Kerstin Pull
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kerstin Pull has a total of 47 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Uschi Backes-Gellner
University of Zürich
11 shared publications - Manfred Stadler
School of Business and Economics University of Tübingen Tübingen Germany
6 shared publications Birgit Pferdmenges
School of Business and Economics, University of Tuebingen, Tuebingen, Germany
5 shared publications- Agnes Bäker
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
4 shared publications Uschi Backes-Gellner
University of Zürich
3 shared publicationsWerner Güth
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Higher Education
- Vol. 50 (12) , 2942-2963
When a B becomes an A: causal evidence on the effects of a journal ranking update on academics’ publication behavior
- 9 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Higher Education
- Vol. 50 (12) , 2942-2963
Open AccessWhen a B becomes an A: causal evidence on the effects of a journal ranking update on academics’ publication behavior
- 30 October 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Human Resource Management
- Vol. 35 (7) , 1283-1311
Role (in-)congruity and the Catch 22 for female executives: how stereotyping contributes to the gender pay gap at top executive level
- 30 October 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Human Resource Management
- Vol. 35 (7) , 1283-1311
Role (in-)congruity and the Catch 22 for female executives: how stereotyping contributes to the gender pay gap at top executive level
- Open Access
Do Output-Dependent Prizes Alleviate the Sabotage Problem in Tournaments?
We investigate whether tournament prizes that depend on joint output (“variable prize tournaments”) can alleviate the sabotage problem which is otherwise inherent in tournament structures. In a game-theoretical model with three contestants, we compare fixed-prize tournaments with tournaments where prizes depend on contestants’ joint output. Our analysis suggests that the incentives to sabotage in a fixed-prize tournament may be counteracted in a variable-prize tournament such that contestants no longer sabotage, but help one another. We empirically test the implications of our model with the help of a classroom experiment where we compare participants’ choices in a fixed-prize treatment () with those of a variable-prize treatment () in a between-subjects design. Given our parametrization, we expect efforts to be identical in both treatments, and we expect sabotage in the treatment and no sabotage in the treatment. In accordance with the model, we find that participants in the fixed-prize tournament sabotage one another, whereas participants in the variable-prize tournament help one another. At the same time, participants’ effort levels do not vary between the two treatments.Open AccessDo Output-Dependent Prizes Alleviate the Sabotage Problem in Tournaments?
We investigate whether tournament prizes that depend on joint output (“variable prize tournaments”) can alleviate the sabotage problem which is otherwise inherent in tournament structures. In a game-theoretical model with three contestants, we compare fixed-prize tournaments with tournaments where prizes depend on contestants’ joint output. Our analysis suggests that the incentives to sabotage in a fixed-prize tournament may be counteracted in a variable-prize tournament such that contestants no longer sabotage, but help one another. We empirically test the implications of our model with the help of a classroom experiment where we compare participants’ choices in a fixed-prize treatment () with those of a variable-prize treatment () in a between-subjects design. Given our parametrization, we expect efforts to be identical in both treatments, and we expect sabotage in the treatment and no sabotage in the treatment. In accordance with the model, we find that participants in the fixed-prize tournament sabotage one another, whereas participants in the variable-prize tournament help one another. At the same time, participants’ effort levels do not vary between the two treatments. - 8 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Schmalenbach Business Review
- Vol. 70 (2) , 189-208
The Opportunity Costs of Becoming a Dean: Does Leadership in Academia Crowd Out Research?
- 8 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Schmalenbach Business Review
- Vol. 70 (2) , 189-208
The Opportunity Costs of Becoming a Dean: Does Leadership in Academia Crowd Out Research?
- 20 December 2017
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in German Economic Review
- Vol. 18 (4) , 444-467
Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
This paper analyzes blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Considering the transition from one information setting to another suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining where task-independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean’ are implemented more frequently.
- 20 December 2017
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in German Economic Review
- Vol. 18 (4) , 444-467
Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
This paper analyzes blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Considering the transition from one information setting to another suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining where task-independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean’ are implemented more frequently.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Opportunity Costs of Becoming a Dean: Does Leadership in Academia Crowd out Research?
Researchers in academia typically perform different tasks: research, teaching and services to the scientific community. We analyze the opportunity costs in terms of a potentially reduced publication productivity associated with becoming a dean in the German institutional setting where deans are non-professional expert-leaders who temporarily take the dean position. Theoretically, we distinguish between two different effects that relate deanship and publication productivity: a resource effect where publication productivity during and – as a result of potentially having developed a taste for service –also post deanship decrease as a result of a reduction of the available time for research and a self-selection effect where pre-deanship publication productivity is lower than that of peers who are not about to become dean. Based on a dataset of 1,110 business and economics researchers from German-speaking universities, we find evidence for a resource effect with leadership in academia reducing research productivity during and also post deanship. We find no evidence of a negative self-selection effect in the sense of less successful researchers being more likely to take the position of a dean. Reduced research productivity during and post deanship as compared to those researchers that never became dean is driven by those researchers who become dean in later periods of their career, i.e., presumably by those who deliberately shift their focus away from research and towards a stronger engagement in the scientific community in their late career years. Early career deans, on the contrary, seem to see their deanship more as a transitory role and are able to compensate the reduced resources during deanship, and they also do not suffer from a reduced publication productivity post deanship.
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Opportunity Costs of Becoming a Dean: Does Leadership in Academia Crowd out Research?
Researchers in academia typically perform different tasks: research, teaching and services to the scientific community. We analyze the opportunity costs in terms of a potentially reduced publication productivity associated with becoming a dean in the German institutional setting where deans are non-professional expert-leaders who temporarily take the dean position. Theoretically, we distinguish between two different effects that relate deanship and publication productivity: a resource effect where publication productivity during and – as a result of potentially having developed a taste for service –also post deanship decrease as a result of a reduction of the available time for research and a self-selection effect where pre-deanship publication productivity is lower than that of peers who are not about to become dean. Based on a dataset of 1,110 business and economics researchers from German-speaking universities, we find evidence for a resource effect with leadership in academia reducing research productivity during and also post deanship. We find no evidence of a negative self-selection effect in the sense of less successful researchers being more likely to take the position of a dean. Reduced research productivity during and post deanship as compared to those researchers that never became dean is driven by those researchers who become dean in later periods of their career, i.e., presumably by those who deliberately shift their focus away from research and towards a stronger engagement in the scientific community in their late career years. Early career deans, on the contrary, seem to see their deanship more as a transitory role and are able to compensate the reduced resources during deanship, and they also do not suffer from a reduced publication productivity post deanship.
- 22 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 34 (2-3) , 97-115
Assessing Mental Models via Recording Decision Deliberations of Pairs
- 22 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 34 (2-3) , 97-115
Assessing Mental Models via Recording Decision Deliberations of Pairs
- 15 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 156 (4) , 1113-1133
Female Executives and Perceived Employer Attractiveness: On the Potentially Adverse Signal of Having a Female CHRO Rather Than a Female CFO
- 15 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 156 (4) , 1113-1133
Female Executives and Perceived Employer Attractiveness: On the Potentially Adverse Signal of Having a Female CHRO Rather Than a Female CFO
- 7 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Schmalenbach Business Review
- Vol. 18 (2) , 129-145
Do Research Training Groups Operate at Optimal Size?
- 7 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Schmalenbach Business Review
- Vol. 18 (2) , 129-145
Do Research Training Groups Operate at Optimal Size?