Sukhdev Johal
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Sukhdev Johal has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Karel Williams
University of Manchester
19 shared publications - Julie Froud
University of Manchester
16 shared publications - Michael Moran
Southwestern Urology, Tucson, Arizona 85715, USA
16 shared publications - Adam Leaver
Sheffield University Management School, University of Sheffield
15 shared publications - Ismail Ertürk
Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester
13 shared publications Adriana Nilsson
8 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 8 February 2017
- Published by Bristol University Press
Avoiding ‘back to the future’ policies by reforming the ‘foundational economy’
Johal, Moran and Williams outline a complementary strategic policy for business accountability to those of Jones and Cumbers. Criticising unrealistic ideas for state control of an increasingly nebulous and fragmented ‘national economy’, they point to the massive potential relevance of a ‘foundational economy’ of locally-based utilities and service provision. These sectors, which range from the ’para-statal’ outsourced public services into informal sectors, such as family care, employ up to a third of the UK workforce; often as low-paid – and female – workers. These concerns are mainly sheltered from the major pressures of international markets but many depend upon approval and quasi-regulation from public and local authorities; for example local council planning permission for retail establishments. So Johal et al recommend a form of re-embedded social accountability for these sectors, through forms of business licensing that is conditional on meeting key social criteria in community responsibility; e.g. for sourcing, training and payment of living wages. A national ‘constitutional settlement’, involving democratic deliberation and multi-stakeholder participation, should construct this foundational compact.
- 8 February 2017
- Published by Bristol University Press
Avoiding ‘back to the future’ policies by reforming the ‘foundational economy’
Johal, Moran and Williams outline a complementary strategic policy for business accountability to those of Jones and Cumbers. Criticising unrealistic ideas for state control of an increasingly nebulous and fragmented ‘national economy’, they point to the massive potential relevance of a ‘foundational economy’ of locally-based utilities and service provision. These sectors, which range from the ’para-statal’ outsourced public services into informal sectors, such as family care, employ up to a third of the UK workforce; often as low-paid – and female – workers. These concerns are mainly sheltered from the major pressures of international markets but many depend upon approval and quasi-regulation from public and local authorities; for example local council planning permission for retail establishments. So Johal et al recommend a form of re-embedded social accountability for these sectors, through forms of business licensing that is conditional on meeting key social criteria in community responsibility; e.g. for sourcing, training and payment of living wages. A national ‘constitutional settlement’, involving democratic deliberation and multi-stakeholder participation, should construct this foundational compact.
- 19 May 2016
- Published by Wiley in The Political Quarterly
- Vol. 87 (3) , 389-397
Breaking the Constitutional Silence: the Public Services Industry and Government
- 19 May 2016
- Published by Wiley in The Political Quarterly
- Vol. 87 (3) , 389-397
Breaking the Constitutional Silence: the Public Services Industry and Government
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Manchester University Press
- p. 27-39
Outsourcing, blame-shifting and major fiascos
The outsourcing revolution is part of a revolution in policy delivery in Britain. That revolution involves shifting responsibility for policy from the governing elite to others – to outsourcing firms themselves, to administrators and to lower level public officials. It thus involves a major exercise in blame shifting, where responsibility for fiascos is diverted from those at the top of politics and economic life and heaped on those who in practice have little power over their shaping. The result is to greatly weaken accountability, and the chief aim of the concerned citizen should be to penetrate the veils surrounding accountability.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Manchester University Press
- p. 27-39
Outsourcing, blame-shifting and major fiascos
The outsourcing revolution is part of a revolution in policy delivery in Britain. That revolution involves shifting responsibility for policy from the governing elite to others – to outsourcing firms themselves, to administrators and to lower level public officials. It thus involves a major exercise in blame shifting, where responsibility for fiascos is diverted from those at the top of politics and economic life and heaped on those who in practice have little power over their shaping. The result is to greatly weaken accountability, and the chief aim of the concerned citizen should be to penetrate the veils surrounding accountability.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Manchester University Press
- p. 77-93
Outsourcing specialists and the gaming of limited liability
The problems of outsourcing do not exist in isolation: they are lodged in a wider business system whose rules and culture enable opportunistic behaviour. At the heart is the system of limited liability, which historically was designed to help entrepreneurs manage and restrict risk in venture, but which in the era of globally organised enterprises offers numerous opportunistic to manipulate balance sheets to allocate and reallocate debt and game tax systems. Two case studies show that this is central to the outsourcing system. They involve Veolia and Biffa, two firms central to an apparently mundane activity, waste management, but which illustrate precisely the opportunistic manipulation of tax regimes, limited liability and corporate governance.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Manchester University Press
- p. 77-93
Outsourcing specialists and the gaming of limited liability
The problems of outsourcing do not exist in isolation: they are lodged in a wider business system whose rules and culture enable opportunistic behaviour. At the heart is the system of limited liability, which historically was designed to help entrepreneurs manage and restrict risk in venture, but which in the era of globally organised enterprises offers numerous opportunistic to manipulate balance sheets to allocate and reallocate debt and game tax systems. Two case studies show that this is central to the outsourcing system. They involve Veolia and Biffa, two firms central to an apparently mundane activity, waste management, but which illustrate precisely the opportunistic manipulation of tax regimes, limited liability and corporate governance.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Manchester University Press
- p. 58-76
Undisciplined outsourcing conglomerates
Outsourcing exhibits a peculiar paradox which is at the heart of this system: firms are simultaneously highly exploitative and highly fragile in their business resilience. The explanation is that outsourcing are forced to play contract roulette. They are in essence bidding machines which can only survive by constantly chasing new contracts and making fresh acquisitions. The result is that they are also forced to take on contractual commitments for which they are ill prepared. The conventional source of discipline and restraint in this perpetual bidding operation, the stock market, simply fails to operate. On the contrary analysts perpetually egg on firms to acquire new lines, and new sources of risk. Thus firms which deliver services only at the price of extracting huge returns on capital, and by exploiting their workforce, nevertheless find themselves lurching from crisis to crisis, thus endangering the wider stability of the whole outsourcing sysem.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Manchester University Press
- p. 58-76
Undisciplined outsourcing conglomerates
Outsourcing exhibits a peculiar paradox which is at the heart of this system: firms are simultaneously highly exploitative and highly fragile in their business resilience. The explanation is that outsourcing are forced to play contract roulette. They are in essence bidding machines which can only survive by constantly chasing new contracts and making fresh acquisitions. The result is that they are also forced to take on contractual commitments for which they are ill prepared. The conventional source of discipline and restraint in this perpetual bidding operation, the stock market, simply fails to operate. On the contrary analysts perpetually egg on firms to acquire new lines, and new sources of risk. Thus firms which deliver services only at the price of extracting huge returns on capital, and by exploiting their workforce, nevertheless find themselves lurching from crisis to crisis, thus endangering the wider stability of the whole outsourcing sysem.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Manchester University Press
- p. 40-57
Unjustifiable profit-taking on mundane contracts
Most public discussion of outsourcing focuses on high level fiascos. But most outsourcing is very different – low level conduct of mundane operations which rarely attracts public attention. This ‘below the radar’ outsourcing, though, offers huge opportunities for dazzling rates of return on virtually risk free terms. These dazzling returns are connected to two features: to ‘gaming’ the contract system, where the terms are manipulated by service deliverers; and creaming profits by pressing down on the pay and conditions of workers in outsourced sectors.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Manchester University Press
- p. 40-57
Unjustifiable profit-taking on mundane contracts
Most public discussion of outsourcing focuses on high level fiascos. But most outsourcing is very different – low level conduct of mundane operations which rarely attracts public attention. This ‘below the radar’ outsourcing, though, offers huge opportunities for dazzling rates of return on virtually risk free terms. These dazzling returns are connected to two features: to ‘gaming’ the contract system, where the terms are manipulated by service deliverers; and creaming profits by pressing down on the pay and conditions of workers in outsourced sectors.
- 1 April 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 60-78
Reframing Industrial Policy
This chapter has reservations about the efficacy of industrial policy to rebalance the UK economy. It raises the usual concerns about the UK’s secular decline but in doing so argues that new industrial strategies overly focused upon promoting national systems of innovation are overly optimistic and are somewhat misplaced. The argument is that the UK lacks the policy levers to deliver a major transformation (in manufacturing performance) and that such strategies fail to account for the severity of regional and social imbalances that have become entrenched since the late 1980s. The chapter argues for reframing industrial policy by focusing upon the ‘foundational economy’ which produces everyday goods and services (such as health, education, transport, and retail banking) and is distributed according to population.
- 1 April 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 60-78
Reframing Industrial Policy
This chapter has reservations about the efficacy of industrial policy to rebalance the UK economy. It raises the usual concerns about the UK’s secular decline but in doing so argues that new industrial strategies overly focused upon promoting national systems of innovation are overly optimistic and are somewhat misplaced. The argument is that the UK lacks the policy levers to deliver a major transformation (in manufacturing performance) and that such strategies fail to account for the severity of regional and social imbalances that have become entrenched since the late 1980s. The chapter argues for reframing industrial policy by focusing upon the ‘foundational economy’ which produces everyday goods and services (such as health, education, transport, and retail banking) and is distributed according to population.
- 1 September 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 219-248
Reform? Hubristic Intervention or Effective Democracy
In this concluding chapter, we do not produce lists of changes required to fix the financial system, but instead reflect on the preceding analysis to find some bearings that could lead towards a much more political analysis of, and intervention against, finance. The introduction to this book reframes the crisis as an elite political debacle rather than some kind of socio-technical accident. The front half of the book describes the aggrandisement of finance under cover of a dubious alibi about financial innovation, while the back half analyses the collapse of public regulation before the crisis and the frustration of financial reform after the crisis across several different jurisdictions. In this conclusion, we draw the political corollary by envisaging a reassertion of democratic control through a combination of measures that both make finance simpler and, through cultural and political changes, change the relation between political and financial elites.
- 1 September 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 219-248
Reform? Hubristic Intervention or Effective Democracy
In this concluding chapter, we do not produce lists of changes required to fix the financial system, but instead reflect on the preceding analysis to find some bearings that could lead towards a much more political analysis of, and intervention against, finance. The introduction to this book reframes the crisis as an elite political debacle rather than some kind of socio-technical accident. The front half of the book describes the aggrandisement of finance under cover of a dubious alibi about financial innovation, while the back half analyses the collapse of public regulation before the crisis and the frustration of financial reform after the crisis across several different jurisdictions. In this conclusion, we draw the political corollary by envisaging a reassertion of democratic control through a combination of measures that both make finance simpler and, through cultural and political changes, change the relation between political and financial elites.
- 1 September 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 188-218
The Limits of Expertise: The United Kingdom as an Unhappy Family
Democratic politicians were central to crisis management in 2008, but they were marginalized once again after the crisis by various kinds of technocrats. This chapter argues that the failure to sustain financial reform in the succeeding couple of years is about the limits of expertise and technocracy, focusing on the UK case. The chapter begins by analysing how, following bank nationalization, the UK Treasury kept management of these organizations at arm’s length by relying on a network of trusted City figures. While technocratic elites have been vocal in their critiques of the finance sector and its regulation, they have operated in an expert, not a political sphere. The second half of the chapter argues first that finance created asset price inflation not productive transformation in the United Kingdom; before exploring the significance of public sector job creation as part of the unsustainable national business model.
- 1 September 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 188-218
The Limits of Expertise: The United Kingdom as an Unhappy Family
Democratic politicians were central to crisis management in 2008, but they were marginalized once again after the crisis by various kinds of technocrats. This chapter argues that the failure to sustain financial reform in the succeeding couple of years is about the limits of expertise and technocracy, focusing on the UK case. The chapter begins by analysing how, following bank nationalization, the UK Treasury kept management of these organizations at arm’s length by relying on a network of trusted City figures. While technocratic elites have been vocal in their critiques of the finance sector and its regulation, they have operated in an expert, not a political sphere. The second half of the chapter argues first that finance created asset price inflation not productive transformation in the United Kingdom; before exploring the significance of public sector job creation as part of the unsustainable national business model.