Timothy R. B. Taylor
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Timothy R. B. Taylor has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David N. Ford
Associate Professor and Urban/Beaver Development Professor, Zachry Dept. of Civil Engineering, Texas A&M Univ., College Station, TX
2 shared publications - Kenneth F. Reinschmidt
Texas A&M University
2 shared publications Alex McCoy
Graduate Research Assistant, Dept. of Civil Engineering, 161 Raymond Building, Univ. of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506-0281
1 shared publication- David N. Ford
Texas A&M University
1 shared publication - Dong Zhai
Assistant Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Kentucky, 151A Raymond Building, Lexington, KY 40506
1 shared publication Eric Lindquist
Institute for Science, Technology, and Public Policy, The Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4350, U.S.A.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 December 2012
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) in Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
- Vol. 138 (12) , 1360-1369
Change Orders and Lessons Learned: Knowledge from Statistical Analyses of Engineering Change Orders on Kentucky Highway Projects
Although change orders occur on many construction projects, data examined in this paper suggest that many change orders can be avoided on roadway construction projects through improved project planning and scoping. Statistical analyses of change orders on 610 Kentucky roadway construction projects from 2005–2008 examined how the causes of change orders varied between construction versus maintenance projects, different road types (e.g., state highways, interstate, and county roads), and construction type (e.g., earth work, structures, and road surfacing). The research examined the risk posed by engineering change orders by measuring the frequency and average percentage change in project costs for different types of change orders. Although the relative impacts did vary by analyses, the leading causes of change orders within the state consistently included contract omissions, owner-induced enhancements, and contract item overrun. The paper’s primary contribution to the overall body of knowledge is th...
- 1 December 2012
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) in Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
- Vol. 138 (12) , 1360-1369
Change Orders and Lessons Learned: Knowledge from Statistical Analyses of Engineering Change Orders on Kentucky Highway Projects
Although change orders occur on many construction projects, data examined in this paper suggest that many change orders can be avoided on roadway construction projects through improved project planning and scoping. Statistical analyses of change orders on 610 Kentucky roadway construction projects from 2005–2008 examined how the causes of change orders varied between construction versus maintenance projects, different road types (e.g., state highways, interstate, and county roads), and construction type (e.g., earth work, structures, and road surfacing). The research examined the risk posed by engineering change orders by measuring the frequency and average percentage change in project costs for different types of change orders. Although the relative impacts did vary by analyses, the leading causes of change orders within the state consistently included contract omissions, owner-induced enhancements, and contract item overrun. The paper’s primary contribution to the overall body of knowledge is th...
- 1 August 2012
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) in Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
- Vol. 138 (8) , 972-981
Impact of Public Policy and Societal Risk Perception on U.S. Civilian Nuclear Power Plant Construction
Due to the increasing demand for energy in the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently reviewing permit applications for 26 new nuclear power reactors. However, the previous generation of U.S. civilian nuclear plant construction experienced significant cost and schedule overruns. Previous research identified “regulatory ratcheting” (continuous, retroactive change in nuclear plant regulations) as one of the primary causes of this poor performance. Regulatory ratcheting was enabled by the nuclear industry’s two-step permitting and licensing process for civilian power plant construction, which allowed society’s perception of the risks associated with nuclear plant operation to impact nuclear plant construction. How will public policy and societal risk perception affect the next generation of U.S. civilian nuclear plant construction? This question is investigated using a dynamic simulation model of the public policy and social feedback processes that impact U.S. nuclear plant construction. The research reveals that proposed strategies to address public policy and societal issues, such as a new nuclear regulatory process and smaller, less expensive reactors, may not prevent cost and schedule overruns on the planned next generation of nuclear plants. Results point to the critical role societal perceptions of nuclear power risk play in nuclear construction project success.
- 1 August 2012
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) in Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
- Vol. 138 (8) , 972-981
Impact of Public Policy and Societal Risk Perception on U.S. Civilian Nuclear Power Plant Construction
Due to the increasing demand for energy in the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently reviewing permit applications for 26 new nuclear power reactors. However, the previous generation of U.S. civilian nuclear plant construction experienced significant cost and schedule overruns. Previous research identified “regulatory ratcheting” (continuous, retroactive change in nuclear plant regulations) as one of the primary causes of this poor performance. Regulatory ratcheting was enabled by the nuclear industry’s two-step permitting and licensing process for civilian power plant construction, which allowed society’s perception of the risks associated with nuclear plant operation to impact nuclear plant construction. How will public policy and societal risk perception affect the next generation of U.S. civilian nuclear plant construction? This question is investigated using a dynamic simulation model of the public policy and social feedback processes that impact U.S. nuclear plant construction. The research reveals that proposed strategies to address public policy and societal issues, such as a new nuclear regulatory process and smaller, less expensive reactors, may not prevent cost and schedule overruns on the planned next generation of nuclear plants. Results point to the critical role societal perceptions of nuclear power risk play in nuclear construction project success.
- 17 May 2012
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
- p. 217-225
Accuracy Analysis of Selected Tools for Estimating Contract Time on Highway Construction Projects
In many highway construction projects, the time available to complete construction is set by the contract documents. Most transportation agencies have developed tools to assist project planners in estimating the amount of time required to complete the project but how accurate are these systems in estimating project duration? The current work examines the accuracy of integrated scheduling systems from two state transportation agencies in estimating contract time for previously completed Kentucky highway construction projects. The accuracy of the systems where tested against project data from 66 completed Kentucky Transportation Cabinet Projects. The analysis revealed that the average accuracy of both systems in predicting project duration was greater than ±200% across a variety of projects. A pilot study of the use of multivariate regression analysis of the data from 66 completed Kentucky Transportation Cabinet projects was performed to identify specific combinations of work item quantities with the engineer's cost estimate that produce the most accurate estimate of project duration. The accuracy of the developed regression equation in predicting highway construction project duration was ±25%. The current work contributes improved understanding of the accuracy of integrate scheduling systems in predicting highway construction duration.
- 17 May 2012
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
- p. 217-225
Accuracy Analysis of Selected Tools for Estimating Contract Time on Highway Construction Projects
In many highway construction projects, the time available to complete construction is set by the contract documents. Most transportation agencies have developed tools to assist project planners in estimating the amount of time required to complete the project but how accurate are these systems in estimating project duration? The current work examines the accuracy of integrated scheduling systems from two state transportation agencies in estimating contract time for previously completed Kentucky highway construction projects. The accuracy of the systems where tested against project data from 66 completed Kentucky Transportation Cabinet Projects. The analysis revealed that the average accuracy of both systems in predicting project duration was greater than ±200% across a variety of projects. A pilot study of the use of multivariate regression analysis of the data from 66 completed Kentucky Transportation Cabinet projects was performed to identify specific combinations of work item quantities with the engineer's cost estimate that produce the most accurate estimate of project duration. The accuracy of the developed regression equation in predicting highway construction project duration was ±25%. The current work contributes improved understanding of the accuracy of integrate scheduling systems in predicting highway construction duration.
- 1 April 2011
- Published by Wiley in System Dynamics Review
- Vol. 27 (2) , 173-194
Science, engineering, and technology in the policy process for mitigating natural–societal risk
- 1 April 2011
- Published by Wiley in System Dynamics Review
- Vol. 27 (2) , 173-194
Science, engineering, and technology in the policy process for mitigating natural–societal risk
- 4 May 2010
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
- p. 1296-1306
The Impact of Regulatory Licensing Processes on U.S. Civilian Nuclear Power Plant Project Performance
Due to increasing U.S. energy demand, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently reviewing permit applications for 25 new nuclear power reactors. However, the previous generation of nuclear plant construction was beset by significant cost and schedule overruns. Several researchers have identified "regulatory ratcheting," increases in retroactive regulations, as one of the primary causes of the poor performance of these projects. Regulatory ratcheting was enabled, in part, by the two step nuclear power plant licensing process (10 CFR Part 50) that required plants under construction to meet all current regulatory requirements before receiving an operating license. This two step licensing process has been replaced by a single step process (10 CFR Part 52). How will this single step licensing process impact project performance? This question is investigated using a dynamic simulation model of the technical and social feedback processes that impact U.S. nuclear plant construction. The research reveals that under 10 CFR Part 52 society's amplified perception of nuclear power risks can still drive regulatory growth leading to potentially significant cost and schedule overruns.
- 4 May 2010
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
- p. 1296-1306
The Impact of Regulatory Licensing Processes on U.S. Civilian Nuclear Power Plant Project Performance
Due to increasing U.S. energy demand, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently reviewing permit applications for 25 new nuclear power reactors. However, the previous generation of nuclear plant construction was beset by significant cost and schedule overruns. Several researchers have identified "regulatory ratcheting," increases in retroactive regulations, as one of the primary causes of the poor performance of these projects. Regulatory ratcheting was enabled, in part, by the two step nuclear power plant licensing process (10 CFR Part 50) that required plants under construction to meet all current regulatory requirements before receiving an operating license. This two step licensing process has been replaced by a single step process (10 CFR Part 52). How will this single step licensing process impact project performance? This question is investigated using a dynamic simulation model of the technical and social feedback processes that impact U.S. nuclear plant construction. The research reveals that under 10 CFR Part 52 society's amplified perception of nuclear power risks can still drive regulatory growth leading to potentially significant cost and schedule overruns.