BSBrian G. Spratt

Brian G. Spratt

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Brian G. Spratt has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:

  • Angela B. Brueggemann

    Nuffield Department of Population Health, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

    1 shared publication
  • David T. Griffiths

    Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College London, St. Mary's Hospital Campus, London W2 1PG,1 Oxford Vaccine Group, University Department of Paediatrics,4 Academic Department of Microbiology and Infectious Disease, John Radcliffe Hospital, University of Oxford, Oxford OX3 9DU,2 Department of Biology and Biochemistry, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, United Kingdom3

    1 shared publication
  • Derrick W. Crook

    Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College London, St. Mary's Hospital Campus, London W2 1PG,1 Oxford Vaccine Group, University Department of Paediatrics,4 Academic Department of Microbiology and Infectious Disease, John Radcliffe Hospital, University of Oxford, Oxford OX3 9DU,2 Department of Biology and Biochemistry, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, United Kingdom3

    1 shared publication
  • Emma Meats

    Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College London, St. Mary's Hospital Campus, London W2 1PG, United Kingdom

    1 shared publication
  • James T Staley

    Department of Microbiology, University of Washington Seattle, WA 98195, USA

    1 shared publication
  • Karen Sleeman

    Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College London, St. Mary's Hospital Campus, London W2 1PG,1 Oxford Vaccine Group, University Department of Paediatrics,4 Academic Department of Microbiology and Infectious Disease, John Radcliffe Hospital, University of Oxford, Oxford OX3 9DU,2 Department of Biology and Biochemistry, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, United Kingdom3

    1 shared publication

Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Stability of Serotypes during Nasopharyngeal Carriage of Streptococcus pneumoniae

    by Emma Meats, Angela B. Brueggemann, Mark C. Enright, Karen Sleeman, David T. Griffiths, Derrick W. Crook, Brian G. Spratt

    Serotype changes among natural isolates of Streptococcus pneumoniae are well documented and occur by recombinational exchanges at the capsular biosynthetic locus. However, the frequency with which this phenomenon occurs within the nasopharynx of children is not clear and is likely to be highest in the nasopharynx of children, who have high rates of pneumococcal carriage. A birth cohort of 100 infants was studied, and pneumococci were recovered from nasopharyngeal samples taken at monthly intervals during the first 6 months of life and then at 2-monthly intervals until the age of 2 years. Among the 1,353 nasopharyngeal samples were 523 that contained presumptive pneumococci, and three colonies from each were serotyped. A total of 333 isolates, including all isolates of differing serotypes from the same child, were characterized by multilocus sequence typing. Sixty-eight children carried multiple serotypes during the first 2 years of life. Two children carried a typeable and a nonserotypeable pneumococcus of identical genotype, and five children carried genetically indistinguishable isolates of serotypes 15B and 15C. These isolates were considered, respectively, to be due to loss of capsule expression and the known ability of serotype 15B and 15C pneumococci to interconvert by loss or gain of an acetyl group on the capsular polysaccharide. In all other cases, isolates from the same children that differed in serotype also differed in genotype, indicating the acquisition of a different pneumococcal strain rather than a change in capsular type. There was therefore no evidence in this study for any change of serotype due to recombinational replacements at the capsular locus among the pneumococci carried within the nasopharynges of the children.


  • Depleted uranium munitions—where are we now?

    by Brian G Spratt

    Kinetic energy weapons that contain a penetrator of depleted uranium (DU) were first used in the Gulf War of 1991 and were subsequently used in the Balkans. DU penetrators are considered to have significant operational advantages over those made of tungsten as they are capable of penetrating the heavy armour of the modern battle tank. The use of DU rounds in military conflicts has, however, provoked a wide debate about the health consequences for soldiers and the local population since DU is a toxic metal and is radioactive. The Royal Society became involved in the debate about the health hazards of DU munitions as a result of public concern, to produce an independent view on the science and the uncertainties, uninfluenced by the conflicting interests of governments and the military, who consider that the risks are very slight, and of other individuals and organisations, some of whom have suggested that hundreds of thousands of deaths from cancer may result from the use of DU in the Gulf War. Large quantities of DU rounds were deployed in the Gulf War (about 340 tonnes) and much smaller amounts in the Balkans (about 11 tonnes). In both conflicts the majority of the DU rounds were fired from aircraft in strafing attacks where most of the penetrators miss their target and penetrate several metres into the soil. Consequently, large numbers of DU penetrators are believed to remain buried in the ground. Corrosion of these penetrators will occur with the possibility of a gradual rise in the uranium levels in local water supplies. About 10,000 larger calibre DU rounds were fired from tanks during the Gulf War, although these were not used in the Balkans. DU rounds that penetrate a target vehicle may pass straight through or, particularly if they hit heavy armour, may release a variable proportion of the penetrator as DU particles which ignite to produce an aerosol of DU oxides. The DU particles released during such impacts will be inhaled by those surviving within a struck tank or by those in the path of the DU aerosol. Unless adequate respiratory protection is used, DU particles will also be inhaled by those charged with cleaning up DU-contaminated vehicles. The fraction of a DU penetrator that is aerosolised and the fraction of the particles of DU oxides that are within the respirable range, as well as the solubility properties of the DU oxides, are not well documented and depend on the type of impact, but a range of values is available from test firings of DU rounds. A number of exposure scenarios were considered in the two Royal Society reports on the Health Hazards of DU Munitions [1, 2] and central and worst-case intakes of DU were estimated from the range of values obtained from test firings. These estimated intakes, and the range of reported values of the properties of the DU oxides released during an impact or fire, were used to produce central estimates and worst-case estimates of risks for soldiers on the battlefield. Although there are uncertainties about the intakes of DU, and of the properties of the DU oxides, there is a clear view among radiation biologists that, given the equivalent doses to tissues, the excess lifetime risks of various fatal cancers can be estimated, perhaps with an order of magnitude of uncertainty. Therefore if the intakes of DU, or the properties of DU oxides, are in future better defined, the estimates of risk given in the Royal Society reports can be adjusted appropriately. There are very different views on the health hazards of DU munitions. Most of the concerns of veterans and their advisors focus on the radiological effects of DU and consequently these are the focus of this editorial. Effects on the kidney and environmental consequences are, however, considered in the second of the Royal Society reports [2] and the main conclusions of both of the reports are outlined in the summary document published in this issue of the journal (page 131). The main radiological concerns focus on the irradiation of lung tissues from inhaled DU particles and irradiation resulting from the translocation of inhaled particles to the thoracic lymph nodes. DU shrapnel is also a concern and the health of a group of US soldiers with retained shrapnel is being carefully monitored, with little signs so far of adverse health effects. However, soft tissue sarcomas have recently been reported around DU pellets implanted in the muscles of rats [3] and long-term monitoring of these soldiers is required. The overwhelming scientific view, presented in the two Royal Society reports and in other independent reviews, is that the main risks of exposure to DU aerosols are an increase in lung cancer and (from chemical toxicity) damage to the kidney, although these are likely to be evident only following substantial intakes. The equivalent doses to the thoracic lymph nodes following inhalation of DU particles are about ten times greater than those to the lung, but the former tissue is considered to be relatively insensitive to radiation-induced cancers [4]. Excepting lung cancer in a few soldiers who could be very heavily exposed to DU, any increases in other cancers, including lymphomas and leukaemias, are predicted to be too small to be detected, unless the intakes for large numbers of soldiers on the battlefield are very much greater than estimated, or the ICRP models greatly under-estimate the risks of inhaled particles of DU oxides. Some advisors to the veterans groups take the latter position, and argue that the alpha-particles from highly insoluble DU particles translocated to the thoracic lymph nodes are much more dangerous than implied by ICRP models, and that the risks of leukaemias and lymphomas are greatly under-estimated. These views are familiar to those who have followed the debate about leukaemia clusters and `hot particles' in discharges from the nuclear industry or increased leukaemias from the accident at Chernobyl. DU particles can hardly be called `hot' but large...