David L. Faigman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
David L. Faigman has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
A. Philip Dawid
Centre for Mathematical Sciences, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK
2 shared publicationsStephen E. Fienberg
Department of Statistics, Heinz College, Machine Learning Department, and Cylab, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
2 shared publicationsJohn Monahan
School of Law, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 December 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 153-175
Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases
- 18 December 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Sociological Methods & Research
- Vol. 44 (1) , 165-174
On the Causes of Effects
We welcome Professor Pearl’s comment on our original article, Dawid et al. Our focus there on the distinction between the “Effects of Causes” (EoC) and the “Causes of Effects” (CoE) concerned two fundamental problems, one a theoretical challenge in statistics and the other a practical challenge for trial courts. In this response, we seek to accomplish several things. First, using Pearl’s own notation, we attempt to clarify the similarities and differences between his technical approach and that in Dawid et al. Second, we consider the more practical challenges for CoE in the trial court setting, and explain why we believe Pearl’s analyses, as described via his example, fail to address these. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.
- 18 December 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Sociological Methods & Research
- Vol. 44 (1) , 165-174
On the Causes of Effects
We welcome Professor Pearl’s comment on our original article, Dawid et al. Our focus there on the distinction between the “Effects of Causes” (EoC) and the “Causes of Effects” (CoE) concerned two fundamental problems, one a theoretical challenge in statistics and the other a practical challenge for trial courts. In this response, we seek to accomplish several things. First, using Pearl’s own notation, we attempt to clarify the similarities and differences between his technical approach and that in Dawid et al. Second, we consider the more practical challenges for CoE in the trial court setting, and explain why we believe Pearl’s analyses, as described via his example, fail to address these. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.
- 19 December 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Sociological Methods & Research
- Vol. 43 (3) , 416-421
Authors’ Response to Comments on Fitting Science Into Legal Contexts
- 19 December 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Sociological Methods & Research
- Vol. 43 (3) , 416-421
Authors’ Response to Comments on Fitting Science Into Legal Contexts
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Psychology
- Vol. 56 (1) , 631-659
Psychological Evidence at the Dawn of the Law's Scientific Age
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., holding that the admissibility of scientific evidence depends on its scientific merit, has made American law receptive to valid science to an unprecedented degree. We review the implications for psychology of the law's taking science seriously. We consider the law before Daubert, and the ways that Daubert as well as modifications to the Federal Rules of Evidence have affected the admissibility of expert testimony. We describe the ramifications of these changes for psychology used as authority to create a general legal rule, as evidence to determine a specific fact, and as framework to provide context. Finally, future prospects for improving psychological testimony are offered: Court-appointed experts will increase the psychological sophistication of judges and juries, and evidence-based practices on the part of psychologists will increase the sophistication of the expert testimony that they proffer in court.
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Psychology
- Vol. 56 (1) , 631-659
Psychological Evidence at the Dawn of the Law's Scientific Age
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., holding that the admissibility of scientific evidence depends on its scientific merit, has made American law receptive to valid science to an unprecedented degree. We review the implications for psychology of the law's taking science seriously. We consider the law before Daubert, and the ways that Daubert as well as modifications to the Federal Rules of Evidence have affected the admissibility of expert testimony. We describe the ramifications of these changes for psychology used as authority to create a general legal rule, as evidence to determine a specific fact, and as framework to provide context. Finally, future prospects for improving psychological testimony are offered: Court-appointed experts will increase the psychological sophistication of judges and juries, and evidence-based practices on the part of psychologists will increase the sophistication of the expert testimony that they proffer in court.
- 19 July 2002
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 297 (5580) , 339-340
Is Science Different for Lawyers?
Courts are obligated to evaluate the basis for proffered expert opinion to determine whether it is reliable and valid. This gate-keeping requirement compels them to review a wide variety of expertises, from auto mechanics to physicists. Increasingly, in the area of forensic science in particular, courts have begun to question whether the scientific method ought to be the touchstone by which they examine expert opinions, because doing so would appear to require the exclusion of evidence, such as fingerprinting, that is a staple of the trial process. In this Policy Forum, [D. L. Faigman][1] argues that the scientific method should be the touchstone by which all experts are judged. Scientists can be instrumental in assisting courts in the admittedly difficult task of evaluating the wide range of experts and expertises that make their way into court. [1]: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/297/5580/339
- 19 July 2002
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 297 (5580) , 339-340
Is Science Different for Lawyers?
Courts are obligated to evaluate the basis for proffered expert opinion to determine whether it is reliable and valid. This gate-keeping requirement compels them to review a wide variety of expertises, from auto mechanics to physicists. Increasingly, in the area of forensic science in particular, courts have begun to question whether the scientific method ought to be the touchstone by which they examine expert opinions, because doing so would appear to require the exclusion of evidence, such as fingerprinting, that is a staple of the trial process. In this Policy Forum, [D. L. Faigman][1] argues that the scientific method should be the touchstone by which all experts are judged. Scientists can be instrumental in assisting courts in the admittedly difficult task of evaluating the wide range of experts and expertises that make their way into court. [1]: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/297/5580/339