James W. Fredrickson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
James W. Fredrickson has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alison Davis‐Blake
Carlson School of Management, The University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, Minneapolis, Minnesota, U.S.A.
1 shared publication- Francisco Polidoro
McCombs School of Business The University of Texas at Austin Austin Texas USA
1 shared publication - Matt Theeke
George Mason University, School of Business, Fairfax, VA, USA
1 shared publication Wm. Gerard Sanders
Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University, Houston, Texas, U.S.A.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 December 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Administrative Science Quarterly
- Vol. 63 (4) , 910-942
Path-dependent Routines in the Evaluation of Novelty: The Effects of Innovators’ New Knowledge Use on Brokerage Firms’ Coverage
This paper examines how path dependencies in evaluation routines affect a brokerage firm’s decision to provide coverage to a company that builds on new knowledge. Companies depend on brokerage firms to gain access to external resources, as a brokerage firm’s coverage is a valuable form of recognition that may lower a company’s cost of capital and increase its value. Yet path dependencies in a brokerage firm’s evaluation routines may make it less likely to cover a company whose inventive activities build on different knowledge than it used in the past. Using data on 183 U.S. publicly traded medical device companies from 1993 to 2006, we examine how a company’s use of new knowledge affects a brokerage firm’s decision to cover the company. Our results suggest that a company may face a tension between exploration and resource dependence, as after it overcomes internal path dependencies that hinder exploration and successfully uses new knowledge, it may still fail to gain the attention of outside organizations on which it depends to access relevant resources due to externally borne path dependencies in the routines these outside organizations use to evaluate novelty. Also, in contrast with existing literature suggesting that brokerage firms have homogenous expectations for which strategies are appropriate for different types of companies, our results highlight that brokerage firms differ in how they respond to companies’ inventive activities based on factors such as their prior exposure to new knowledge, prior evaluation of the companies’ downstream product markets, and scope of technological expertise.
- 14 December 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Administrative Science Quarterly
- Vol. 63 (4) , 910-942
Open AccessPath-dependent Routines in the Evaluation of Novelty: The Effects of Innovators’ New Knowledge Use on Brokerage Firms’ Coverage
This paper examines how path dependencies in evaluation routines affect a brokerage firm’s decision to provide coverage to a company that builds on new knowledge. Companies depend on brokerage firms to gain access to external resources, as a brokerage firm’s coverage is a valuable form of recognition that may lower a company’s cost of capital and increase its value. Yet path dependencies in a brokerage firm’s evaluation routines may make it less likely to cover a company whose inventive activities build on different knowledge than it used in the past. Using data on 183 U.S. publicly traded medical device companies from 1993 to 2006, we examine how a company’s use of new knowledge affects a brokerage firm’s decision to cover the company. Our results suggest that a company may face a tension between exploration and resource dependence, as after it overcomes internal path dependencies that hinder exploration and successfully uses new knowledge, it may still fail to gain the attention of outside organizations on which it depends to access relevant resources due to externally borne path dependencies in the routines these outside organizations use to evaluate novelty. Also, in contrast with existing literature suggesting that brokerage firms have homogenous expectations for which strategies are appropriate for different types of companies, our results highlight that brokerage firms differ in how they respond to companies’ inventive activities based on factors such as their prior exposure to new knowledge, prior evaluation of the companies’ downstream product markets, and scope of technological expertise.
- 16 February 2010
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 31 (10) , 1031-1053
Sharing the wealth: social comparisons and pay dispersion in the CEO's top team
The antecedents and consequences of pay dispersion are studied using theory that focuses on the social comparisons that occur among members of the CEO's top team. Results from a sample of large public firms indicate that when members of this elite group were similar on a variety of dimensions, and thus likely to compare their pay, the board allowed less dispersion. In addition, pay dispersion was negatively related to company performance, particularly when it exceeded what could be justified by characteristics of the industry, firm, or team. But the strength of that relationship depended on how uniformly members of the team would benefit from subsequent performance gains. Specifically, the negative effect was particularly strong in firms where major differences in compensation—that is, some executives were given significantly more stock options—combined with a volatile stock price to provide only a few team members with the opportunity to realize very large financial gains in the future. The study demonstrates that the social‐psychological factors that affect comparisons among members of the CEO's top team impact the board's pay setting process, which in turn affects pay dispersion, and ultimately firm performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 16 February 2010
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 31 (10) , 1031-1053
Sharing the wealth: social comparisons and pay dispersion in the CEO's top team
The antecedents and consequences of pay dispersion are studied using theory that focuses on the social comparisons that occur among members of the CEO's top team. Results from a sample of large public firms indicate that when members of this elite group were similar on a variety of dimensions, and thus likely to compare their pay, the board allowed less dispersion. In addition, pay dispersion was negatively related to company performance, particularly when it exceeded what could be justified by characteristics of the industry, firm, or team. But the strength of that relationship depended on how uniformly members of the team would benefit from subsequent performance gains. Specifically, the negative effect was particularly strong in firms where major differences in compensation—that is, some executives were given significantly more stock options—combined with a volatile stock price to provide only a few team members with the opportunity to realize very large financial gains in the future. The study demonstrates that the social‐psychological factors that affect comparisons among members of the CEO's top team impact the board's pay setting process, which in turn affects pay dispersion, and ultimately firm performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.