Dominic Smith
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Dominic Smith has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alister W. Graham
Centre for Astrophysics and Supercomputing, Swinburne University of Technology , Hawthorn, VIC 3122
1 shared publication - Angel R. Lopez-Sanchez
ARC Centre of Excellence for All Sky Astrophysics in 3 Dimensions (ASTRO 3D) , Australia
1 shared publication - Benne Willem Holwerda
University of Louisville
1 shared publication Christopher P. A. Henry
University of Louisville
1 shared publication- Clayton D. Robertson
Department of Physics, University of Louisville, Natural Science Building 102, Louisville, KY 40292, USA
1 shared publication - David O'Ryan
10 Centro de Astrobiología, INTA-CSIC, Camino Bajo del Castillo, s/n, 28692, Villanueva de la Cañada, Madrid, Spain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Galaxy And Mass Assembly: Galaxy Morphology in the Green Valley, Prominent rings and looser Spiral Arms
Galaxies broadly fall into two categories: star-forming (blue) galaxies and quiescent (red) galaxies. In between, one finds the less populated ``green valley". Some of these galaxies are suspected to be in the process of ceasing their star-formation through a gradual exhaustion of gas supply or already dead and are experiencing a rejuvenation of star-formation through fuel injection. We use the Galaxy And Mass Assembly database and the Galaxy Zoo citizen science morphological estimates to compare the morphology of galaxies in the green valley against those in the red sequence and blue cloud. Our goal is to examine the structural differences within galaxies that fall in the green valley, and what brings them there. Previous results found disc features such as rings and lenses are more prominently represented in the green valley population. We revisit this with a similar sized data set of galaxies with morphology labels provided by the Galaxy Zoo for the GAMA fields based on new KiDS images. Our aim is to compare qualitatively the results from expert classification to that of citizen science. We observe that ring structures are indeed found more commonly in green valley galaxies compared to their red and blue counterparts. We suggest that ring structures are a consequence of disc galaxies in the green valley actively exhibiting characteristics of fading discs and evolving disc morphology of galaxies. We note that the progression from blue to red correlates with loosening spiral arm structure.
Open AccessGalaxy And Mass Assembly: Galaxy Morphology in the Green Valley, Prominent rings and looser Spiral Arms
Galaxies broadly fall into two categories: star-forming (blue) galaxies and quiescent (red) galaxies. In between, one finds the less populated ``green valley". Some of these galaxies are suspected to be in the process of ceasing their star-formation through a gradual exhaustion of gas supply or already dead and are experiencing a rejuvenation of star-formation through fuel injection. We use the Galaxy And Mass Assembly database and the Galaxy Zoo citizen science morphological estimates to compare the morphology of galaxies in the green valley against those in the red sequence and blue cloud. Our goal is to examine the structural differences within galaxies that fall in the green valley, and what brings them there. Previous results found disc features such as rings and lenses are more prominently represented in the green valley population. We revisit this with a similar sized data set of galaxies with morphology labels provided by the Galaxy Zoo for the GAMA fields based on new KiDS images. Our aim is to compare qualitatively the results from expert classification to that of citizen science. We observe that ring structures are indeed found more commonly in green valley galaxies compared to their red and blue counterparts. We suggest that ring structures are a consequence of disc galaxies in the green valley actively exhibiting characteristics of fading discs and evolving disc morphology of galaxies. We note that the progression from blue to red correlates with loosening spiral arm structure.
- Open Access
- 12 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-18
Stiegler’s Rigour: Metaphors for a Critical Continental Philosophy of Technology
This essay claims that Stiegler’s sense of metaphor gives his work an overlooked rigour. Part one argues that La Faute d’Epiméthée’s key claim (that technics is philosophy’s “unthought”) opens an excess of potential that threatens to overwhelm Stiegler’s work. Part two looks at two metaphors (the pharmakon and organ). Part three argues that a focus on Stiegler’s technique of metaphor mitigates suspicions that his work is trivial or jargonistic, and allows it to emerge as a counterbalance to a positivistic tendency in contemporary philosophy of technology. This tendency is the legacy of an “empirical turn” in philosophy of technology in the late 1990s; it is problematic, I argue, because it threatens to turn philosophical engagements with technologies into endorsements of Zeitgeist-seizing artifacts (smartphones or social media, for example), to the detriment of what Stiegler’s sense of metaphor allows him to address as the broader “pharmacological” and “organological” implications of technologies for society.
- 12 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-18
Open AccessStiegler’s Rigour: Metaphors for a Critical Continental Philosophy of Technology
This essay claims that Stiegler’s sense of metaphor gives his work an overlooked rigour. Part one argues that La Faute d’Epiméthée’s key claim (that technics is philosophy’s “unthought”) opens an excess of potential that threatens to overwhelm Stiegler’s work. Part two looks at two metaphors (the pharmakon and organ). Part three argues that a focus on Stiegler’s technique of metaphor mitigates suspicions that his work is trivial or jargonistic, and allows it to emerge as a counterbalance to a positivistic tendency in contemporary philosophy of technology. This tendency is the legacy of an “empirical turn” in philosophy of technology in the late 1990s; it is problematic, I argue, because it threatens to turn philosophical engagements with technologies into endorsements of Zeitgeist-seizing artifacts (smartphones or social media, for example), to the detriment of what Stiegler’s sense of metaphor allows him to address as the broader “pharmacological” and “organological” implications of technologies for society.
- 3 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology
- Vol. 9 (2) , 87-99
Reimagining AI: Introduction
- 3 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology
- Vol. 9 (2) , 87-99
Reimagining AI: Introduction
- Open Access
- 21 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 27 (4) , 1317-1325
Necessity, Entailment, Shared Agonism
This short paper offers a series of responses to Jochem Zwier and Timothy Barker’s comments on my extended paper ‘Taking Exception: Philosophy of Technology as a Multidimensional Problem Space.’ Part one responds to questions concerning the modality of the renewed understanding of the theme of the transcendental that was argued for in my initial paper: I argue for the deep contingency of such a move, against any sense that it is necessary. Part two takes this consideration of modality further, considering the possibilities that a renewal of the theme of the transcendental stands to offer philosophy of technology today. I argue that the contingency of our contemporary sense of the transcendental can be precisely what makes it valuable. Whereas parts one and two turn on incisive questions posed by Zwier, part three closes by reconsidering the claims for a ‘multidimensional problem space’ offered in my initial paper. In response to an acute insight from Barker, I close by arguing that philosophy of technology’s problem space should be explored in terms of a notion of ‘shared agonism’.
- 21 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 27 (4) , 1317-1325
Open AccessNecessity, Entailment, Shared Agonism
This short paper offers a series of responses to Jochem Zwier and Timothy Barker’s comments on my extended paper ‘Taking Exception: Philosophy of Technology as a Multidimensional Problem Space.’ Part one responds to questions concerning the modality of the renewed understanding of the theme of the transcendental that was argued for in my initial paper: I argue for the deep contingency of such a move, against any sense that it is necessary. Part two takes this consideration of modality further, considering the possibilities that a renewal of the theme of the transcendental stands to offer philosophy of technology today. I argue that the contingency of our contemporary sense of the transcendental can be precisely what makes it valuable. Whereas parts one and two turn on incisive questions posed by Zwier, part three closes by reconsidering the claims for a ‘multidimensional problem space’ offered in my initial paper. In response to an acute insight from Barker, I close by arguing that philosophy of technology’s problem space should be explored in terms of a notion of ‘shared agonism’.
- Open Access
- 5 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 27 (1) , 155-170
Taking Exception: Philosophy of Technology as a Multidimensional Problem Space
This essay develops three key claims made in my 2018 book, Exceptional Technologies. Part one argues for ‘trivialising the transcendental’, to remove stigmas attached to the word ‘transcendental’ in philosophy in general and philosophy of technology in particular. Part two outlines the concept of ‘exceptional technologies’. These are artefacts and practices that show up as limit cases for our received pictures of what constitutes a ‘technology’ (what I refer to as our ‘pictures of method’) and that force us to reassess the conditions for the possibility of these pictures. I focus on the case of autonomous vehicles here, arguing that Google Street View provides a relatively better picture for approaching philosophical issues at stake than the famous ‘Trolley Problem’. Part three then concludes with a focus on Heidegger’s ‘Question Concerning Technology’ essay. Heidegger asserts that philosophical questioning ‘builds a way’ (1977: 3). I argue that philosophical approaches to technologies might better be considered in terms of a multidimensional problem space.
- 5 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 27 (1) , 155-170
Open AccessTaking Exception: Philosophy of Technology as a Multidimensional Problem Space
This essay develops three key claims made in my 2018 book, Exceptional Technologies. Part one argues for ‘trivialising the transcendental’, to remove stigmas attached to the word ‘transcendental’ in philosophy in general and philosophy of technology in particular. Part two outlines the concept of ‘exceptional technologies’. These are artefacts and practices that show up as limit cases for our received pictures of what constitutes a ‘technology’ (what I refer to as our ‘pictures of method’) and that force us to reassess the conditions for the possibility of these pictures. I focus on the case of autonomous vehicles here, arguing that Google Street View provides a relatively better picture for approaching philosophical issues at stake than the famous ‘Trolley Problem’. Part three then concludes with a focus on Heidegger’s ‘Question Concerning Technology’ essay. Heidegger asserts that philosophical questioning ‘builds a way’ (1977: 3). I argue that philosophical approaches to technologies might better be considered in terms of a multidimensional problem space.
- 1 July 2019
- Published by Lawrence and Wishart in New Formations
- Vol. 98 (98) , 68-84
Making Automation Explicable: A Challenge for Philosophy of Technology
This article argues for an expanded conception of automation's 'explicability'. When it comes to topics as topical and shot through with multifarious anxieties as automation, it is, I argue, insufficient to rely on a conception of explicability as 'explanation' or 'simplification'. Instead, automation is the kind of topic that is challenging us to develop a more dynamic conception of explicability as explication. By this, I mean that automation is challenging us to develop epistemic strategies that are better capable of implicating people and their anxieties about automation in the topic, and, counterintuitively, of complicating how the topic is interfaced with. The article comprises an introduction followed by four main parts. While the introduction provides general context, each of the four subsequent parts seeks to demonstrate how diverse epistemic strategies might have a role to play in developing the process just described. Together, the parts are intended to build a cumulative case. This does not mean that the strategies they discuss are intended to be definitive, however – other strategies for making automation explicable may be possible and more desirable. Part one historicises automation as a concept. It does this through a focus on a famous passage from Descartes' Second Meditation, where he asks the reader to imagine automata glimpsed through a window. The aim here is to rehearse the presuppositions of a familiar 'modernist' epistemological model, and to outline how a contemporary understanding of automation as a wicked socio-economic problem challenges it. Parts two and three are then framed through concepts emerging from recent psychology: 'automation bias' and 'automation complacency'. The aim here is to consider recent developments in philosophy of technology in terms of these concepts, and to dramatically explicate key presuppositions at stake in the form of reasoning by analogy implied. While part two explicates an analogy between automation bias in philosophical engagements with technologies that involve a 'transcendental' tendency to reify automation, part three explicates an analogy between automation complacency and an opposed 'empirical turn' tendency in philosophy of technology to privilege nuanced description of case studies. Part four then conclude by arguing that anxieties concerning automation might usefully be redirected towards a different sense of the scope and purpose of philosophy of technology today: not as a movement to be 'turned' in one direction at the expense of others ('empirical' vs 'transcendental', for instance) but as a multidimensional 'problem space' to be explicated in many different directions at once. Through reference to Kierkegaard and Simondon, I show how different approaches to exemplification, indirection and indeterminacy can be consistent with this, and with the approach to explicability recommended above.
- 1 July 2019
- Published by Lawrence and Wishart in New Formations
- Vol. 98 (98) , 68-84
Making Automation Explicable: A Challenge for Philosophy of Technology
This article argues for an expanded conception of automation's 'explicability'. When it comes to topics as topical and shot through with multifarious anxieties as automation, it is, I argue, insufficient to rely on a conception of explicability as 'explanation' or 'simplification'. Instead, automation is the kind of topic that is challenging us to develop a more dynamic conception of explicability as explication. By this, I mean that automation is challenging us to develop epistemic strategies that are better capable of implicating people and their anxieties about automation in the topic, and, counterintuitively, of complicating how the topic is interfaced with. The article comprises an introduction followed by four main parts. While the introduction provides general context, each of the four subsequent parts seeks to demonstrate how diverse epistemic strategies might have a role to play in developing the process just described. Together, the parts are intended to build a cumulative case. This does not mean that the strategies they discuss are intended to be definitive, however – other strategies for making automation explicable may be possible and more desirable. Part one historicises automation as a concept. It does this through a focus on a famous passage from Descartes' Second Meditation, where he asks the reader to imagine automata glimpsed through a window. The aim here is to rehearse the presuppositions of a familiar 'modernist' epistemological model, and to outline how a contemporary understanding of automation as a wicked socio-economic problem challenges it. Parts two and three are then framed through concepts emerging from recent psychology: 'automation bias' and 'automation complacency'. The aim here is to consider recent developments in philosophy of technology in terms of these concepts, and to dramatically explicate key presuppositions at stake in the form of reasoning by analogy implied. While part two explicates an analogy between automation bias in philosophical engagements with technologies that involve a 'transcendental' tendency to reify automation, part three explicates an analogy between automation complacency and an opposed 'empirical turn' tendency in philosophy of technology to privilege nuanced description of case studies. Part four then conclude by arguing that anxieties concerning automation might usefully be redirected towards a different sense of the scope and purpose of philosophy of technology today: not as a movement to be 'turned' in one direction at the expense of others ('empirical' vs 'transcendental', for instance) but as a multidimensional 'problem space' to be explicated in many different directions at once. Through reference to Kierkegaard and Simondon, I show how different approaches to exemplification, indirection and indeterminacy can be consistent with this, and with the approach to explicability recommended above.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
- Vol. 19 (3) , 381-410
The Internet as Idea
This article has two related aims: to examine how the Internet might be rendered an object of coherent philosophical consideration and critique, and to contribute to divesting the term “transcendental” of the negative connotations it carries in contemporary philosophy of technology. To realise them, it refers to Kant’s transcendental approach. The key argument is that Kant’s “transcendental idealism” is one example of a more general and potentially thoroughgoing “transcendental” approach focused on conditions that much contemporary philosophy of technology misunderstands or ignores, to the detriment of the field. Diverse contemporary approaches are engaged to make this claim, including those of Verbeek, Brey, Stiegler, Clark and Chalmers, Feenberg, and Fuchs. The article considers how these approaches stand in relation to tendencies towards determinism, subjectivism, and excessive forms of optimism and pessimism in contemporary considerations of the Internet. In terms of Kant’s transcendental idealism, specifically, it concludes by arguing that contemporary philosophy of technology does not go far enough in considering the Internet as a “regulative idea”; in terms of transcendental approaches more generally, it concludes by arguing that openness to the transcendental has the potential to call into question presuppositions regarding what constitutes an “empirical” object of enquiry in philosophy of technology, thereby, opening the field up to important new areas of research.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology
- Vol. 19 (3) , 381-410
The Internet as Idea
This article has two related aims: to examine how the Internet might be rendered an object of coherent philosophical consideration and critique, and to contribute to divesting the term “transcendental” of the negative connotations it carries in contemporary philosophy of technology. To realise them, it refers to Kant’s transcendental approach. The key argument is that Kant’s “transcendental idealism” is one example of a more general and potentially thoroughgoing “transcendental” approach focused on conditions that much contemporary philosophy of technology misunderstands or ignores, to the detriment of the field. Diverse contemporary approaches are engaged to make this claim, including those of Verbeek, Brey, Stiegler, Clark and Chalmers, Feenberg, and Fuchs. The article considers how these approaches stand in relation to tendencies towards determinism, subjectivism, and excessive forms of optimism and pessimism in contemporary considerations of the Internet. In terms of Kant’s transcendental idealism, specifically, it concludes by arguing that contemporary philosophy of technology does not go far enough in considering the Internet as a “regulative idea”; in terms of transcendental approaches more generally, it concludes by arguing that openness to the transcendental has the potential to call into question presuppositions regarding what constitutes an “empirical” object of enquiry in philosophy of technology, thereby, opening the field up to important new areas of research.
- 26 August 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 28 (4) , 533-551
Rewriting the Constitution: A Critique of ‘Postphenomenology’
- 26 August 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 28 (4) , 533-551
Rewriting the Constitution: A Critique of ‘Postphenomenology’
- 1 February 2013
- Published by Edinburgh University Press in Deleuze Studies
- Vol. 7 (1) , 83-105
Beyond Bartleby and Bad Faith: Thinking Critically with Sartre and Deleuze
This essay argues that important critical and political perspective can be gained on Deleuze's famous essay, ‘Bartleby; or, The Formula’ by viewing it as an attempt to move beyond the Sartrean framework of ‘bad faith’. The argument comprises four sections. In section one, I contextualise Deleuze's essay in terms of contrasting readings of Bartleby, from a prior account by Georges Perec, to contemporary accounts indebted to Deleuze, from Hardt and Negri's Empire to Gisèle Berkman's recent L'Effet Bartleby. The argument of this section is that a problematically reductive image of Bartleby has emerged in the wake of Deleuze's essay, but that this can be challenged in favour of a more nuanced and politically significant reading by contextualising the essay as an attempt to overcome bad faith. In section two, I develop this by drawing out the nature and relevance of the threat posed by bad faith through a focus on Sartrean, Deleuzian and Badioucan critiques of Bartleby, before arguing, in section three, that attention to the concept of a ‘logic of presuppositions’ developed in Deleuze's essay shows how bad faith can be overcome. These sections all build towards the fourth and longest section, which draws out the wider political significance of what it means to overcome bad faith. To do so, I pay attention to how logics of presupposition function in Bartleby's story, and consider Deleuze's essay in relation to his work on ‘control societies’ and ‘collective assemblages of enunciation’.
- 1 February 2013
- Published by Edinburgh University Press in Deleuze Studies
- Vol. 7 (1) , 83-105
Beyond Bartleby and Bad Faith: Thinking Critically with Sartre and Deleuze
This essay argues that important critical and political perspective can be gained on Deleuze's famous essay, ‘Bartleby; or, The Formula’ by viewing it as an attempt to move beyond the Sartrean framework of ‘bad faith’. The argument comprises four sections. In section one, I contextualise Deleuze's essay in terms of contrasting readings of Bartleby, from a prior account by Georges Perec, to contemporary accounts indebted to Deleuze, from Hardt and Negri's Empire to Gisèle Berkman's recent L'Effet Bartleby. The argument of this section is that a problematically reductive image of Bartleby has emerged in the wake of Deleuze's essay, but that this can be challenged in favour of a more nuanced and politically significant reading by contextualising the essay as an attempt to overcome bad faith. In section two, I develop this by drawing out the nature and relevance of the threat posed by bad faith through a focus on Sartrean, Deleuzian and Badioucan critiques of Bartleby, before arguing, in section three, that attention to the concept of a ‘logic of presuppositions’ developed in Deleuze's essay shows how bad faith can be overcome. These sections all build towards the fourth and longest section, which draws out the wider political significance of what it means to overcome bad faith. To do so, I pay attention to how logics of presupposition function in Bartleby's story, and consider Deleuze's essay in relation to his work on ‘control societies’ and ‘collective assemblages of enunciation’.
- 1 December 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Angelaki
- Vol. 12 (3) , 35-55
“Deleuze's Ethics Of Reading”
- 1 December 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Angelaki
- Vol. 12 (3) , 35-55
“Deleuze's Ethics Of Reading”