Hans F. M. Crombag
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Hans F. M. Crombag has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Caroline A. C. Remijn
Maastricht University , Maastricht, the Netherlands
1 shared publicationEric Rassin
1 shared publicationRobert Horselenberg
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 19 March 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Psychology, Crime & Law
- Vol. 13 (2) , 201-211
Heuristics in causal reasoning and their influence on eyewitness testimony
In two experiments the effect of knowledge of the seriousness of an event's outcome on the estimated strength of its causes was studied. In experiment 1 participants (n=87) were shown a video of a homeless man being evicted from a police station by a police officer, during which the evictee fell. One group of participants were told that the homeless man subsequently died; the other group was told that he was uninjured. Participants who thought the homeless man had died more often blamed the policeman for the man's fall. Estimations of the force of the push were not directly related to the outcome of the event, but rather to the attribution of blame, with those who blamed the officer giving higher estimates of the force of the push. In experiment 2, before watching a revised version of the video, the participants (n=88) were assigned to one of four groups. Groups A and B were told that the homeless man had died; groups C and D were told that he had survived. In an effort to counter interference of blame attribution, groups A and C were told that the officer was to blame for the man's fall, and groups B and D that the officer was not to blame. The manipulation of guilt was not successful, but this time a significant relation between event outcome and push force was found, with those who thought the homeless man had died giving higher estimates of the force of the push than those who thought that the man had survived. As in experiment 1, those who thought the homeless man had died more often blamed the policeman and those who blamed the policeman again gave higher estimates of the force of the push. It appears then that the more tragic the outcome of a violent incident, the more blame witnesses tend to attribute to the perpetrator, and the more they tend to overestimate the amount of violence involved.
- 19 March 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Psychology, Crime & Law
- Vol. 13 (2) , 201-211
Heuristics in causal reasoning and their influence on eyewitness testimony
In two experiments the effect of knowledge of the seriousness of an event's outcome on the estimated strength of its causes was studied. In experiment 1 participants (n=87) were shown a video of a homeless man being evicted from a police station by a police officer, during which the evictee fell. One group of participants were told that the homeless man subsequently died; the other group was told that he was uninjured. Participants who thought the homeless man had died more often blamed the policeman for the man's fall. Estimations of the force of the push were not directly related to the outcome of the event, but rather to the attribution of blame, with those who blamed the officer giving higher estimates of the force of the push. In experiment 2, before watching a revised version of the video, the participants (n=88) were assigned to one of four groups. Groups A and B were told that the homeless man had died; groups C and D were told that he had survived. In an effort to counter interference of blame attribution, groups A and C were told that the officer was to blame for the man's fall, and groups B and D that the officer was not to blame. The manipulation of guilt was not successful, but this time a significant relation between event outcome and push force was found, with those who thought the homeless man had died giving higher estimates of the force of the push than those who thought that the man had survived. As in experiment 1, those who thought the homeless man had died more often blamed the policeman and those who blamed the policeman again gave higher estimates of the force of the push. It appears then that the more tragic the outcome of a violent incident, the more blame witnesses tend to attribute to the perpetrator, and the more they tend to overestimate the amount of violence involved.
- 1 December 2003
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Psychology, Crime & Law
- Vol. 9 (4) , 333-344
ON VENGEANCE
At first sight, vengeance appears to be a puzzling emotion, as it does not redress the harm that elicited it, while acting on it may well turn out to be counterproductive. In this study we asked a large group of (young) respondents (n=513) to think of a particular recent incident that made them feel vengeful and to report whether they had acted on it or not, what their purpose had been in doing so, and how they felt afterwards. Only a minority of the respondents reported that they had taken action to get even with the perpetrator, mostly in order to restore the disturbed balance of power. The type of harm that they had suffered had no significant relation to the decision to act on it. Although most of them said that afterwards they felt good about it, this may only have been a fleeting satisfaction, as the data suggest that in the end taking action had not made their residual vengeful feelings subside any faster than those of respondents who had not acted on them. The question of the generalizability of the results is briefly discussed.
- 1 December 2003
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Psychology, Crime & Law
- Vol. 9 (4) , 333-344
ON VENGEANCE
At first sight, vengeance appears to be a puzzling emotion, as it does not redress the harm that elicited it, while acting on it may well turn out to be counterproductive. In this study we asked a large group of (young) respondents (n=513) to think of a particular recent incident that made them feel vengeful and to report whether they had acted on it or not, what their purpose had been in doing so, and how they felt afterwards. Only a minority of the respondents reported that they had taken action to get even with the perpetrator, mostly in order to restore the disturbed balance of power. The type of harm that they had suffered had no significant relation to the decision to act on it. Although most of them said that afterwards they felt good about it, this may only have been a fleeting satisfaction, as the data suggest that in the end taking action had not made their residual vengeful feelings subside any faster than those of respondents who had not acted on them. The question of the generalizability of the results is briefly discussed.