Ibrahim Al-Marashi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ibrahim Al-Marashi has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira
University of Minho
1 shared publication - Arshin Adib-Moghaddam
SOAS University of London
1 shared publication Aysegul Keskin
Political Science , Kent State University , Ohio, US
1 shared publication- Christian Kaunert
Dublin City University
1 shared publication - Fabio Cristiano
Utrecht University
1 shared publication - Lauro Borges
Department of Political Science, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Geopolitics
- Vol. 31 (3) , 1178-1220
The Geopolitics of AI-Driven Arms Races
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Geopolitics
- Vol. 31 (3) , 1178-1220
The Geopolitics of AI-Driven Arms Races
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Procon, Ltd. in Connections: The Quarterly Journal
- Vol. 22 (1) , 69-82
НАТО и антропогенная стратегическая безопасность
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Procon, Ltd. in Connections: The Quarterly Journal
- Vol. 22 (1) , 69-82
Open AccessНАТО и антропогенная стратегическая безопасность
- 8 July 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding
- Vol. 15 (4) , 441-458
Demobilization Minus Disarmament and Reintegration: Iraq’s Security Sector from the US Invasion to the Covid-19 Pandemic
This article argues that ethno-sectarian exclusion undermined the post-invasion attempts at security sector reform (SSR) in Iraq by the US and successive local governments. While corruption, poor management, improper training, and lack of equipment contributed to the collapse of the Iraqi military in the face of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria invasion in 2014, this article primarily examines how the exclusion of Arab and Turkmen Sunnis from the new security sector resulted in this failure. This event led to the rise of militias in Iraq, complicating SSR, but emerging as a de-facto strategy in maintaining domestic security.
- 8 July 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding
- Vol. 15 (4) , 441-458
Demobilization Minus Disarmament and Reintegration: Iraq’s Security Sector from the US Invasion to the Covid-19 Pandemic
This article argues that ethno-sectarian exclusion undermined the post-invasion attempts at security sector reform (SSR) in Iraq by the US and successive local governments. While corruption, poor management, improper training, and lack of equipment contributed to the collapse of the Iraqi military in the face of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria invasion in 2014, this article primarily examines how the exclusion of Arab and Turkmen Sunnis from the new security sector resulted in this failure. This event led to the rise of militias in Iraq, complicating SSR, but emerging as a de-facto strategy in maintaining domestic security.
- 12 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Politics
- Vol. 60 (1) , 194-213
Iraq’s popular mobilisation units: intra-sectarian rivalry and Arab Shi’a mobilisation from the 2003 invasion to Covid-19 pandemic
The Popular Mobilisation Units’ (PMU) rise in Iraq resulted from a de facto, post-2003 hybridization of security governance, opposed to an emergency
- 12 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Politics
- Vol. 60 (1) , 194-213
Iraq’s popular mobilisation units: intra-sectarian rivalry and Arab Shi’a mobilisation from the 2003 invasion to Covid-19 pandemic
The Popular Mobilisation Units’ (PMU) rise in Iraq resulted from a de facto, post-2003 hybridization of security governance, opposed to an emergency
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Project MUSE in Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies
- Vol. 44 (2) , 1-18
Baghdad in the Middle: Iraq’s Negotiation of its Constrained Sovereignty during the Trump Presidency
As of November 2020, President-Elect Joseph Biden and Vice President-Elect Kamala Harris articulated a vision for the next four years of foreign policy at a global level and regional levels, seeking to repair trans-Atlantic relations and pursue the elusive pivot to Asia. Nevertheless, the new administration has also to deal with the Trump administration’s legacy in the Middle East. The year 2020 ushered in a new decade with concerns over “World War III” breaking out after U.S. President Trump ordered the assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, only to be eclipsed by fears of the Covid-19 pandemic.1 Iraq emerged as a site where both these existential risk scenarios unfolded as a result of its position neighboring Iran. Headlines referring to Iraq often declare it as between “Iraq and a hard place,” a pun based on the phrase, “a rock and a hard place,” which encapsulates the argument of this article.2 The rivalry between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran, a conflict between a [End Page 1] superpower and a regional power, has served as a constant variable shaping Iraq’s domestic politics since 2003. While this bilateral conflict had been managed under the Obama administration into a de facto alliance in combatting the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, during the Trump administration it had escalated into direct violence. Trump’s repudiation of the Iran nuclear deal served as the primary causal factor in intensifying the tensions, which played out primarily on Iraqi soil, albeit with a brief period of clashes in Syria and the waters of the Gulf in May 2019.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Project MUSE in Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies
- Vol. 44 (2) , 1-18
Baghdad in the Middle: Iraq’s Negotiation of its Constrained Sovereignty during the Trump Presidency
As of November 2020, President-Elect Joseph Biden and Vice President-Elect Kamala Harris articulated a vision for the next four years of foreign policy at a global level and regional levels, seeking to repair trans-Atlantic relations and pursue the elusive pivot to Asia. Nevertheless, the new administration has also to deal with the Trump administration’s legacy in the Middle East. The year 2020 ushered in a new decade with concerns over “World War III” breaking out after U.S. President Trump ordered the assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, only to be eclipsed by fears of the Covid-19 pandemic.1 Iraq emerged as a site where both these existential risk scenarios unfolded as a result of its position neighboring Iran. Headlines referring to Iraq often declare it as between “Iraq and a hard place,” a pun based on the phrase, “a rock and a hard place,” which encapsulates the argument of this article.2 The rivalry between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran, a conflict between a [End Page 1] superpower and a regional power, has served as a constant variable shaping Iraq’s domestic politics since 2003. While this bilateral conflict had been managed under the Obama administration into a de facto alliance in combatting the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, during the Trump administration it had escalated into direct violence. Trump’s repudiation of the Iran nuclear deal served as the primary causal factor in intensifying the tensions, which played out primarily on Iraqi soil, albeit with a brief period of clashes in Syria and the waters of the Gulf in May 2019.
- 15 December 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
- Vol. 36 (3) , 449-461
Iraq's Gulf Policy and Regime Security from the Monarchy to the post-Ba'athist Era
Domestic regime security has explained Iraq's foreign policy to the Gulf since the birth of the nascent Hashemite kingdom in Baghdad. Saudi Arabia presented one of the first security threats to the Iraqi monarchy, and both King Ghazi and ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim sought to invade Kuwait in order to bolster their nationalist credentials at home. Baghdad's policy to Gulf prior to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War reflected a perceived threat from the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Thus, ensuring regime security in Baghdad has resulted in tensions with Iraq's Gulf neighbours since the creation of the Iraqi state.
- 15 December 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
- Vol. 36 (3) , 449-461
Iraq's Gulf Policy and Regime Security from the Monarchy to the post-Ba'athist Era
Domestic regime security has explained Iraq's foreign policy to the Gulf since the birth of the nascent Hashemite kingdom in Baghdad. Saudi Arabia presented one of the first security threats to the Iraqi monarchy, and both King Ghazi and ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim sought to invade Kuwait in order to bolster their nationalist credentials at home. Baghdad's policy to Gulf prior to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War reflected a perceived threat from the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Thus, ensuring regime security in Baghdad has resulted in tensions with Iraq's Gulf neighbours since the creation of the Iraqi state.
- 20 June 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Mediterranean Politics
- Vol. 13 (2) , 243-259
Reconciliation Dilemmas in Post-Ba'athist Iraq: Truth Commissions, Media and Ethno-sectarian Conflicts
Based on field work conducted in post-Ba'ath Iraq, as well as a study of official statements, print and broadcast media and insurgent communiqués and interviews with proponents of truth and reconciliation in post-war Iraq, this article examines attempts to create a truth and reconciliation committee to settle differences and tensions between former members of the party and communities affected by its collective policies. It shows that in 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority failed to endorse plans based on the South African model. Instead, it embarked on a policy of de-Ba'athification which eventually fed into the insurgency. Since then, the Arab League and Prime Minister Maliki have launched attempts to foster national reconciliation. The article argues that these initiatives failed because the idea of reconciliation from the outset was tied to greater political dynamics.
- 20 June 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Mediterranean Politics
- Vol. 13 (2) , 243-259
Reconciliation Dilemmas in Post-Ba'athist Iraq: Truth Commissions, Media and Ethno-sectarian Conflicts
Based on field work conducted in post-Ba'ath Iraq, as well as a study of official statements, print and broadcast media and insurgent communiqués and interviews with proponents of truth and reconciliation in post-war Iraq, this article examines attempts to create a truth and reconciliation committee to settle differences and tensions between former members of the party and communities affected by its collective policies. It shows that in 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority failed to endorse plans based on the South African model. Instead, it embarked on a policy of de-Ba'athification which eventually fed into the insurgency. Since then, the Arab League and Prime Minister Maliki have launched attempts to foster national reconciliation. The article argues that these initiatives failed because the idea of reconciliation from the outset was tied to greater political dynamics.