Alan H. Guth
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alan H. Guth has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David I. Kaiser
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
6 shared publications - Mohammad Hossein Namjoo
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM)
5 shared publications - Feraz Azhar
Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, USA
4 shared publications - Chanda Prescod-Weinstein
MIT Kavli Institute for Astrophysics and Space Research & Dept. of Physics Massachusetts Institute of Technology 02139 Cambridge MA USA
2 shared publications - Edward Farhi
MIT Center for Theoretical Physics
2 shared publications - Jason Gallicchio
Harvey Mudd College 91711 Claremont California USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 2 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 167-190
On Quantum Creation of a Toroidal Universe
- Open Access
Probabilistic inference in very large universes
[Abridged] Some cosmological theories propose that the observable universe is a small part of a much larger universe in which parameters describing the low-energy laws of physics vary from region to region. How can we reasonably assess a theory that describes such a mostly unobservable universe? We propose a Bayesian method based on theory-generated probability distributions for our observations. We focus on basic principles, leaving aside concerns about practicality. (We also leave aside the measure problem, to discuss other issues.) We argue that cosmological theories can be tested by standard Bayesian updating, but we need to use theoretical predictions for "first-person" probabilities -- i.e., probabilities for our observations, accounting for all relevant selection effects. These selection effects can depend on the observer, and on time, so in principle first-person probabilities are defined for each observer-instant -- an observer at an instant of time. First-person probabilities should take into account everything the observer believes about herself and her surroundings -- i.e., her "subjective state". We advocate a "Principle of Self-Locating Indifference" (PSLI), asserting that any real observer should make predictions as if she were chosen randomly from the theoretically predicted observer-instants that share her subjective state. We believe the PSLI is intuitively very reasonable, but also argue that it maximizes the expected fraction of observers who will make correct predictions. Cosmological theories will in general predict a set of possible universes, each with a probability. To calculate first-person probabilities, we argue that each possible universe should be weighted by the number of observer-instants in the specified subjective state that it contains. We also discuss Boltzmann brains, the humans/Jovians parable of Hartle and Srednicki, and the use of "old evidence".
Open AccessProbabilistic inference in very large universes
[Abridged] Some cosmological theories propose that the observable universe is a small part of a much larger universe in which parameters describing the low-energy laws of physics vary from region to region. How can we reasonably assess a theory that describes such a mostly unobservable universe? We propose a Bayesian method based on theory-generated probability distributions for our observations. We focus on basic principles, leaving aside concerns about practicality. (We also leave aside the measure problem, to discuss other issues.) We argue that cosmological theories can be tested by standard Bayesian updating, but we need to use theoretical predictions for "first-person" probabilities -- i.e., probabilities for our observations, accounting for all relevant selection effects. These selection effects can depend on the observer, and on time, so in principle first-person probabilities are defined for each observer-instant -- an observer at an instant of time. First-person probabilities should take into account everything the observer believes about herself and her surroundings -- i.e., her "subjective state". We advocate a "Principle of Self-Locating Indifference" (PSLI), asserting that any real observer should make predictions as if she were chosen randomly from the theoretically predicted observer-instants that share her subjective state. We believe the PSLI is intuitively very reasonable, but also argue that it maximizes the expected fraction of observers who will make correct predictions. Cosmological theories will in general predict a set of possible universes, each with a probability. To calculate first-person probabilities, we argue that each possible universe should be weighted by the number of observer-instants in the specified subjective state that it contains. We also discuss Boltzmann brains, the humans/Jovians parable of Hartle and Srednicki, and the use of "old evidence".
- Open Access
Bayesian questions with frequentist answers
The two statistical methods, namely the frequentist and the Bayesian methods, are both commonly used for probabilistic inference in many scientific situations. However, it is not straightforward to interpret the result of one approach in terms of the concepts of the other. In this paper we explore the possibility of finding a Bayesian significance for the frequentist's main object of interest, the $p$-value, which is the probability assigned to the proposition -- which we call the {\it extremity proposition} -- that a measurement will result in a value that is at least as extreme as the value that was actually obtained. To make contact with the frequentist language, the Bayesian can choose to update probabilities based on the {\it extremity proposition}, which is weaker than the standard Bayesian update proposition, which uses the actual observed value. We then show that the posterior probability (or probability density) of a theory is equal to the prior probability (or probability density) multiplied by the ratio of the $p$-value for the data obtained, given that theory, to the mean $p$-value -- averaged over all theories weighted by their prior probabilities. Thus, we provide frequentist answers to Bayesian questions. Our result is generic -- it does not rely on restrictive assumptions about the situation under consideration or specific properties of the likelihoods or the priors.
Open AccessBayesian questions with frequentist answers
The two statistical methods, namely the frequentist and the Bayesian methods, are both commonly used for probabilistic inference in many scientific situations. However, it is not straightforward to interpret the result of one approach in terms of the concepts of the other. In this paper we explore the possibility of finding a Bayesian significance for the frequentist's main object of interest, the $p$-value, which is the probability assigned to the proposition -- which we call the {\it extremity proposition} -- that a measurement will result in a value that is at least as extreme as the value that was actually obtained. To make contact with the frequentist language, the Bayesian can choose to update probabilities based on the {\it extremity proposition}, which is weaker than the standard Bayesian update proposition, which uses the actual observed value. We then show that the posterior probability (or probability density) of a theory is equal to the prior probability (or probability density) multiplied by the ratio of the $p$-value for the data obtained, given that theory, to the mean $p$-value -- averaged over all theories weighted by their prior probabilities. Thus, we provide frequentist answers to Bayesian questions. Our result is generic -- it does not rely on restrictive assumptions about the situation under consideration or specific properties of the likelihoods or the priors.
- Open Access
A Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario
In "Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief", Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga's reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived.
Open AccessA Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario
In "Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief", Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga's reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived.
- Open Access
- 14 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (6) , 2543
Correction to: A Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario
- 14 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (6) , 2543
Open AccessCorrection to: A Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario
- Open Access
- 21 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (1) , 355-366
A Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario
In Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief, Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga’s reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived.
- 21 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (1) , 355-366
Open AccessA Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario
In Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief, Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga’s reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived.
- Open Access
Relaxed Bell Inequalities with Arbitrary Measurement Dependence for Each Observer
Bell's inequality was originally derived under the assumption that experimenters are free to select detector settings independently of any local "hidden variables" that might affect the outcomes of measurements on entangled particles. This assumption has come to be known as "measurement independence" (also referred to as "freedom of choice" or "settings independence"). For a two-setting, two-outcome Bell test, we derive modified Bell inequalities that relax measurement independence, for either or both observers, while remaining locally causal. We describe the loss of measurement independence for each observer using the parameters $M_1$ and $M_2$, as defined by Hall in 2010, and also by a more complete description that adds two new parameters, which we call $\hat{M}_1$ and $\hat{M}_2$, deriving a modified Bell inequality for each description. These "relaxed" inequalities subsume those considered in previous work as special cases, and quantify how much the assumption of measurement independence needs to be relaxed in order for a locally causal model to produce a given violation of the standard Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (Bell-CHSH) inequality. We show that both relaxed Bell inequalities are tight bounds on the CHSH parameter by constructing locally causal models that saturate them. For any given Bell inequality violation, the new two-parameter and four-parameter models each require significantly less mutual information between the hidden variables and measurement settings than previous models. We conjecture that the new models, with optimal parameters, require the minimum possible mutual information for a given Bell violation. We further argue that, contrary to various claims in the literature, relaxing freedom of choice need not imply superdeterminism.Open AccessRelaxed Bell Inequalities with Arbitrary Measurement Dependence for Each Observer
Bell's inequality was originally derived under the assumption that experimenters are free to select detector settings independently of any local "hidden variables" that might affect the outcomes of measurements on entangled particles. This assumption has come to be known as "measurement independence" (also referred to as "freedom of choice" or "settings independence"). For a two-setting, two-outcome Bell test, we derive modified Bell inequalities that relax measurement independence, for either or both observers, while remaining locally causal. We describe the loss of measurement independence for each observer using the parameters $M_1$ and $M_2$, as defined by Hall in 2010, and also by a more complete description that adds two new parameters, which we call $\hat{M}_1$ and $\hat{M}_2$, deriving a modified Bell inequality for each description. These "relaxed" inequalities subsume those considered in previous work as special cases, and quantify how much the assumption of measurement independence needs to be relaxed in order for a locally causal model to produce a given violation of the standard Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (Bell-CHSH) inequality. We show that both relaxed Bell inequalities are tight bounds on the CHSH parameter by constructing locally causal models that saturate them. For any given Bell inequality violation, the new two-parameter and four-parameter models each require significantly less mutual information between the hidden variables and measurement settings than previous models. We conjecture that the new models, with optimal parameters, require the minimum possible mutual information for a given Bell violation. We further argue that, contrary to various claims in the literature, relaxing freedom of choice need not imply superdeterminism. - Open Access
- 24 January 2019
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review A
- Vol. 99 (1) , 012121
Relaxed Bell inequalities with arbitrary measurement dependence for each observer
Bell's inequality was originally derived under the assumption that experimenters are free to select detector settings independently of any local “hidden variables” that might affect the outcomes of measurements on entangled particles. This assumption has come to be known as “measurement independence” (also referred to as “freedom of choice” or “settings independence”). For a two-setting, two-outcome Bell test, we derive modified Bell inequalities that relax measurement independence, for either or both observers, while remaining locally causal. We describe the loss of measurement independence for each observer using the parameters and , as defined by Hall in 2010, and also by a more complete description that adds two new parameters, which we call and , deriving a modified Bell inequality for each description. These “relaxed” inequalities subsume those considered in previous work as special cases, and quantify how much the assumption of measurement independence needs to be relaxed in order for a locally causal model to produce a given violation of the standard Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (Bell-CHSH) inequality. We show that both relaxed Bell inequalities are tight bounds on the CHSH parameter by constructing locally causal models that saturate them. For any given Bell inequality violation, the new two-parameter and four-parameter models each require significantly less mutual information between the hidden variables and measurement settings than previous models. We conjecture that the new models, with optimal parameters, require the minimum possible mutual information for a given Bell violation. We further argue that, contrary to various claims in the literature, relaxing freedom of choice need not imply superdeterminism.- 24 January 2019
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review A
- Vol. 99 (1) , 012121
Open AccessRelaxed Bell inequalities with arbitrary measurement dependence for each observer
Bell's inequality was originally derived under the assumption that experimenters are free to select detector settings independently of any local “hidden variables” that might affect the outcomes of measurements on entangled particles. This assumption has come to be known as “measurement independence” (also referred to as “freedom of choice” or “settings independence”). For a two-setting, two-outcome Bell test, we derive modified Bell inequalities that relax measurement independence, for either or both observers, while remaining locally causal. We describe the loss of measurement independence for each observer using the parameters and , as defined by Hall in 2010, and also by a more complete description that adds two new parameters, which we call and , deriving a modified Bell inequality for each description. These “relaxed” inequalities subsume those considered in previous work as special cases, and quantify how much the assumption of measurement independence needs to be relaxed in order for a locally causal model to produce a given violation of the standard Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (Bell-CHSH) inequality. We show that both relaxed Bell inequalities are tight bounds on the CHSH parameter by constructing locally causal models that saturate them. For any given Bell inequality violation, the new two-parameter and four-parameter models each require significantly less mutual information between the hidden variables and measurement settings than previous models. We conjecture that the new models, with optimal parameters, require the minimum possible mutual information for a given Bell violation. We further argue that, contrary to various claims in the literature, relaxing freedom of choice need not imply superdeterminism. - Open Access
- 20 July 2018
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review D
- Vol. 98 (1) , 016011
Relativistic corrections to nonrelativistic effective field theories
In this paper we develop a formalism for studying the nonrelativistic limit of relativistic field theories in a systematic way. By introducing a simple, nonlocal field redefinition, we transform a given relativistic theory, describing a real, self-interacting scalar field, into an equivalent theory, describing a complex scalar field that encodes at each time both the original field and its conjugate momentum. Our low-energy effective theory incorporates relativistic corrections to the kinetic energy as well as the backreaction of fast-oscillating terms on the behavior of the dominant, slowly varying component of the field. Possible applications of our new approach include axion dark matter, though the methods developed here should be applicable to the low-energy limits of other field theories as well.
- 20 July 2018
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review D
- Vol. 98 (1) , 016011
Open AccessRelativistic corrections to nonrelativistic effective field theories
In this paper we develop a formalism for studying the nonrelativistic limit of relativistic field theories in a systematic way. By introducing a simple, nonlocal field redefinition, we transform a given relativistic theory, describing a real, self-interacting scalar field, into an equivalent theory, describing a complex scalar field that encodes at each time both the original field and its conjugate momentum. Our low-energy effective theory incorporates relativistic corrections to the kinetic energy as well as the backreaction of fast-oscillating terms on the behavior of the dominant, slowly varying component of the field. Possible applications of our new approach include axion dark matter, though the methods developed here should be applicable to the low-energy limits of other field theories as well.
- Open Access
Relativistic Corrections to Nonrelativistic Effective Field Theories
In this paper we develop a formalism for studying the nonrelativistic limit of relativistic field theories in a systematic way. By introducing a simple, nonlocal field redefinition, we transform a given relativistic theory, describing a real, self-interacting scalar field, into an equivalent theory, describing a complex scalar field that encodes at each time both the original field and its conjugate momentum. Our low-energy effective theory incorporates relativistic corrections to the kinetic energy as well as the backreaction of fast-oscillating terms on the behavior of the dominant, slowly varying component of the field. Possible applications of our new approach include axion dark matter, though the methods developed here should be applicable to the low-energy limits of other field theories as well.
Open AccessRelativistic Corrections to Nonrelativistic Effective Field Theories
In this paper we develop a formalism for studying the nonrelativistic limit of relativistic field theories in a systematic way. By introducing a simple, nonlocal field redefinition, we transform a given relativistic theory, describing a real, self-interacting scalar field, into an equivalent theory, describing a complex scalar field that encodes at each time both the original field and its conjugate momentum. Our low-energy effective theory incorporates relativistic corrections to the kinetic energy as well as the backreaction of fast-oscillating terms on the behavior of the dominant, slowly varying component of the field. Possible applications of our new approach include axion dark matter, though the methods developed here should be applicable to the low-energy limits of other field theories as well.