Kenneth Dyson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kenneth Dyson has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Martin Marcussen
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
1 shared publication Thomas Saalfeld
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 April 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 35 (3) , 207-222
Sworn to Grim Necessity? Imperfections of European Economic Governance, Normative Political Theory, and Supreme Emergency
This contribution examines the Euro Area crisis and European economic governance reforms through a less technocratic lens. It argues for the need to reframe debate around foundation issues in normative legal and political theory. The defining issue is supreme emergency. The credibility of its capacity to act in supreme emergency is of existential significance for the Euro Area. At the same time this capacity poses is bound up with basic legitimacy issues. In particular, it involves ultimately contentious requirements for supranational executive discretion, including credible contingent commitments to take exceptional measures. Meeting these requirements exposed a power vacuum within the Euro Area, consequent on domestic political constraints. This vacuum was filled—if reluctantly—by the European Central Bank. However, difficult legitimacy issues remain. They leave open the credibility of the ECB contingent commitment to act in supreme emergency.
- 17 April 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 35 (3) , 207-222
Sworn to Grim Necessity? Imperfections of European Economic Governance, Normative Political Theory, and Supreme Emergency
This contribution examines the Euro Area crisis and European economic governance reforms through a less technocratic lens. It argues for the need to reframe debate around foundation issues in normative legal and political theory. The defining issue is supreme emergency. The credibility of its capacity to act in supreme emergency is of existential significance for the Euro Area. At the same time this capacity poses is bound up with basic legitimacy issues. In particular, it involves ultimately contentious requirements for supranational executive discretion, including credible contingent commitments to take exceptional measures. Meeting these requirements exposed a power vacuum within the Euro Area, consequent on domestic political constraints. This vacuum was filled—if reluctantly—by the European Central Bank. However, difficult legitimacy issues remain. They leave open the credibility of the ECB contingent commitment to act in supreme emergency.
- 29 October 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 34 (7) , 791-808
‘Maastricht Plus’: Managing the Logic of Inherent Imperfections
Seen from the perspective of the interconnected excessive imbalances, banking, and sovereign debt crises that beset the Euro Area from 2007, the central inadequacy of the Maastricht Treaty was the failure to address the problem of the inherent imperfections of any provisions for crisis prevention and management in Economic and Monetary Union. The inadequacy stemmed from a cluster of naïve assumptions: about state capacity to comply with Treaty-based rules to prevent crises; about the tractability of economic and political cultures; about the adequacy of moral hazard as a design principle for monetary union; and about putting in place monetary union without economic, fiscal, banking, and political union. Consequently, managing crises of sovereign and bank creditworthiness had not been a problem on the Maastricht agenda. Subsequent failures to be prepared to manage compound crises were compounded by the complacency induced by the ‘political economy of good times’ into which the Euro Area was launched. EMU posed questions about the dominant teleological assumption underpinning the Maastricht Treaty. It risked exposing not just the limits of Europeanization but also serving as a catalyst for ‘de-Europeanization’.
- 29 October 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 34 (7) , 791-808
‘Maastricht Plus’: Managing the Logic of Inherent Imperfections
Seen from the perspective of the interconnected excessive imbalances, banking, and sovereign debt crises that beset the Euro Area from 2007, the central inadequacy of the Maastricht Treaty was the failure to address the problem of the inherent imperfections of any provisions for crisis prevention and management in Economic and Monetary Union. The inadequacy stemmed from a cluster of naïve assumptions: about state capacity to comply with Treaty-based rules to prevent crises; about the tractability of economic and political cultures; about the adequacy of moral hazard as a design principle for monetary union; and about putting in place monetary union without economic, fiscal, banking, and political union. Consequently, managing crises of sovereign and bank creditworthiness had not been a problem on the Maastricht agenda. Subsequent failures to be prepared to manage compound crises were compounded by the complacency induced by the ‘political economy of good times’ into which the Euro Area was launched. EMU posed questions about the dominant teleological assumption underpinning the Maastricht Treaty. It risked exposing not just the limits of Europeanization but also serving as a catalyst for ‘de-Europeanization’.
- 25 November 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in German Politics
- Vol. 19 (3-4) , 393-415
In the Shifting Shadows of Crisis: Pivot Points, Crisis Attribution, and Macro-Economic Policies under Grand Coalition
This article seeks to explain why the second Grand Coalition was less ambitious in pursuing systemic transformation in macro-economic policy than its predecessor in 1966–69; why the biggest financial and economic crisis in post-war German history produced the seeming paradox of strengthening ordo-liberal ideas and practices (notably the ‘debt brake’) and shifting political discourse towards the centre-left; and why, in contrast to the first Grand Coalition, the Federal Chancellor rather than the Federal Finance Minister was the major political beneficiary. March 2003 and September 2008 emerge as the ‘pivot’ points in shifting trajectories of policy development. The article examines how the dynamics of crisis attribution, and how they differ in character post-2003 and post-2008, are decisive in understanding the direction of policy trajectories.
- 25 November 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in German Politics
- Vol. 19 (3-4) , 393-415
In the Shifting Shadows of Crisis: Pivot Points, Crisis Attribution, and Macro-Economic Policies under Grand Coalition
This article seeks to explain why the second Grand Coalition was less ambitious in pursuing systemic transformation in macro-economic policy than its predecessor in 1966–69; why the biggest financial and economic crisis in post-war German history produced the seeming paradox of strengthening ordo-liberal ideas and practices (notably the ‘debt brake’) and shifting political discourse towards the centre-left; and why, in contrast to the first Grand Coalition, the Federal Chancellor rather than the Federal Finance Minister was the major political beneficiary. March 2003 and September 2008 emerge as the ‘pivot’ points in shifting trajectories of policy development. The article examines how the dynamics of crisis attribution, and how they differ in character post-2003 and post-2008, are decisive in understanding the direction of policy trajectories.
- 25 November 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in German Politics
- Vol. 19 (3-4) , 269-282
Actors, Structures and Strategies: Policy Continuity and Change under the German Grand Coalition (2005–09)
- 25 November 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in German Politics
- Vol. 19 (3-4) , 269-282
Actors, Structures and Strategies: Policy Continuity and Change under the German Grand Coalition (2005–09)
- 15 January 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 32 (1) , 17-39
Transverse Integration in European Economic Governance: Between Unitary and Differentiated Integration
After more than a decade of the euro, we have a good idea about what sort of European macro‐economic governance structure is in the making — its underlying principles and its relationship to EU ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ and, not least, to globalization. In relation to economic union, above all the single market, the principle of unitary integration provides an overarching framework, its rationale provided by customs union theory. In contrast, monetary union exhibits the principle of differentiated integration, its rationale founded on ‘will and capability’. This duality is expressed in the EU as ‘one market’ co‐existing with several currencies, one of which is the euro. We conceptualize the outcome as ‘transverse integration’ to capture the hybrid, multidimensional and dynamic character of European macro‐economic governance. This concept seeks to show that European macro‐economic governance transcends traditional classifications such as euro ‘insiders’ versus ‘outsiders’ and ‘frontrunners’ versus ‘laggards’ in euro entry. It offers a tool with which to critically examine these classifications. Transverse integration is also multidimensional in capturing the input side (public opinion), governance structures (‘institutional fuzziness’), and output side (performance) of European macro‐economic governance. Finally, it highlights the dynamic character of European macro‐economic governance, showing how the balance between the unitary and differentiated integration principles changes over time. The article argues that it makes more sense to study unitary and differentiated integration as cross‐cutting phenomena in European macro‐economic governance. Experience suggests that differentiation should not be seen as a temporary phenomenon and hence that transverse integration is here to stay.
- 15 January 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 32 (1) , 17-39
Transverse Integration in European Economic Governance: Between Unitary and Differentiated Integration
After more than a decade of the euro, we have a good idea about what sort of European macro‐economic governance structure is in the making — its underlying principles and its relationship to EU ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ and, not least, to globalization. In relation to economic union, above all the single market, the principle of unitary integration provides an overarching framework, its rationale provided by customs union theory. In contrast, monetary union exhibits the principle of differentiated integration, its rationale founded on ‘will and capability’. This duality is expressed in the EU as ‘one market’ co‐existing with several currencies, one of which is the euro. We conceptualize the outcome as ‘transverse integration’ to capture the hybrid, multidimensional and dynamic character of European macro‐economic governance. This concept seeks to show that European macro‐economic governance transcends traditional classifications such as euro ‘insiders’ versus ‘outsiders’ and ‘frontrunners’ versus ‘laggards’ in euro entry. It offers a tool with which to critically examine these classifications. Transverse integration is also multidimensional in capturing the input side (public opinion), governance structures (‘institutional fuzziness’), and output side (performance) of European macro‐economic governance. Finally, it highlights the dynamic character of European macro‐economic governance, showing how the balance between the unitary and differentiated integration principles changes over time. The article argues that it makes more sense to study unitary and differentiated integration as cross‐cutting phenomena in European macro‐economic governance. Experience suggests that differentiation should not be seen as a temporary phenomenon and hence that transverse integration is here to stay.
- 13 February 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 16 (2) , 286-306
The evolving timescapes of European economic governance: contesting and using time
This article examines the ambivalent character of time in European economic governance and how it is conceptualized, especially by its constituent expert élites. On the one hand, it serves to rationally order and stabilize power relationships; on the other, it provokes contest about its appropriate use, focused on fiscal and economic reform policies. The article also highlights the different functional specificities in temporal governance in monetary, fiscal, financial stability and economic reform policies and the differences in potential of issues to mobilize political opposition and to produce problems of synchronization. In particular, monetary union forms an inner circle within European economic governance. Its discursive, regulative and strategic effects radiate with varying results into its other circles. Nevertheless, European economic governance is not a single ‘time-rule’ exercise. Finally, the article examines how, through its ‘compression’ effects on European states, European economic governance raises serious issues about the quality of modern democracy.
- 13 February 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 16 (2) , 286-306
The evolving timescapes of European economic governance: contesting and using time
This article examines the ambivalent character of time in European economic governance and how it is conceptualized, especially by its constituent expert élites. On the one hand, it serves to rationally order and stabilize power relationships; on the other, it provokes contest about its appropriate use, focused on fiscal and economic reform policies. The article also highlights the different functional specificities in temporal governance in monetary, fiscal, financial stability and economic reform policies and the differences in potential of issues to mobilize political opposition and to produce problems of synchronization. In particular, monetary union forms an inner circle within European economic governance. Its discursive, regulative and strategic effects radiate with varying results into its other circles. Nevertheless, European economic governance is not a single ‘time-rule’ exercise. Finally, the article examines how, through its ‘compression’ effects on European states, European economic governance raises serious issues about the quality of modern democracy.
- 21 May 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 30 (3) , 417-442
Euro Area entry in east-central Europe: Paradoxical Europeanisation and clustered convergence
Economic and Monetary Union offers a useful case study for critically examining Europeanisation and conditionality as explanatory variables for the euro entry strategies of east-central European states. This article highlights the paradoxes of extreme and limited Europeanisation and of extreme ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ conditionality with multiple sources of uncertainty. These paradoxes have provided the context within which east-central European governments have evolved political strategies for the temporal management of euro entry. These strategies reflect in turn different ‘clusters’ of convergence in the Baltic States, the Visegrad states, and Slovenia. Euro Area accession in east-central Europe offers insights not just into how Europeanisation works in a central political issue area but also into the temporal management of EU policy and ‘clustered’ convergence.
- 21 May 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 30 (3) , 417-442
Euro Area entry in east-central Europe: Paradoxical Europeanisation and clustered convergence
Economic and Monetary Union offers a useful case study for critically examining Europeanisation and conditionality as explanatory variables for the euro entry strategies of east-central European states. This article highlights the paradoxes of extreme and limited Europeanisation and of extreme ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ conditionality with multiple sources of uncertainty. These paradoxes have provided the context within which east-central European governments have evolved political strategies for the temporal management of euro entry. These strategies reflect in turn different ‘clusters’ of convergence in the Baltic States, the Visegrad states, and Slovenia. Euro Area accession in east-central Europe offers insights not just into how Europeanisation works in a central political issue area but also into the temporal management of EU policy and ‘clustered’ convergence.