Chris Kaposy
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Studies
- Vol. 32 (1) , 101-108
Coming Into Existence: The Good, The Bad, and The Indifferent
- 1 March 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Studies
- Vol. 32 (1) , 101-108
Coming Into Existence: The Good, The Bad, and The Indifferent
- 27 September 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Analysis
- Vol. 18 (1) , 17-34
Improving Abortion Access in Canada
Though abortion is legal in Canada, policies currently in place at various levels of the health care system, and the individual actions of medical professionals, can inhibit access to abortion. This paper examines the various extra-legal barriers to abortion access that exist in Canada, and argues that these barriers are unjust because there are no good reasons for the restrictions on autonomy that they present. The paper then outlines the various policy measures that could be taken to improve access.
- 27 September 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Analysis
- Vol. 18 (1) , 17-34
Improving Abortion Access in Canada
Though abortion is legal in Canada, policies currently in place at various levels of the health care system, and the individual actions of medical professionals, can inhibit access to abortion. This paper examines the various extra-legal barriers to abortion access that exist in Canada, and argues that these barriers are unjust because there are no good reasons for the restrictions on autonomy that they present. The paper then outlines the various policy measures that could be taken to improve access.
- 27 August 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 12 (3) , 301-311
The public funding of abortion in Canada: going beyond the concept of medical necessity
This article defends the public funding of abortion in the Canadian health care system in light of objections by opponents of abortion that the procedure should be denied public funding. Abortion opponents point out that women terminate their pregnancies most often for social reasons, that the Canadian health care system only requires funding for medically necessary procedures, and that abortion for social reasons is not medically necessary care. I offer two lines of response. First, I briefly present an argument that characterizes abortion sought for social reasons as medically necessary care, directly contesting the anti-abortion position. Second, and more substantially, I present a justice argument that shows that even if abortion is not regarded as medically necessary care, the reasons that typically motivate women to seek abortion are sufficiently weighty from the moral perspective that it would be unjust to deny them public funding. I finish by drawing the more general conclusion that health care funding decisions should be guided by a broader concept of necessary care, rather than by a narrow concept of specifically medical necessity. A broad concept of necessary care has been debated in health care policy in the Netherlands, and I suggest that such a concept would be a more just and defensible guide for funding decisions than the concept of medical necessity.
- 27 August 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 12 (3) , 301-311
The public funding of abortion in Canada: going beyond the concept of medical necessity
This article defends the public funding of abortion in the Canadian health care system in light of objections by opponents of abortion that the procedure should be denied public funding. Abortion opponents point out that women terminate their pregnancies most often for social reasons, that the Canadian health care system only requires funding for medically necessary procedures, and that abortion for social reasons is not medically necessary care. I offer two lines of response. First, I briefly present an argument that characterizes abortion sought for social reasons as medically necessary care, directly contesting the anti-abortion position. Second, and more substantially, I present a justice argument that shows that even if abortion is not regarded as medically necessary care, the reasons that typically motivate women to seek abortion are sufficiently weighty from the moral perspective that it would be unjust to deny them public funding. I finish by drawing the more general conclusion that health care funding decisions should be guided by a broader concept of necessary care, rather than by a narrow concept of specifically medical necessity. A broad concept of necessary care has been debated in health care policy in the Netherlands, and I suggest that such a concept would be a more just and defensible guide for funding decisions than the concept of medical necessity.
- 10 July 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Neuroethics
- Vol. 2 (1) , 51-59
Will Neuroscientific Discoveries about Free Will and Selfhood Change our Ethical Practices?
- 10 July 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Neuroethics
- Vol. 2 (1) , 51-59
Will Neuroscientific Discoveries about Free Will and Selfhood Change our Ethical Practices?
- 1 March 2008
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Quarterly Review of Biology
- Vol. 83 (1) , 77-86
Ethical Muscle and Scientific Interests: A Role for Philosophy in Scientific Research
Ethics, a branch of philosophy, has a place in the regulatory framework of human subjects research. Sometimes, however, ethical concepts and arguments play a more central role in scientific activity. This can happen, for example, when violations of research norms are also ethical violations. In such a situation, ethical arguments can be marshaled to improve the quality of the scientific research. I explore two different examples in which philosophers and scientists have used ethical arguments to plead for epistemological improvements in the conduct of research. The first example deals with research dishonesty in pharmaceutical development. The second example is concerned with neuropsychological research using fMRI technology.
- 1 March 2008
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Quarterly Review of Biology
- Vol. 83 (1) , 77-86
Ethical Muscle and Scientific Interests: A Role for Philosophy in Scientific Research
Ethics, a branch of philosophy, has a place in the regulatory framework of human subjects research. Sometimes, however, ethical concepts and arguments play a more central role in scientific activity. This can happen, for example, when violations of research norms are also ethical violations. In such a situation, ethical arguments can be marshaled to improve the quality of the scientific research. I explore two different examples in which philosophers and scientists have used ethical arguments to plead for epistemological improvements in the conduct of research. The first example deals with research dishonesty in pharmaceutical development. The second example is concerned with neuropsychological research using fMRI technology.
- 7 August 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 7 (8) , 34-36
The real-life consequences of being denied access to an abortion.
- 7 August 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 7 (8) , 34-36
The real-life consequences of being denied access to an abortion.
- 1 August 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 28 (4) , 301-330
Can Infants Have Interests in Continued Life?
The philosophers Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan hold variations of the view that infant interests in continued life are suspect because infants lack the cognitive complexity to anticipate the future. Since infants cannot see themselves as having a future, Singer argues that the future cannot have value for them, and McMahan argues that the future can only have minimal value for an infant. This paper critically analyzes these arguments and defends the view that infants can have interests in continuing to live. Even though infants themselves lack a strong psychological connection to the future, others who are involved in an infant’s life can anticipate, on an infant’s behalf, the kind of future that awaits the infant, and on the basis of this insight judge that continuing to live would be in the infant’s interests. After defending this position, I argue that this position on the interests of infants in continued life does not commit one to opposing abortion, and it does not commit one to the view that our ethical obligations to protect the lives of sentient animals are the same as our ethical obligations to protect infant lives.
- 1 August 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 28 (4) , 301-330
Can Infants Have Interests in Continued Life?
The philosophers Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan hold variations of the view that infant interests in continued life are suspect because infants lack the cognitive complexity to anticipate the future. Since infants cannot see themselves as having a future, Singer argues that the future cannot have value for them, and McMahan argues that the future can only have minimal value for an infant. This paper critically analyzes these arguments and defends the view that infants can have interests in continuing to live. Even though infants themselves lack a strong psychological connection to the future, others who are involved in an infant’s life can anticipate, on an infant’s behalf, the kind of future that awaits the infant, and on the basis of this insight judge that continuing to live would be in the infant’s interests. After defending this position, I argue that this position on the interests of infants in continued life does not commit one to opposing abortion, and it does not commit one to the view that our ethical obligations to protect the lives of sentient animals are the same as our ethical obligations to protect infant lives.