Nicolas Jabko
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Latest Publications
- 22 March 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 17 (3) , 318-334
The hidden face of the euro
Europe's economic and monetary union is often depicted as a market-conforming institutional order. The creation of an inflation-fighting independent European Central Bank and the obligation of member governments to maintain fiscal discipline are widely cited as evidence of the European desire to maintain stability and thus placate financial markets. But the euro also has a more hidden face, which is much less liberal and more decidedly managerial. The single currency is itself the boldest expression of a nascent federal power at the European level. It represents a far-reaching delegation of competence from the member states to the institutions of the European Union. It has also enabled member states not only to create a framework for multilateral fiscal discipline – the Stability and Growth Pact – but also to collectively regain some clout vis-à-vis market actors. The question for the future is whether EU and national policy-makers will be able and willing to pursue collective priorities beyond monetary stability and the rules of the Stability Pact.
- 22 March 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 17 (3) , 318-334
The hidden face of the euro
Europe's economic and monetary union is often depicted as a market-conforming institutional order. The creation of an inflation-fighting independent European Central Bank and the obligation of member governments to maintain fiscal discipline are widely cited as evidence of the European desire to maintain stability and thus placate financial markets. But the euro also has a more hidden face, which is much less liberal and more decidedly managerial. The single currency is itself the boldest expression of a nascent federal power at the European level. It represents a far-reaching delegation of competence from the member states to the institutions of the European Union. It has also enabled member states not only to create a framework for multilateral fiscal discipline – the Stability and Growth Pact – but also to collectively regain some clout vis-à-vis market actors. The question for the future is whether EU and national policy-makers will be able and willing to pursue collective priorities beyond monetary stability and the rules of the Stability Pact.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue française de science politique
- Vol. 55 (2) , 221-242
Comment la France définit ses intérêts dans l'Union européenne
Cet article avance une lecture institutionnaliste des positions françaises dans le débat sur l’avenir de l’Europe depuis le traité de Maastricht de 1992 jusqu’au traité constitutionnel de 2004. Selon cette lecture, le déterminant le plus important des préférences exprimées par la France a été la logique interne de l’exercice constitutionnel. En particulier, l’article met en lumière des phénomènes typiquement institutionnels de formatage du débat et de dépendance au sentier. Cette logique institutionnelle a été prépondérante par rapport aux ambitions de puissance nationale, aux considérations sur l’efficacité du processus de décision et à la vision de l’Europe des dirigeants français. De même, les considérations de politique intérieure ont joué un rôle relativement secondaire puisque la Constitution française autorisait le président à s’en affranchir.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue française de science politique
- Vol. 55 (2) , 221-242
Comment la France définit ses intérêts dans l'Union européenne
Cet article avance une lecture institutionnaliste des positions françaises dans le débat sur l’avenir de l’Europe depuis le traité de Maastricht de 1992 jusqu’au traité constitutionnel de 2004. Selon cette lecture, le déterminant le plus important des préférences exprimées par la France a été la logique interne de l’exercice constitutionnel. En particulier, l’article met en lumière des phénomènes typiquement institutionnels de formatage du débat et de dépendance au sentier. Cette logique institutionnelle a été prépondérante par rapport aux ambitions de puissance nationale, aux considérations sur l’efficacité du processus de décision et à la vision de l’Europe des dirigeants français. De même, les considérations de politique intérieure ont joué un rôle relativement secondaire puisque la Constitution française autorisait le président à s’en affranchir.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Critique internationale
- Vol. 27 (2) , 55-62
Monnaie et politique en Europe
European Currency and Politics This article examines the reasons for the difficult reform of the EU Stability and Growth Pact in March 2005. The debate on the Pact resuscitated a latent tension between two opposite sets of motivations that had led to the creation of the euro in the 1980s and 1990s. From this perspective, the reform of 2005 is a dilatory solution that leaves the political game fairly open.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Critique internationale
- Vol. 27 (2) , 55-62
Monnaie et politique en Europe
European Currency and Politics This article examines the reasons for the difficult reform of the EU Stability and Growth Pact in March 2005. The debate on the Pact resuscitated a latent tension between two opposite sets of motivations that had led to the creation of the euro in the 1980s and 1990s. From this perspective, the reform of 2005 is a dilatory solution that leaves the political game fairly open.
- 1 January 2004
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Critique internationale
- Vol. 25 (4) , 189-193
L'Europe en otage ?
- 1 January 2004
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Critique internationale
- Vol. 25 (4) , 189-193
L'Europe en otage ?