Taeko Hiroi

Why do politically and economically powerful states accept the loss of their legislative power by assenting to their underrepresentation in the national legislature? Given high levels of legislative malapportionment, it is puzzling why populous states would accept a deal they could easily refute. Powerful states may accept their legislative underrepresentation in order to create a sustainable political-institutional arrangement by which they can secure the real powers of policymaking, especially in the areas of macroeconomic policy, by conceding to small-population states on legislative representation. The historical data of principal political and economic offices in Brazil since 1889 support this compensation hypothesis: legislatively underrepresented regions and states have been significantly overrepresented in the most important policymaking offices, such as the country’s presidency, the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, federal ministers, and the heads of key economic institutions.

Many children die of easily preventable or treatable diseases in developing countries. What are the relationships between corruption, patronage, and child mortality in low‐ and middle‐income countries? We argue that corruption and patronage affect child mortality outcomes for some causes of death, especially those that are more easily prevented or treated with affordable care. To test our hypotheses, we utilize cross‐national time‐series analysis of under‐five child mortality in developing countries between 1996 and 2016. Our study finds that patronage and corruption increase under‐five child mortality arising from easily preventable childhood diseases, but they have almost no effect on under‐five child mortality caused by more complex illnesses. Our study underscores the need to examine cause‐specific health outcomes rather than overall health outcomes in comparative health analysis, as the ability of governments to address specific health issues depends on the nature of the problems.Related Articles: Ireni‐Saban, Liza. 2013. “Give Me Children or Else I Die: The Politics and Policy of Cross‐Border Reproductive Care.”Politics & Policy41(1): 5–38.https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12004.Lagunes, Paul F. 2012. “Corruption's Challenge to Democracy: A Review of the Issues.”Politics & Policy40(5): 802–26.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00384.x.Tusalem, Rollin F. 2022. “Does Gendered Representation in National Legislatures Promote Substantive Representation and Human Development? Evidence from the Developing World.”Politics & Policy50(6): 1096–137.https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12503.

We posit that having an economically preponderant member state in a regional integration organization (RIO) helps prevent and defeat coups within member states, particularly in organizations with no formal prohibition against irregular government change. The economic promises of integration require political stability between and within member states. Previous research demonstrates that economically preponderant states, acting as regional leaders, are instrumental in creating and developing RIOs. We, therefore, argue that RIO leaders’ intrinsic and instrumental interests motivate them to promote political stability within member states in order to safeguard regional integration's promised economic benefits. An examination from 1945–2016 of 40 RIOs around the world demonstrates that the economic asymmetry does reduce coup chance, more so when commitments to domestic political stability are not treaty obligated.

Resumo Este artigo procura identificar os fatores que influenciam a escolha dos ministros no Brasil, considerando a importância/saliência de cada um dos ministérios. Buscamos conhecer a influência dos aspectos regionais sobre tal escolha, controlando as características e trajetórias pessoais dos ministros, seja no que diz respeito aos aspectos políticos e técnicos, seja com relação à proximidade e à lealdade ao presidente da República. Para isso, utilizamos um banco de dados inédito, que abrange todo o período da Nova República.

Nesse estudo, procuramos identificar o peso dos estados na ocupação dos cargos mais importantes do país durante todo o período republicano. O nosso ponto principal é que os estados mais ricos, especialmente São Paulo, apesar de terem sido sub-representados no Senado Federal e na Câmara dos Deputados, predominaram na ocupação de outros cargos ainda mais importantes, tais como os de presidente da República, ministros da área econômica, presidentes do Banco Central e presidentes da Câmara dos Deputados. Dessa forma, pretendemos contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do arranjo federativo brasileiro, que tem sido analisado principalmente com a perspectiva da autonomia ou da dependência das subunidades territoriais em relação à União; pouco tem sido feito no sentido de compreender a contribuição de tais subunidades para a estruturação do poder central.

The speed and actions that bills face in legislatures vary immensely, but we do not have a comprehensive framework to analyse legislative durations. Moreover, the absence of data detailing legislative activities and durations in distinct stages of legislative processes hinders analysis. This article presents a framework for analysing legislative delay in coalitional presidential systems and examines unique data on durations, attributes, and parliamentary activities in legislative processes at the level of individual proposals. The empirical analysis investigates executive proposals considered by the Brazilian Congress and seeks to disentangle when duration means legislative activism, when it is due to political conflict, and when it only represents inertia. Our analysis indicates substantial activities in both content-influencing legislative activism and politically motivated obstructionism. Hence, political conflict is as important a source as policy disagreement in accounting for legislative delay. By examining a hitherto untapped area with rich data, this study opens up new venues for rigorous analyses of legislative durations and gridlock.

En este artículo se explica cómo la gestión de la coalición de gobierno y los atributos de la dinámica del conflicto entre e intra-coaliciones, tanto del gobierno como de la oposición, afectan a la incidencia de movimientos de obstrucción en la Cámara de los Diputados brasileña entre 1991 y 2010. Los movimientos de obstrucción son operacionalizados a través del porcentaje de votaciones nominales mensuales relativas a requerimientos procedimentales que de alguna forma retrasan la decisión sobre una propuesta legislativa. Se encuentra que la proporcionalidad en la distribución de cargos en los ministerios es eficiente a la hora de reducir la obstrucción en coaliciones menores. En coaliciones mayores, este tipo de incentivo tiene poco efecto para reducir movimientos obstruccionistas. Coaliciones de gobierno menores, más unidas y mejor administradas, son más eficientes que alianzas hinchadas para aminorar los problemas de toma de decisión en la Cámara de los Diputados.

Building on the models developed by Boix, Acemoglu, and Robinson on the relationship between economic structures and regime change, we develop a theory that emphasises structural characteristics of societies and the effects of policy change in such circumstances. We posit that significant policy change in an unequal or asset-specific society induces coups against the incumbent political leader by the losing faction of the elites seeking to prevent or cut losses associated with the policy shifts. Our empirical analysis indicates that the risk of a coup rises considerably during a period of a significant policy change in a society with a skewed distribution of income and one dominated by asset-specific production, such as oil, mining, and agriculture.

Parliamentary systems are generally regarded as superior to presidential ones in democratic sustenance. This article contributes to the debate on the relationship between systems of government and the survival of democracy by bringing in a new perspective and analysing the experiences of 131 democracies during 1960–2006. We argue that systems of government do matter, but their effects are indirect; they exert their influence through societies' prior democratic records. Confirming the conventional argument, our data analysis shows that uninterrupted parliamentary democracies face significantly lower risks of a first breakdown than their presidential counterparts. Contrary to the common understanding, however, we find that the risk of a democratic breakdown can be higher for parliamentary regimes than for presidential regimes among the countries whose democracy has collapsed in the past. Furthermore, the risk of a previously failed democracy falling again grows as (the risk of) government crises increase(s). Hence our study questions the common belief that parliamentary systems are categorically more conducive to democratic stability than presidential ones.