Amy Greenwald
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Amy Greenwald has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Amir Jafari
Duke University
1 shared publication - Casey Marks
Five Hut Consulting
1 shared publication Michael L. Littman
Department of Computer Science, Rutgers, The State University of NJ, Piscataway
1 shared publication- Michael L. Littman
Rutgers University
1 shared publication - Seong Jae Lee
Computer Science and Engineering University of Washington Seattle 98195 WA USA
1 shared publication - Takehiro Oyakawa
Department of Computer Science Department of Computer Science Brown University Brown University Microsoft Research NYC
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Optimal Auctions with Convex Perceived Payments
Myerson derived a simple and elegant solution to the single-parameter revenue-maximization problem in his seminal work on optimal auction design assuming the usual model of quasi-linear utilities. In this paper, we consider a slight generalization of this usual model---from linear to convex "perceived" payments. This more general problem does not appear to admit a solution as simple and elegant as Myerson's. While some of Myerson's results extend to our setting, like his payment formula (suitably adjusted), others do not. For example, we observe that the solutions to the Bayesian and the robust (i.e., non-Bayesian) optimal auction design problems in the convex perceived payment setting do not coincide like they do in the case of linear payments. We therefore study the two problems in turn. We derive an upper and a heuristic lower bound on expected revenue in our setting. These bounds are easily computed pointwise, and yield monotonic allocation rules, so can be supported by Myerson payments (suitably adjusted). In this way, our bounds yield heuristics that approximate the optimal robust auction, assuming convex perceived payments. We close with experiments, the final set of which massages the output of one of the closed-form heuristics for the robust problem into an extremely fast, near-optimal heuristic solution to the Bayesian optimal auction design problem.
Open AccessOptimal Auctions with Convex Perceived Payments
Myerson derived a simple and elegant solution to the single-parameter revenue-maximization problem in his seminal work on optimal auction design assuming the usual model of quasi-linear utilities. In this paper, we consider a slight generalization of this usual model---from linear to convex "perceived" payments. This more general problem does not appear to admit a solution as simple and elegant as Myerson's. While some of Myerson's results extend to our setting, like his payment formula (suitably adjusted), others do not. For example, we observe that the solutions to the Bayesian and the robust (i.e., non-Bayesian) optimal auction design problems in the convex perceived payment setting do not coincide like they do in the case of linear payments. We therefore study the two problems in turn. We derive an upper and a heuristic lower bound on expected revenue in our setting. These bounds are easily computed pointwise, and yield monotonic allocation rules, so can be supported by Myerson payments (suitably adjusted). In this way, our bounds yield heuristics that approximate the optimal robust auction, assuming convex perceived payments. We close with experiments, the final set of which massages the output of one of the closed-form heuristics for the robust problem into an extremely fast, near-optimal heuristic solution to the Bayesian optimal auction design problem.
- Open Access
RoxyBot-06: Stochastic Prediction and Optimization in TAC Travel
In this paper, we describe our autonomous bidding agent, RoxyBot, who emerged victorious in the travel division of the 2006 Trading Agent Competition in a photo finish. At a high level, the design of many successful trading agents can be summarized as follows: (i) price prediction: build a model of market prices; and (ii) optimization: solve for an approximately optimal set of bids, given this model. To predict, RoxyBot builds a stochastic model of market prices by simulating simultaneous ascending auctions. To optimize, RoxyBot relies on the sample average approximation method, a stochastic optimization technique.
Open AccessRoxyBot-06: Stochastic Prediction and Optimization in TAC Travel
In this paper, we describe our autonomous bidding agent, RoxyBot, who emerged victorious in the travel division of the 2006 Trading Agent Competition in a photo finish. At a high level, the design of many successful trading agents can be summarized as follows: (i) price prediction: build a model of market prices; and (ii) optimization: solve for an approximately optimal set of bids, given this model. To predict, RoxyBot builds a stochastic model of market prices by simulating simultaneous ascending auctions. To optimize, RoxyBot relies on the sample average approximation method, a stochastic optimization technique.
- 7 March 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 119-140
No-Φ-Regret: A Connection between Computational Learning Theory and Game Theory
- 7 March 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 119-140
No-Φ-Regret: A Connection between Computational Learning Theory and Game Theory
- 31 May 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 171 (7) , 440-447
A hierarchy of prescriptive goals for multiagent learning
- 31 May 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 171 (7) , 440-447
A hierarchy of prescriptive goals for multiagent learning
- 20 March 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Machine Learning
- Vol. 67 (1-2) , 3-6
Introduction to the special issue on learning and computational game theory
- 20 March 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Machine Learning
- Vol. 67 (1-2) , 3-6
Introduction to the special issue on learning and computational game theory
- Open Access
- 1 June 2006
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGecom Exchanges
- Vol. 6 (1) , 35-44
Heuristics for the deterministic bidding problem
We study a suite of heuristics that were designed for bidding in the simultaneous auctions that characterize the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Travel Game. At a high-level, the design of many successful TAC agents can be summarized as: (i) predict: build a model of the auctions' clearing prices, and (ii) optimize: solve for an (approximately) optimal set of bids, given this model. We focus on the optimization piece of this design.
- 1 June 2006
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGecom Exchanges
- Vol. 6 (1) , 35-44
Open AccessHeuristics for the deterministic bidding problem
We study a suite of heuristics that were designed for bidding in the simultaneous auctions that characterize the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Travel Game. At a high-level, the design of many successful TAC agents can be summarized as: (i) predict: build a model of the auctions' clearing prices, and (ii) optimize: solve for an (approximately) optimal set of bids, given this model. We focus on the optimization piece of this design.