Stephen Darwall
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 130 (3) , 637-658
Reply to Feldman, Hurka, and Rosati
- 1 September 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 130 (3) , 637-658
Reply to Feldman, Hurka, and Rosati
- 1 September 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 130 (3) , 579-584
Précis of Welfare and Rational Care
- 1 September 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 130 (3) , 579-584
Précis of Welfare and Rational Care
- 1 June 2006
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 18 (4) , 434-444
Reply to Griffin, Raz, and Wolf
I am honored that Jim Griffin, Joseph Raz, and Susan Wolf, all of whose work I greatly admire, have thought my ideas on welfare and care worth engaging, and I am very grateful to them for doing so. Each has raised searching and difficult questions. Rather than attempting to respond to them seriatim, I propose to discuss the issues under three broad headings: questions about the concept of welfare, questions about care or sympathetic concern, and the question of whether welfare claims have agent-relative or agent-neutral normative force. These issues are, of course, interconnected, but it may nonetheless be helpful to divide them up in these ways.
- 1 June 2006
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 18 (4) , 434-444
Reply to Griffin, Raz, and Wolf
I am honored that Jim Griffin, Joseph Raz, and Susan Wolf, all of whose work I greatly admire, have thought my ideas on welfare and care worth engaging, and I am very grateful to them for doing so. Each has raised searching and difficult questions. Rather than attempting to respond to them seriatim, I propose to discuss the issues under three broad headings: questions about the concept of welfare, questions about care or sympathetic concern, and the question of whether welfare claims have agent-relative or agent-neutral normative force. These issues are, of course, interconnected, but it may nonetheless be helpful to divide them up in these ways.
- 1 March 2002
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 14 (1) , 113-123
Review of Skorupski's Ethical Explorations
- 1 March 2002
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 14 (1) , 113-123
Review of Skorupski's Ethical Explorations
- 1 November 2000
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 12 (3) , 291-306
Sidgwick, Concern, and the Good
Sidgwick maintains, plausibly, that the concept of a person's good is a normative one and takes for granted that it is normative for the agent's own choice and action. I argue that the normativity of a person's good must be understood in relation to concern for someone for that person's own sake. A person's good, I suggest, is what one should (rationally) want for that person in so far as one cares about him, or what one should want for him for his sake. I examine Sidgwick's defence of the axioms of rational prudence and argue that it is powerless to convince anyone who lacks self-concern or thinks he has no reason to care for himself. To the extent that Sidgwick is persuasive, I argue, it is because he insinuates an assumption of self-concern. Similarly, Sidgwick's defence of the axiom of rational benevolence tacitly assumes, not just impersonality, but equal concern.
- 1 November 2000
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 12 (3) , 291-306
Sidgwick, Concern, and the Good
Sidgwick maintains, plausibly, that the concept of a person's good is a normative one and takes for granted that it is normative for the agent's own choice and action. I argue that the normativity of a person's good must be understood in relation to concern for someone for that person's own sake. A person's good, I suggest, is what one should (rationally) want for that person in so far as one cares about him, or what one should want for him for his sake. I examine Sidgwick's defence of the axioms of rational prudence and argue that it is powerless to convince anyone who lacks self-concern or thinks he has no reason to care for himself. To the extent that Sidgwick is persuasive, I argue, it is because he insinuates an assumption of self-concern. Similarly, Sidgwick's defence of the axiom of rational benevolence tacitly assumes, not just impersonality, but equal concern.
- 1 April 1997
- Published by Project MUSE in Hume Studies
- Vol. 23 (1) , 73-89
Hutcheson on Practical Reason
Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 1, April 1997, pp. 73-89 Hutcheson on Practical Reason STEPHEN DARWALL Sections II iii 1 and III i 1 of Hume's Treatise ("Of the Influencing Motives of the Will" and "Moral Distinctions Not Deriv'd From Reason") are generally regarded as the classical critique of ethical rationalism and statement of an empirical naturalist approach to practical reason.1 There Hume famously argues that morality cannot be based on reason since reason cannot strictly oppose or endorse any action or motive. Reason's task is the "discovery of truth and falsehood." It has no power to motivate the will by itself. Rather, its function is to inform us of facts whose practical relevance depends on motivational sources—desires and aversions—that are entirely separate from it. All this is well known. What is less well appreciated is how much Hume's discussion owes to the writings of Francis Hutcheson. Hume presents his conclusions in more skeptical terms, but the main lines of his account, as well as significant details, derive directly from Hutcheson. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the impression that Hume had Hutcheson's Illustrations as well as Hutcheson's Letters to Gilbert Burnet on his desk for easy reference while composing these sections.2 Hume's aim in Treatise III i 1 is to clear the way for the Hutchesonian thesis he will introduce in Section 2, that moral distinctions derive "from a moral sense." He begins Section 1 with two Hutchesonian observations: (i) moral "perceptions" naturally influence passions, and (ii) without such a natural mechanism all moralizing would be in vain.3 In the next few pages alone we find Hume relying on: Stephen Darwall is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 2215 AngelÃ- Hall, Ann Arbor MI 48109-1003 USA. email: sdarwall@umich.edu 74 Stephen Darwall (a) Hutcheson's distinction between "speculative" and "practical" truths (T 457; L 209); (b) Hutcheson's definition of reason as what discovers truth (T 458; L 209; IL i 215); (c) Hutcheson's description of two categories of truths reason can discover that are relevant to action: those concerning which objects give pleasure and those concerning "what means are most effectual to obtain such objects" (T 459; cf. 414-416; L 209); (d) Hutcheson's claim that actions can neither conform nor be contrary to truth in any way that distinguishes alternatives for choice, and hence that actions can be neither reasonable nor unreasonable in that sense (T 458; L 212; IL i 215-216); and (e) Hutcheson's point that any attempt, such as Wollaston's, to understand vice as a kind of falsity cannot explain how there can be degrees of vice and virtue (T 460; IL i 216-217). Even Hume's example of the fruit desired for its apparent pleasant taste comes from Illustrations (T 460; cf. 416-417; IL i). And Hume's famous 'is'/ 'ought' passage contains distinct echoes of Hutcheson's it were to be wished that writers would guard against...involving very complex ideas under some short words and particles which almost escape observation in sentences, such as 'ought,' 'should'...[and] our English gerunds, 'is to be done,' 'is to be preferred,' and such like. (T 469; L 213) Treatise II iii 2, "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will," owes yet further debts to Hutcheson. Hume's critique of "talk of the combat of passion and reason" and of the idea that reason alone can motivate closely follows Hutcheson's arguments in Illustrations and his Letters. And Hume's distinction between calm and violent passions also comes from Hutcheson, as does Hume's claim that however reason-like calm passions may be, distinguishing acts motivated by them from those motivated by violent passions does not, now to quote Hutcheson, "set rational actions in opposition to those from instinct, desire or affection" (IL iv 283). Nothing can motivate a rational agent independently of all "instincts and affections" (IL i 218). So an important source of Hume's "critique of practical reason" is Hutcheson. But if this is not as well appreciated as it should be, it is even less well recognized that...
- 1 April 1997
- Published by Project MUSE in Hume Studies
- Vol. 23 (1) , 73-89
Hutcheson on Practical Reason
Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 1, April 1997, pp. 73-89 Hutcheson on Practical Reason STEPHEN DARWALL Sections II iii 1 and III i 1 of Hume's Treatise ("Of the Influencing Motives of the Will" and "Moral Distinctions Not Deriv'd From Reason") are generally regarded as the classical critique of ethical rationalism and statement of an empirical naturalist approach to practical reason.1 There Hume famously argues that morality cannot be based on reason since reason cannot strictly oppose or endorse any action or motive. Reason's task is the "discovery of truth and falsehood." It has no power to motivate the will by itself. Rather, its function is to inform us of facts whose practical relevance depends on motivational sources—desires and aversions—that are entirely separate from it. All this is well known. What is less well appreciated is how much Hume's discussion owes to the writings of Francis Hutcheson. Hume presents his conclusions in more skeptical terms, but the main lines of his account, as well as significant details, derive directly from Hutcheson. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the impression that Hume had Hutcheson's Illustrations as well as Hutcheson's Letters to Gilbert Burnet on his desk for easy reference while composing these sections.2 Hume's aim in Treatise III i 1 is to clear the way for the Hutchesonian thesis he will introduce in Section 2, that moral distinctions derive "from a moral sense." He begins Section 1 with two Hutchesonian observations: (i) moral "perceptions" naturally influence passions, and (ii) without such a natural mechanism all moralizing would be in vain.3 In the next few pages alone we find Hume relying on: Stephen Darwall is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 2215 AngelÃ- Hall, Ann Arbor MI 48109-1003 USA. email: sdarwall@umich.edu 74 Stephen Darwall (a) Hutcheson's distinction between "speculative" and "practical" truths (T 457; L 209); (b) Hutcheson's definition of reason as what discovers truth (T 458; L 209; IL i 215); (c) Hutcheson's description of two categories of truths reason can discover that are relevant to action: those concerning which objects give pleasure and those concerning "what means are most effectual to obtain such objects" (T 459; cf. 414-416; L 209); (d) Hutcheson's claim that actions can neither conform nor be contrary to truth in any way that distinguishes alternatives for choice, and hence that actions can be neither reasonable nor unreasonable in that sense (T 458; L 212; IL i 215-216); and (e) Hutcheson's point that any attempt, such as Wollaston's, to understand vice as a kind of falsity cannot explain how there can be degrees of vice and virtue (T 460; IL i 216-217). Even Hume's example of the fruit desired for its apparent pleasant taste comes from Illustrations (T 460; cf. 416-417; IL i). And Hume's famous 'is'/ 'ought' passage contains distinct echoes of Hutcheson's it were to be wished that writers would guard against...involving very complex ideas under some short words and particles which almost escape observation in sentences, such as 'ought,' 'should'...[and] our English gerunds, 'is to be done,' 'is to be preferred,' and such like. (T 469; L 213) Treatise II iii 2, "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will," owes yet further debts to Hutcheson. Hume's critique of "talk of the combat of passion and reason" and of the idea that reason alone can motivate closely follows Hutcheson's arguments in Illustrations and his Letters. And Hume's distinction between calm and violent passions also comes from Hutcheson, as does Hume's claim that however reason-like calm passions may be, distinguishing acts motivated by them from those motivated by violent passions does not, now to quote Hutcheson, "set rational actions in opposition to those from instinct, desire or affection" (IL iv 283). Nothing can motivate a rational agent independently of all "instincts and affections" (IL i 218). So an important source of Hume's "critique of practical reason" is Hutcheson. But if this is not as well appreciated as it should be, it is even less well recognized that...