Kor Grit
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kor Grit has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Antoinette de Bont
Institute of Health Policy & Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
1 shared publication - Hester van de Bovenkamp
Erasmus University Rotterdam
1 shared publication - Jacqueline C.F. van Oijen
Institute of Health Policy & Management, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
1 shared publication - Roland Bal
Erasmus University Rotterdam
1 shared publication - Teun Zuiderent-Jerak
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Health Policy
- Vol. 121 (9) , 971-977
Effects of EU harmonization policies on national public supervision of clinical trials: A dynamic cycle of institutional change and institutional work
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Health Policy
- Vol. 121 (9) , 971-977
Effects of EU harmonization policies on national public supervision of clinical trials: A dynamic cycle of institutional change and institutional work
- Open Access
- 8 May 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Analysis
- Vol. 25 (3) , 242-259
Making Markets in Long-Term Care: Or How a Market Can Work by Being Invisible
Many Western countries have introduced market principles in healthcare. The newly introduced financial instrument of “care-intensity packages” in the Dutch long-term care sector fit this development since they have some characteristics of a market device. However, policy makers and care providers positioned these instruments as explicitly not belonging to the general trend of marketisation in healthcare. Using a qualitative case study approach, we study the work that the two providers have done to fit these instruments to their organisations and how that enables and legitimatises market development. Both providers have done various types of work that could be classified as market development, including creating accounting systems suitable for markets, redefining public values in the context of markets, and starting commercial initiatives. Paradoxically, denying the existence of markets for long-term care and thus avoiding ideological debates on the marketisation of healthcare has made the use of market devices all the more likely. Making the market invisible seems to be an operative element in making the market work. Our findings suggest that Dutch long-term care reform points to the need to study the ‘making’ rather than the ‘liberalising’ of markets and that the study of healthcare markets should not be confined to those practices that explicitly label themselves as such.
- 8 May 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Analysis
- Vol. 25 (3) , 242-259
Open AccessMaking Markets in Long-Term Care: Or How a Market Can Work by Being Invisible
Many Western countries have introduced market principles in healthcare. The newly introduced financial instrument of “care-intensity packages” in the Dutch long-term care sector fit this development since they have some characteristics of a market device. However, policy makers and care providers positioned these instruments as explicitly not belonging to the general trend of marketisation in healthcare. Using a qualitative case study approach, we study the work that the two providers have done to fit these instruments to their organisations and how that enables and legitimatises market development. Both providers have done various types of work that could be classified as market development, including creating accounting systems suitable for markets, redefining public values in the context of markets, and starting commercial initiatives. Paradoxically, denying the existence of markets for long-term care and thus avoiding ideological debates on the marketisation of healthcare has made the use of market devices all the more likely. Making the market invisible seems to be an operative element in making the market work. Our findings suggest that Dutch long-term care reform points to the need to study the ‘making’ rather than the ‘liberalising’ of markets and that the study of healthcare markets should not be confined to those practices that explicitly label themselves as such.
- 4 February 2010
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 36 (2) , 79-83
Tailor-made finance versus tailor-made care. Can the state strengthen consumer choice in healthcare by reforming the financial structure of long-term care?: Table 1
Background Policy instruments based on the working of markets have been introduced to empower consumers of healthcare. However, it is still not easy to become a critical consumer of healthcare. Objectives The aim of this study is to analyse the possibilities of the state to strengthen the position of patients with the aid of a new financial regime, such as personal health budgets. Methods Data were collected through in-depth interviews with executives, managers, professionals and client representatives of six long-term care institutions. Results With the introduction of individual budgets the responsibility for budgetary control has shifted from the organisational level to the individual level in the caregiver-client relationship. Having more luxurious care on offer necessitates a stronger demarcation of regular care because organisations cannot simultaneously offer extra care as part of the standard care package. New financial instruments have an impact on the culture of receiving and giving care. Distributive justice takes on new meaning with the introduction of financial market mechanisms in healthcare; the distributing principle of ‘need’ is transformed into the principle of ‘economic demand’. Conclusion Financial instruments not only act as a countervailing power against providers insufficiently client-oriented, but are also used by providers to reinforce their own positions vis-à-vis demanding clients. Tailor-made finance is not the same as tailor-made care.
- 4 February 2010
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 36 (2) , 79-83
Tailor-made finance versus tailor-made care. Can the state strengthen consumer choice in healthcare by reforming the financial structure of long-term care?: Table 1
Background Policy instruments based on the working of markets have been introduced to empower consumers of healthcare. However, it is still not easy to become a critical consumer of healthcare. Objectives The aim of this study is to analyse the possibilities of the state to strengthen the position of patients with the aid of a new financial regime, such as personal health budgets. Methods Data were collected through in-depth interviews with executives, managers, professionals and client representatives of six long-term care institutions. Results With the introduction of individual budgets the responsibility for budgetary control has shifted from the organisational level to the individual level in the caregiver-client relationship. Having more luxurious care on offer necessitates a stronger demarcation of regular care because organisations cannot simultaneously offer extra care as part of the standard care package. New financial instruments have an impact on the culture of receiving and giving care. Distributive justice takes on new meaning with the introduction of financial market mechanisms in healthcare; the distributing principle of ‘need’ is transformed into the principle of ‘economic demand’. Conclusion Financial instruments not only act as a countervailing power against providers insufficiently client-oriented, but are also used by providers to reinforce their own positions vis-à-vis demanding clients. Tailor-made finance is not the same as tailor-made care.
- 1 August 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 53 (1-2) , 97-106
Corporate Citizenship: How to Strengthen the Social Responsibility of Managers?
- 1 August 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 53 (1-2) , 97-106
Corporate Citizenship: How to Strengthen the Social Responsibility of Managers?