Kimberlee Weaver
Research Subjects
Kimberlee Weaver has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dale T. Miller
1 shared publicationKimberly Daniloski
1 shared publicationMeghan Pierce
1 shared publicationNorbert Schwarz
1 shared publication- Norbert Schwarz
Department of Psychology, University of Southern California
1 shared publication - Stefan J. Hock
Virginia Tech
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 4 June 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Marketing Letters
- Vol. 27 (1) , 27-38
“Top 10” reasons: When adding persuasive arguments reduces persuasion
- 4 June 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Marketing Letters
- Vol. 27 (1) , 27-38
“Top 10” reasons: When adding persuasive arguments reduces persuasion
- 1 May 2007
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 92 (5) , 821-833
Inferring the popularity of an opinion from its familiarity: A repetitive voice can sound like a chorus.
Despite the importance of doing so, people do not always correctly estimate the distribution of opinions within their group. One important mechanism underlying such misjudgments is people's tendency to infer that a familiar opinion is a prevalent one, even when its familiarity derives solely from the repeated expression of 1 group member. Six experiments demonstrate this effect and show that it holds even when perceivers are consciously aware that the opinions come from 1 speaker. The results also indicate that the effect is due to opinion accessibility rather than a conscious inference about the meaning of opinion repetition in a group. Implications for social consensus estimation and social influence are discussed.
- 1 May 2007
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 92 (5) , 821-833
Inferring the popularity of an opinion from its familiarity: A repetitive voice can sound like a chorus.
Despite the importance of doing so, people do not always correctly estimate the distribution of opinions within their group. One important mechanism underlying such misjudgments is people's tendency to infer that a familiar opinion is a prevalent one, even when its familiarity derives solely from the repeated expression of 1 group member. Six experiments demonstrate this effect and show that it holds even when perceivers are consciously aware that the opinions come from 1 speaker. The results also indicate that the effect is due to opinion accessibility rather than a conscious inference about the meaning of opinion repetition in a group. Implications for social consensus estimation and social influence are discussed.