BKBurhan Kuruscu

Burhan Kuruscu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Burhan Kuruscu has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Unemployment Insurance and Macro-Financial (In)Stability

    by Yavuz Arslan, Ahmet Degerli, Bulent Guler, Gazi Kabas, Burhan Kuruscu

    We identify and study two mechanisms that can overturn the stabilizing effects of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. First, households in economies with more generous UI reduce their precautionary savings and increase their mortgage debt. Second, the share of mortgages, especially those with higher loan-to-income ratios, increases on bank balance sheets. As a result, both bank and household balance sheets become more vulnerable to adverse shocks, which deepens recessions. We demonstrate the importance of these channels by employing a quantitative heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model and by providing county-level empirical evidence from the U.S. housing and mortgage markets.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Use It or Lose It: Efficiency and Redistributional Effects of Wealth Taxation

    by Fatih Guvenen, Gueorgui Kambourov, Burhan Kuruscu, Sergio Ocampo, Daphne Chen

    How does wealth taxation differ from capital income taxation? When the return on investment is equal across individuals, a well-known result is that the two tax systems are equivalent. Motivated by recent empirical evidence documenting persistent return heterogeneity, we revisit this question. With heterogeneity, the two tax systems typically have opposite implications for efficiency and inequality. Under capital income taxation, entrepreneurs who are more productive and therefore generate more income pay higher taxes. Under wealth taxation, entrepreneurs who have similar wealth levels pay similar taxes regardless of their productivity, which expands the tax base, shifts the tax burden toward unproductive entrepreneurs, and raises the savings rate of productive ones. This reallocation increases aggregate productivity and output. In the simulated model parameterized to match the U.S. data, replacing the capital income tax with a wealth tax in a revenue-neutral way delivers a significantly higher average welfare. Turning to optimal taxation, the optimal wealth tax (OWT) is positive and yields large welfare gains by raising efficiency and lowering inequality. In contrast, the optimal capital income tax (OKIT) is negative—a subsidy—and delivers lower welfare gains than OWT, owing to the welfare losses from higher inequality. Furthermore, when the transition path is considered, the gains from OKIT turn into significant welfare losses for existing cohorts, whereas OWT continues to deliver robust welfare gains. These results suggest that moderate wealth taxation may be a more appealing alternative than capital income taxation, which can be significantly more distorting under return heterogeneity than under the equal-returns assumption.


  • Open Access

    Multidimensional Skill Mismatch

    by Fatih Guvenen, Burhanettin Kuruscu, Satoshi Tanaka, David Wiczer

    Multidimensional Skill Mismatch


  • Open Access

    Multidimensional Skill Mismatch

    by Faith Guvenen, Burhan Kuruscu, Satoshi Tanaka, David Wiczer

    What determines the earnings of a worker relative to his peers in the same occupation? What makes a worker fail in one occupation but succeed in another? More broadly, what are the factors that determine the productivity of a worker-occupation match? In this paper, we propose an empirical measure of skill mismatch for a worker-occupation match, which sheds light on these questions. This measure is based on the discrepancy between the portfolio of skills required by an occupation and the portfolio of abilities possessed by a worker for learning those skills. This measure arises naturally in a dynamic model of occupational choice and human capital accumulation with multidimensional skills and Bayesian learning about one’s ability to learn these skills. In this model, mismatch is central to the career outcomes of workers: it reduces the returns to occupational tenure, and it predicts occupational switching behavior. We construct our empirical analog by combining data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) on workers, and the O*NET on occupations. Our empirical results show that the effects of mismatch on wages are large and persistent: mismatch in occupations held early in life has a strong negative effect on wages in future occupations. Skill mismatch also significantly increases the probability of an occupational switch and predicts its direction in the skill space. These results provide fresh evidence on the importance of skill mismatch for the job search process.


  • Temptation and Taxation

    by Per Krusell, Burhanettin Kuruşçu, Anthony A. Smith

    We study optimal taxation when consumers have temptation and self-control problems. Embedding the class of preferences developed by Gul and Pesendorfer into a standard macroeconomic setting, we first prove, in a two-period model, that the optimal policy is to subsidize savings when consumers are tempted by “excessive” impatience. The savings subsidy improves welfare because it makes succumbing to temptation less attractive. We then study an economy with a long but finite horizon which nests, as a special case, the Phelps–Pollak–Laibson multiple-selves model (thereby providing guidance on how to evaluate welfare in this model). We prove that when period utility is logarithmic, the optimal savings subsidies increase over time for any finite horizon. Moreover, as the horizon grows large, the optimal policy prescribes a constant subsidy, in contrast to the well known Chamley–Judd result