Christopher Hood
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Christopher Hood has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ruth Dixon
4 shared publications- Barbara Maria Piotrowska
Department of Political Economy King's College London London UK
2 shared publications Craig Beeston
University of Oxford
1 shared publicationLawrence R. Jones
International Public Management Network
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 April 2021
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 101 (1) , 303-317
Who loves input controls? What happened to “outputs not inputs” in UK Public Financial Management, and why?
Why do frequently criticized input controls survive in the management of public spending while apparently more enlightened output/outcome controls come and go? The question matters, because output/outcome controls are often assumed in public financial management and related literature to lead to superior policy performance as compared with input‐focused approaches. We tackle the question by applying qualitative push–pull analysis to compare one key type of input controls (administration cost [AC] controls) with one much‐discussed form of output/outcome controls (performance targets linked to spending allocations) in one major country case, the United Kingdom, over two decades. Drawing on documents and in‐depth interviews with 120 key political and bureaucratic players, we conclude that bureaucratic inertia at most only partially explains the survival of input AC controls in this case. The push/pull factors associated with the politics of blame and credit made the political players fair‐weather output controllers but all‐weather input controllers.
- 17 April 2021
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 101 (1) , 303-317
Open AccessWho loves input controls? What happened to “outputs not inputs” in UK Public Financial Management, and why?
Why do frequently criticized input controls survive in the management of public spending while apparently more enlightened output/outcome controls come and go? The question matters, because output/outcome controls are often assumed in public financial management and related literature to lead to superior policy performance as compared with input‐focused approaches. We tackle the question by applying qualitative push–pull analysis to compare one key type of input controls (administration cost [AC] controls) with one much‐discussed form of output/outcome controls (performance targets linked to spending allocations) in one major country case, the United Kingdom, over two decades. Drawing on documents and in‐depth interviews with 120 key political and bureaucratic players, we conclude that bureaucratic inertia at most only partially explains the survival of input AC controls in this case. The push/pull factors associated with the politics of blame and credit made the political players fair‐weather output controllers but all‐weather input controllers.
- 7 April 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Performance & Management Review
- Vol. 44 (2) , 250-271
Goodhart’s Law and the Gaming of UK Public Spending Numbers
- 7 April 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Performance & Management Review
- Vol. 44 (2) , 250-271
Goodhart’s Law and the Gaming of UK Public Spending Numbers
- 3 October 2016
- Published by Wiley in Financial Accountability & Management
- Vol. 32 (4) , 409-428
Not What It Said on the Tin? Reflections on Three Decades of UK Public Management Reform
- 3 October 2016
- Published by Wiley in Financial Accountability & Management
- Vol. 32 (4) , 409-428
Not What It Said on the Tin? Reflections on Three Decades of UK Public Management Reform
- 1 October 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Sociologie du Travail
- Vol. 58 (4) , 403-411
Ranking Academic Research Performance: A Recipe for Success?
- 1 October 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Sociologie du Travail
- Vol. 58 (4) , 403-411
Ranking Academic Research Performance: A Recipe for Success?
- 24 September 2012
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration Review
- Vol. 72 (s1)
Public Management by Numbers as a Performance‐Enhancing Drug: Two Hypotheses
“Public management by numbers” has experienced an international policy boom in recent decades, and big claims have been made about its performance‐enhancing effects. But it is hard to assess such claims systematically, even though we can find dramatic anecdotes of cases in which management by numbers seems to have had performance‐weakening as well as performance‐enhancing effects. In an attempt to build on studies that have gone beyond critiquing the statistical validity and reliability of performance numbers for public services, this article develops two hypotheses about performance enhancement, arguing that (1) the performance‐enhancing (or ‐obstructing) effects of management by numbers will vary according to whether the numbers are used for the purposes of targets, rankings, or “intelligence,” and (2) the performance‐enhancing (or ‐obstructing) effects of those three applications will vary according to the culture in which they operate, working differently in hierarchist, egalitarian, individualist, and fatalist settings.
- 24 September 2012
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration Review
- Vol. 72 (s1)
Public Management by Numbers as a Performance‐Enhancing Drug: Two Hypotheses
“Public management by numbers” has experienced an international policy boom in recent decades, and big claims have been made about its performance‐enhancing effects. But it is hard to assess such claims systematically, even though we can find dramatic anecdotes of cases in which management by numbers seems to have had performance‐weakening as well as performance‐enhancing effects. In an attempt to build on studies that have gone beyond critiquing the statistical validity and reliability of performance numbers for public services, this article develops two hypotheses about performance enhancement, arguing that (1) the performance‐enhancing (or ‐obstructing) effects of management by numbers will vary according to whether the numbers are used for the purposes of targets, rankings, or “intelligence,” and (2) the performance‐enhancing (or ‐obstructing) effects of those three applications will vary according to the culture in which they operate, working differently in hierarchist, egalitarian, individualist, and fatalist settings.
- 6 January 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Management Review
- Vol. 13 (2) , 321-326
Public management research on the road from consilience to experimentation?
(2011). Public management research on the road from consilience to experimentation? Public Management Review: Vol. 13, Public management research methodology: current trends and future prospects. Editors - Christopher Hood (All Souls College, Oxford) and Stephen P Osborne (University of Edinburgh Business School), pp. 321-326.
- 6 January 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Management Review
- Vol. 13 (2) , 321-326
Public management research on the road from consilience to experimentation?
(2011). Public management research on the road from consilience to experimentation? Public Management Review: Vol. 13, Public management research methodology: current trends and future prospects. Editors - Christopher Hood (All Souls College, Oxford) and Stephen P Osborne (University of Edinburgh Business School), pp. 321-326.
- 15 August 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Public Management Journal
- Vol. 11 (3) , 298-328
Rating the Rankings: Assessing International Rankings of Public Service Performance
This paper documents the growth of international rankings of governance and public services and seeks to contribute to a second-generation approach to the analysis of this phenomenon. It does so primarily by setting out a method for ranking international ratings, building on and extending earlier work by other scholars, and applies that method to 14 international rankings of governance and public services, to explore the scope and limits of the approach. The final section argues that the development of such a method could form the basis for benchmarking international rankings as they develop in the future.
- 15 August 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Public Management Journal
- Vol. 11 (3) , 298-328
Rating the Rankings: Assessing International Rankings of Public Service Performance
This paper documents the growth of international rankings of governance and public services and seeks to contribute to a second-generation approach to the analysis of this phenomenon. It does so primarily by setting out a method for ranking international ratings, building on and extending earlier work by other scholars, and applies that method to 14 international rankings of governance and public services, to explore the scope and limits of the approach. The final section argues that the development of such a method could form the basis for benchmarking international rankings as they develop in the future.
- 15 August 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Public Management Journal
- Vol. 11 (3) , 253-255
Ratings and Rankings of Public Service Performance: Special Issue Introduction
(2008). Ratings and Rankings of Public Service Performance: Special Issue Introduction. International Public Management Journal: Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 253-255.
- 15 August 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Public Management Journal
- Vol. 11 (3) , 253-255
Ratings and Rankings of Public Service Performance: Special Issue Introduction
(2008). Ratings and Rankings of Public Service Performance: Special Issue Introduction. International Public Management Journal: Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 253-255.