Ines Dombrowsky
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ines Dombrowsky has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eran Feitelson
Department of Geography, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel
1 shared publication Natalie Mutlak
Bremen University, Bremen, Germany
1 shared publicationNir Becker
Department of Economics and Management, Tel Hai College, Upper Galilee, Israel
1 shared publicationRam Almog
Department of Geography, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
1 shared publicationSimone Klawitter
Water Sector Reform Program, German Development Cooperation GTZ, Lusaka, Zambia
1 shared publicationStefan Lindemann
Environmental Policy Research Centre, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 April 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental Management
- Vol. 45 (5) , 1112-1126
How Widely Applicable is River Basin Management? An Analysis of Wastewater Management in an Arid Transboundary Case
- 11 April 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental Management
- Vol. 45 (5) , 1112-1126
How Widely Applicable is River Basin Management? An Analysis of Wastewater Management in an Arid Transboundary Case
- 8 April 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Water International
- Vol. 35 (2) , 132-149
The role of intra-water sector issue linkage in the resolution of transboundary water conflicts
Issue linkage has often been mentioned as a strategy for resolving transboundary water conflicts. Given that water is a multi-functional resource, there may in principle also be opportunities for issue linkage within the water sector. As a first step this paper introduces two types of intra-water sector issue linkages: (1) the linkage of water uses with effects in reversed directions, and (2) the linkage of water uses with rectified effects in river basins in which riparians hold reversed positions. As a second step it explores the empirical relevance of different linkages in the Scheldt-Meuse and the Colorado-Rio Grande negotiations.
- 8 April 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Water International
- Vol. 35 (2) , 132-149
The role of intra-water sector issue linkage in the resolution of transboundary water conflicts
Issue linkage has often been mentioned as a strategy for resolving transboundary water conflicts. Given that water is a multi-functional resource, there may in principle also be opportunities for issue linkage within the water sector. As a first step this paper introduces two types of intra-water sector issue linkages: (1) the linkage of water uses with effects in reversed directions, and (2) the linkage of water uses with rectified effects in river basins in which riparians hold reversed positions. As a second step it explores the empirical relevance of different linkages in the Scheldt-Meuse and the Colorado-Rio Grande negotiations.
- 1 April 2009
- Published by IWA Publishing in Water Policy
- Vol. 11 (2) , 125-140
Revisiting the potential for benefit sharing in the management of trans-boundary rivers
It has been suggested that trans-boundary water conflicts may be resolved through benefit sharing. The idea of benefit sharing is that a zero-sum game of water sharing is replaced through a positive-sum game of benefit sharing. In order to test the benefit sharing hypothesis, this paper presents a conceptual analysis of the incentives and institutional prerequisites required to realize mutual benefits in the use of trans-boundary rivers. The paper argues that it is useful to distinguish negative and positive unidirectional externality problems related to the use of trans-boundary rivers, as these two cases represent fundamentally different cooperation problems. In the case of negative externalities, the benefits of cooperation exist in principle, but their realization requires an agreement on often disputed property rights as well as on the set up of an enforcement mechanism. Thus cooperation remains institutionally demanding. In contrast, in the case of positive externality problems, no property rights issues are involved. However, whether cooperation can be expected depends on the underlying payoff structure. The downstream riparian can be expected to participate in the provision of a positive externality upstream, either if the project is only collectively rational (coordination problem) or if the downstream riparian's participation allows for a Pareto improvement vis-à-vis the non-cooperative solution (cooperation problem). Given the property rights implications of negative externality problems, it may be useful, where possible, to refocus from negative to positive externality problems.
- 1 April 2009
- Published by IWA Publishing in Water Policy
- Vol. 11 (2) , 125-140
Revisiting the potential for benefit sharing in the management of trans-boundary rivers
It has been suggested that trans-boundary water conflicts may be resolved through benefit sharing. The idea of benefit sharing is that a zero-sum game of water sharing is replaced through a positive-sum game of benefit sharing. In order to test the benefit sharing hypothesis, this paper presents a conceptual analysis of the incentives and institutional prerequisites required to realize mutual benefits in the use of trans-boundary rivers. The paper argues that it is useful to distinguish negative and positive unidirectional externality problems related to the use of trans-boundary rivers, as these two cases represent fundamentally different cooperation problems. In the case of negative externalities, the benefits of cooperation exist in principle, but their realization requires an agreement on often disputed property rights as well as on the set up of an enforcement mechanism. Thus cooperation remains institutionally demanding. In contrast, in the case of positive externality problems, no property rights issues are involved. However, whether cooperation can be expected depends on the underlying payoff structure. The downstream riparian can be expected to participate in the provision of a positive externality upstream, either if the project is only collectively rational (coordination problem) or if the downstream riparian's participation allows for a Pareto improvement vis-à-vis the non-cooperative solution (cooperation problem). Given the property rights implications of negative externality problems, it may be useful, where possible, to refocus from negative to positive externality problems.
- Open Access
- 4 February 2008
- Published by Copernicus GmbH in Hydrology and Earth System Sciences
- Vol. 12 (1) , 223-238
Institutional design and regime effectiveness in transboundary river management – the Elbe water quality regime
The literature on transboundary river management suggests that institutions play an important role in bringing about cooperation. However, knowledge about how such institutions should be designed in order to do so remains limited. One way to learn more about adequate institutional design is to assess the effectiveness of existing regimes, and to trace the causal relationships that lead to the respective outcomes. In order to gain further insights into the relationship between institutional design and regime effectiveness, this paper presents a study on the water quality regime of the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe (ICPE). The analysis is based on a review of pertinent documents and ten qualitative interviews with Czech and German Commission members and NGO representatives. Particular emphasis has been put on determining the ICPE's specific contribution and the no-regime counterfactual as well as on the perceived expediency of the institutional arrangements. The study shows overall that the countries were relatively successful in improving water quality in the Elbe basin. However, this outcome can only partly be attributed to the ICPE itself. Furthermore, the ICPE's contribution towards achieving the various goals varied significantly between the different areas of activity: it was relatively significant where the main responsibility for action lay with the public authorities, such as in the area of wastewater treatment and the establishment of an international alarm plan and model, but was practically non-existent in the reduction of non-point pollution from agriculture, where success depended on the behavior of individual private actors (farmers). The commission contributed towards problem solving by serving as a forum for the joint identification of priorities for action from a basin-wide perspective. The resulting international obligations increased the power of national water administrations and their access to funds. At the same time, the Commission's reporting to the public served as an enforcement mechanism. From a methodological point of view, the paper highlights the opportunities and limitations of a combined quantitative and qualitative approach to determining regime effectiveness.
- 4 February 2008
- Published by Copernicus GmbH in Hydrology and Earth System Sciences
- Vol. 12 (1) , 223-238
Open AccessInstitutional design and regime effectiveness in transboundary river management – the Elbe water quality regime
The literature on transboundary river management suggests that institutions play an important role in bringing about cooperation. However, knowledge about how such institutions should be designed in order to do so remains limited. One way to learn more about adequate institutional design is to assess the effectiveness of existing regimes, and to trace the causal relationships that lead to the respective outcomes. In order to gain further insights into the relationship between institutional design and regime effectiveness, this paper presents a study on the water quality regime of the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe (ICPE). The analysis is based on a review of pertinent documents and ten qualitative interviews with Czech and German Commission members and NGO representatives. Particular emphasis has been put on determining the ICPE's specific contribution and the no-regime counterfactual as well as on the perceived expediency of the institutional arrangements. The study shows overall that the countries were relatively successful in improving water quality in the Elbe basin. However, this outcome can only partly be attributed to the ICPE itself. Furthermore, the ICPE's contribution towards achieving the various goals varied significantly between the different areas of activity: it was relatively significant where the main responsibility for action lay with the public authorities, such as in the area of wastewater treatment and the establishment of an international alarm plan and model, but was practically non-existent in the reduction of non-point pollution from agriculture, where success depended on the behavior of individual private actors (farmers). The commission contributed towards problem solving by serving as a forum for the joint identification of priorities for action from a basin-wide perspective. The resulting international obligations increased the power of national water administrations and their access to funds. At the same time, the Commission's reporting to the public served as an enforcement mechanism. From a methodological point of view, the paper highlights the opportunities and limitations of a combined quantitative and qualitative approach to determining regime effectiveness.