving ICANN and WIPO, and the three cumulative elements required for a successful complaint: confusing similarity, lack of legitimate interest, and registration and use in bad faith. The study explores procedural stages from filing to implementation, highlighting the efficiency, accessibility, and international scope of the mechanism. It further evaluates its structural advantages—such as speed and cost-effectiveness—alongside its limitations, including restricted remedies, absence of binding precedent, and lack of an internal appeals system. By comparing this framework with litigation, the Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS), and country-code policies, the analysis situates it within a broader ecosystem of digital trademark protection tools. The work ultimately assesses its governance impact and its role in shaping best practices for intellectual property enforcement online.
- 17 March 2026
- Published by Universidad Catolica del Norte - Chile
Open AccessThe Uniform domain name dispute resolution policy (UDRP): A comprehensive analysis of how it works and has a practical impact
This work provides a systematic examination of the international administrative framework designed to address abusive domain name registrations within the global Internet ecosystem. It analyzes the historical context of its creation, the collaborative governance model involving ICANN and WIPO, and the three cumulative elements required for a successful complaint: confusing similarity, lack of legitimate interest, and registration and use in bad faith. The study explores procedural stages from filing to implementation, highlighting the efficiency, accessibility, and international scope of the mechanism. It further evaluates its structural advantages—such as speed and cost-effectiveness—alongside its limitations, including restricted remedies, absence of binding precedent, and lack of an internal appeals system. By comparing this framework with litigation, the Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS), and country-code policies, the analysis situates it within a broader ecosystem of digital trademark protection tools. The work ultimately assesses its governance impact and its role in shaping best practices for intellectual property enforcement online.
- 19 February 2026
- Published by Universidad Catolica del Norte - Chile
Domain name disputes: Understanding the problem
This educational resource introduces the technical and legal foundations of the Domain Name System (DNS) and the conflicts arising from its use. It explains the strategic importance of domain names in digital communication and commerce, and examines abusive registration practices such as opportunistic conduct, typographical imitation, and deceptive online behavior. Through the analysis of key cases before and after the adoption of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), it highlights tensions between trademark protection, freedom of expression, and legitimate use. The resource also addresses the role of ICANN and accredited providers in establishing an international administrative framework for resolving such conflicts, providing students with conceptual tools to understand the legal, economic, and regulatory implications of domain name use in a dynamic digital environment.
- 19 February 2026
- Published by Universidad Catolica del Norte - Chile
Domain name disputes: Understanding the problem
This educational resource introduces the technical and legal foundations of the Domain Name System (DNS) and the conflicts arising from its use. It explains the strategic importance of domain names in digital communication and commerce, and examines abusive registration practices such as opportunistic conduct, typographical imitation, and deceptive online behavior. Through the analysis of key cases before and after the adoption of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), it highlights tensions between trademark protection, freedom of expression, and legitimate use. The resource also addresses the role of ICANN and accredited providers in establishing an international administrative framework for resolving such conflicts, providing students with conceptual tools to understand the legal, economic, and regulatory implications of domain name use in a dynamic digital environment.
- Top Cited Papers
- 15 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Vol. 31 (1) , 133-167
Black is the new orange: how to determine AI liability
- 15 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Vol. 31 (1) , 133-167
Top Cited PapersBlack is the new orange: how to determine AI liability
- 6 August 2018
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 376 (2128) , 20170360
How should we regulate artificial intelligence?
Using artificial intelligence (AI) technology to replace human decision-making will inevitably create new risks whose consequences are unforeseeable. This naturally leads to calls for regulation, but I argue that it is too early to attempt a general system of AI regulation. Instead, we should work incrementally within the existing legal and regulatory schemes which allocate responsibility, and therefore liability, to persons. Where AI clearly creates risks which current law and regulation cannot deal with adequately, then new regulation will be needed. But in most cases, the current system can work effectively if the producers of AI technology can provide sufficient transparency in explaining how AI decisions are made. Transparency ex post can often be achieved through retrospective analysis of the technology's operations, and will be sufficient if the main goal is to compensate victims of incorrect decisions. Ex ante transparency is more challenging, and can limit the use of some AI technologies such as neural networks. It should only be demanded by regulation where the AI presents risks to fundamental rights, or where society needs reassuring that the technology can safely be used. Masterly inactivity in regulation is likely to achieve a better long-term solution than a rush to regulate in ignorance. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘The growing ubiquity of algorithms in society: implications, impacts and innovations'.
- 6 August 2018
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 376 (2128) , 20170360
How should we regulate artificial intelligence?
Using artificial intelligence (AI) technology to replace human decision-making will inevitably create new risks whose consequences are unforeseeable. This naturally leads to calls for regulation, but I argue that it is too early to attempt a general system of AI regulation. Instead, we should work incrementally within the existing legal and regulatory schemes which allocate responsibility, and therefore liability, to persons. Where AI clearly creates risks which current law and regulation cannot deal with adequately, then new regulation will be needed. But in most cases, the current system can work effectively if the producers of AI technology can provide sufficient transparency in explaining how AI decisions are made. Transparency ex post can often be achieved through retrospective analysis of the technology's operations, and will be sufficient if the main goal is to compensate victims of incorrect decisions. Ex ante transparency is more challenging, and can limit the use of some AI technologies such as neural networks. It should only be demanded by regulation where the AI presents risks to fundamental rights, or where society needs reassuring that the technology can safely be used. Masterly inactivity in regulation is likely to achieve a better long-term solution than a rush to regulate in ignorance. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘The growing ubiquity of algorithms in society: implications, impacts and innovations'.
- 2 May 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Law and Information Technology
- Vol. 26 (2) , 160-182
Beyond BitCoin—legal impurities and off-chain assets
Blockchain technology allows the creation of distributed ledgers. These distribute control among the players rather than requiring a centralized database, and so can reduce costs and speed-up transactions. However, when it is used for assets which exist outside the blockchain itself, an unmodified adoption of the technology would bypass legal and regulatory requirements which, for these kinds of assets, cannot be bypassed without fundamental change to the law. Building those requirements into any blockchain-based system introduces features which are not necessary for performing its core functions, and we call these ‘legal impurities’. The most important legal impurities required are those relating to identification of the parties, and introducing the ability of a trusted third party to make modifications to the ledger. Not only does introducing these legal impurities make fundamental changes to the concept behind blockchain, but it is also essential that they are implemented in ways which do not threaten the integrity of the blockchain as evidence. This article has been produced by members of the Microsoft Cloud Computing Research Centre, a collaboration between the Cloud Legal Project, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London and the Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge. The authors are grateful to members of the MCCRC team and to attendees at the fourth Annual MCCRC Symposium (Windsor, September 2017) for helpful comments and to Microsoft for the generous financial support that has made this project possible. Responsibility for views expressed, however, remain with the authors.
- 2 May 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Law and Information Technology
- Vol. 26 (2) , 160-182
Beyond BitCoin—legal impurities and off-chain assets
Blockchain technology allows the creation of distributed ledgers. These distribute control among the players rather than requiring a centralized database, and so can reduce costs and speed-up transactions. However, when it is used for assets which exist outside the blockchain itself, an unmodified adoption of the technology would bypass legal and regulatory requirements which, for these kinds of assets, cannot be bypassed without fundamental change to the law. Building those requirements into any blockchain-based system introduces features which are not necessary for performing its core functions, and we call these ‘legal impurities’. The most important legal impurities required are those relating to identification of the parties, and introducing the ability of a trusted third party to make modifications to the ledger. Not only does introducing these legal impurities make fundamental changes to the concept behind blockchain, but it is also essential that they are implemented in ways which do not threaten the integrity of the blockchain as evidence. This article has been produced by members of the Microsoft Cloud Computing Research Centre, a collaboration between the Cloud Legal Project, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London and the Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge. The authors are grateful to members of the MCCRC team and to attendees at the fourth Annual MCCRC Symposium (Windsor, September 2017) for helpful comments and to Microsoft for the generous financial support that has made this project possible. Responsibility for views expressed, however, remain with the authors.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Legal Studies
- Vol. 38 (2) , 263-278
Why judges need jurisprudence in cyberspace
Judges are increasingly asked to decide whether a rule of national law is applicable to a cyberspace actor who is not present in their jurisdiction, or whose activities do not clearly fall within the established understanding of the rule. They do this through interpreting the applicability and meaning of the law.Every attempt to enforce a national law makes a claim that the law has authority over the cyberspace actor. By accepting that claim, the judge asserts that the law's claim is legitimate. This is a Hartian exercise, adopting the internal view of the national legal system as the test for legitimacy.But in cyberspace the legitimacy of a national law claim is determined not by the internal perspective of the legal system but by the external perspective of cyberspace actors. A law will only have authority in cyberspace if it can convince cyberspace actors that its claim is legitimate. And a legal system which repeatedly makes illegitimate claims thereby weakens its status as a system which adheres to the rule of law.Judges can help solve this problem by interpreting laws and applying public and private international law so as to reject applicability claims which are illegitimate. To do this successfully, they need to understand the jurisprudential foundations of any law's authority in cyberspace.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Legal Studies
- Vol. 38 (2) , 263-278
Why judges need jurisprudence in cyberspace
Judges are increasingly asked to decide whether a rule of national law is applicable to a cyberspace actor who is not present in their jurisdiction, or whose activities do not clearly fall within the established understanding of the rule. They do this through interpreting the applicability and meaning of the law.Every attempt to enforce a national law makes a claim that the law has authority over the cyberspace actor. By accepting that claim, the judge asserts that the law's claim is legitimate. This is a Hartian exercise, adopting the internal view of the national legal system as the test for legitimacy.But in cyberspace the legitimacy of a national law claim is determined not by the internal perspective of the legal system but by the external perspective of cyberspace actors. A law will only have authority in cyberspace if it can convince cyberspace actors that its claim is legitimate. And a legal system which repeatedly makes illegitimate claims thereby weakens its status as a system which adheres to the rule of law.Judges can help solve this problem by interpreting laws and applying public and private international law so as to reject applicability claims which are illegitimate. To do this successfully, they need to understand the jurisprudential foundations of any law's authority in cyberspace.
- 9 May 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Law and Information Technology
- Vol. 18 (3) , 248-273
Online and Offline Equivalence: Aspiration and Achievement
A widely accepted principle of lawmaking is there should be equivalence between online and offline laws. The application of this principle requires the achievement of functional equivalence, irrespective of whether there is also formal equivalence of wording. However, there are complex barriers, deriving from the nature of the online technologies, to doing so successfully. In many instances the only way to achieve equivalence is via a fundamental reform of offline law. Ultimately, this process will leave little if any room for a separate law of cyberspace.
- 9 May 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Law and Information Technology
- Vol. 18 (3) , 248-273
Online and Offline Equivalence: Aspiration and Achievement
A widely accepted principle of lawmaking is there should be equivalence between online and offline laws. The application of this principle requires the achievement of functional equivalence, irrespective of whether there is also formal equivalence of wording. However, there are complex barriers, deriving from the nature of the online technologies, to doing so successfully. In many instances the only way to achieve equivalence is via a fundamental reform of offline law. Ultimately, this process will leave little if any room for a separate law of cyberspace.
- 19 June 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Information & Communications Technology Law
- Vol. 18 (2) , 79-82
The challenge of hate speech online
Real-world hate speech crimes are defined by reference to the special attributes of the victim. A thought experiment about hate speech in virtual worlds indicates that this approach to the criminalisation of hate speech may not be sustainable.
- 19 June 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Information & Communications Technology Law
- Vol. 18 (2) , 79-82
The challenge of hate speech online
Real-world hate speech crimes are defined by reference to the special attributes of the victim. A thought experiment about hate speech in virtual worlds indicates that this approach to the criminalisation of hate speech may not be sustainable.
- 7 October 2004
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 307-314
Facing the legislative and regulatory challenge
The examination of legal and regulatory issues in the preceding chapters indicates that the challenges posed by the Internet are unlikely to be solved merely by adapting and extending existing legal concepts. The new ways of communicating via the Internet raise legal questions which are fundamentally different for one of two reasons: The activity is unknown in the physical world, and is so unlike any current type of activity that no existing legal or regulatory model is appropriate. One of the clearest examples of this is the identity certification infrastructure, examined in detail in Chapter 5. Although the problem is present in the physical world and cannot be solved by extending existing concepts, it occurs so infrequently that leaving it unsolved is an acceptable solution. However, the same problem occurs so frequently in the context of Internet activities that it becomes qualitatively different. Examples of this type of challenge to the law include the domain name/trade mark issues examined in Chapter 3 and the application of indirect taxation rules to on-line supplies of information – see Chapter 8.1.1.1. If we ask ourselves why these activities present fundamentally new challenges to the law, we see that the challenges arise out of two characteristics which are rarely, if ever, exhibited by traditional physical world activities.
- 7 October 2004
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 307-314
Facing the legislative and regulatory challenge
The examination of legal and regulatory issues in the preceding chapters indicates that the challenges posed by the Internet are unlikely to be solved merely by adapting and extending existing legal concepts. The new ways of communicating via the Internet raise legal questions which are fundamentally different for one of two reasons: The activity is unknown in the physical world, and is so unlike any current type of activity that no existing legal or regulatory model is appropriate. One of the clearest examples of this is the identity certification infrastructure, examined in detail in Chapter 5. Although the problem is present in the physical world and cannot be solved by extending existing concepts, it occurs so infrequently that leaving it unsolved is an acceptable solution. However, the same problem occurs so frequently in the context of Internet activities that it becomes qualitatively different. Examples of this type of challenge to the law include the domain name/trade mark issues examined in Chapter 3 and the application of indirect taxation rules to on-line supplies of information – see Chapter 8.1.1.1. If we ask ourselves why these activities present fundamentally new challenges to the law, we see that the challenges arise out of two characteristics which are rarely, if ever, exhibited by traditional physical world activities.