LCL. Jean Camp

L. Jean Camp

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


L. Jean Camp has a total of 74 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Lessons in In Privacy and Safety from Interactions with a General Purpose Chatbot

    by Jayati Dev, Tatiana Ringenberg, L. Jean Camp, Jacob Abbott

    The ability of chatbots to engage in fluid and complex discussions creates new challenges in human-computer interaction. Prior research shows that when chatbots appear indistinguishable from human-human interactions they can influence information sharing and disclosure. In this study, we explore (i) information disclosure themes around the type of information users are willing to share and (ii) the types of data that can be gathered based on the sensitive information definitions laid out in the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). We conducted a thematic analysis of 37 conversational logs from a general-purpose chatbot (Cleverbot). Our findings provide general insights into conversational expectations and disclosures of users, indicating a need for privacy-preserving design. Our work provides developers and privacy researchers with an analysis of chatbot relationship-building that leads to information disclosure topics from our sample. We close with recommendations for integrating privacy-preserving principles into conversation chatbot design.

  • Open Access

    Usability, Efficacy, and Acceptability of the U.S. Cyber Trust Mark

    by Peter Caven, Ambarish Gurjar, Zitao Zhang, Xinyao Ma, Ljean Camp


  • Open Access

    Avara: A Uniform Evaluation System for Perceptibility Analysis Against Adversarial Object Evasion Attacks

    by Xinyao Ma, Chaoqi Zhang, Huadi Zhu, L. Jean Camp, Ming Li, Xiaojing Liao

    Thanks to recent advances in machine learning (ML) techniques, Autonomous Driving (AD) has seen significant breakthroughs with enhanced capabilities. However, the susceptibility of ML models to adversarial evasion attacks poses a critical threat, undermining the reliability of autonomous driving systems. Despite efforts by researchers to mitigate these attacks within the AD context, unfortunately, a significant gap persists in fully understanding such adversarial maneuvers, particularly from a driver's perspective. To bridge this gap, we propose Avara, the first unified evaluation platform for assessing human drivers' perceptibility to adversarial attacks in AD contexts. Leveraging Virtual Reality (VR) and eye-tracking technology, Avara captures multi-modal driver awareness data, enabling detailed assessments of driver perception. Our approach integrates three distinct sources of multi-modal awareness evaluation metrics, addressing gaps inherent in previous evaluation strategies. The effectiveness and usability of Avara were validated through a human subject study, where participants engaged actively with the platform and provided extensive feedback on their perception and response to adversarial evasion attacks. Utilizing Avara, we identify an intriguing discovery that the current imperceptibility metrics for adversarial attacks fail to accurately reflect the autonomous vehicle driver's perceptibility.


  • Open Access

    AI Must Be Anti-Ableist and Accessible

    by Jennifer Mankoff, Devva Kasnitz, L. Jean Camp, Jonathan Lazar, Harry Hochheiser

    Seeking to improve AI accessibility by changing how AI-based systems are built.


  • Open Access

    User-Centered Phishing Detection through Personalized Edge Computing

    by Sanchari Das, DongInn Kim, Jacob Abbott, L. Jean Camp

    Ensuring user-centered phishing detection is a significant challenge due to the difficulty in distinguishing threats. To address this, we propose a personalized tool - Holistic User-Centered Identification of Threats at the Edge (HUCITE). Our system utilizes probabilistic logic to provide real-time risk estimates for local machines and employs simple cartoons as a user interface. Our approach focuses on identifying anomalies in a single machine and user browsing history for the generation of a personalized green list and global threat information for a shared red list. This approach enables blocking and identification of phishing websites, potentially malicious scripts, unfamiliar domains, and previously unencountered certificate authorities. By creating a zone of safety for a specific user and identifying departures from that zone, our approach addresses the limitations of traditional anomaly detection techniques. We present the underlying architecture and approach to local risk identification, reporting on an in-lab experiment involving 45 participants to test the effectiveness of our system in various stress conditions affecting users' phishing perception.


  • Open Access

    Comparing the Use and Usefulness of Four IoT Security Labels

    by Peter Caven, Zitao Zhang, Jacob Abbott, Xinyao Ma, L. Jean Camp

    There are currently multiple proposed security label designs for consumer products, with each prioritizing different security and privacy factors. These differences risk making product comparisons more confusing than informative. Standardized labels could potentially resolve this by informing consumers of a product’s security features at the point of purchase. But which standard? This survey, of 500 participants, studied four label designs and measured comprehension, response time, acceptability, and cognitive load. We gauged understanding of participant perception and preferences using three smart devices: light bulbs, cameras, and thermostats. We identified preferences and behaviors before, during, and after label use for product selection. At first, participants believed more information-dense labels would better support their purchasing behavior; however, after they evaluated and compared products, participants gravitated towards less cognitively demanding designs. We identified how participants utilized and prioritized label elements to provide recommendations for US label design efforts.


  • Open Access

    Towards a More Secure Ecosystem: Implications for Cybersecurity Labels and SBOMs

    by Peter Caven, L. Jean Camp

    Regulatory efforts to enhance the security of the United States’ cybersecurity supply chain were enacted through Presidential Executive Order 14028. Two components of this were a framework for a cohesive cybersecurity labeling program and the requirement for a software bill of materials (SBOM). The 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy explicitly reified the importance of cybersecurity labels and SBOMs. While significant efforts have been made since the Executive Order was issued, both label and SBOM efforts remain relatively inchoate. Labels are intended for use during point-of-purchase, while SBOMs are designed to track vulnerabilities through a supply chain. Ideally, the combination of SBOMs and labels will enhance the security posture of products, nudging consumers towards more security-focused decisions throughout a product’s lifecycle. The efficacy of labels and SBOMs will be a function of their reliability and relevance. In this work, we address which security factors are most desired by consumers, and identify how these differ across different consumers based on demographics and context.

  • Open Access

    An Argument and Worked Example: Private DNS as a Human Right

    by L. Jean Camp, Natnatee Ko Dokmai

    Domain Name System (DNS) privacy and security are the core argument for encrypted DNS. However, the present encrypted DNS proposals do not necessarily increase consumers' privacy; in addition, the current implementations of transit-only protection create additional security and privacy risks. The most notable risk is increased data concentration at DNS operators. It is not far-fetched to claim that concentration of data is a privacy violation, given the exploitation of users' data by data collectors and online services in the recent years. The second security and privacy risk is the removal of traditional DNS-based defense at the network edge, leaving the control over security policies to DNS operators. In this work we illustrate that private DNS in a highly concentrated market at some computational cost. Details on the computational cost are available as a cryptological preprint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1082