Vann McGee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Vann McGee has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Brian P. McLaughlin
Rutgers University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 March 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 173 (12) , 3153-3168
Thought, thoughts, and deflationism
- 5 March 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 173 (12) , 3153-3168
Open AccessThought, thoughts, and deflationism
- 4 November 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 147 (3) , 421-432
Field’s logic of truth
- 4 November 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 147 (3) , 421-432
Field’s logic of truth
- 1 October 2004
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Philosophia Mathematica
- Vol. 12 (3) , 278-284
Critical Studies / Book Reviews
VANN McGEE; Critical Studies / Book Reviews, Philosophia Mathematica, Volume 12, Issue 3, 1 October 2004, Pages 278–284, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/12.3.2
- 1 October 2004
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Philosophia Mathematica
- Vol. 12 (3) , 278-284
Critical Studies / Book Reviews
VANN McGEE; Critical Studies / Book Reviews, Philosophia Mathematica, Volume 12, Issue 3, 1 October 2004, Pages 278–284, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/12.3.2
- 1 February 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Linguistics and Philosophy
- Vol. 27 (1) , 123-136
Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson
- 1 February 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Linguistics and Philosophy
- Vol. 27 (1) , 123-136
Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson
- 1 September 2001
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 7 (3) , 379-380
John Etchemendy. The concept of logical consequence. An unaltered republication of JSL LVII 254. The David Hume series of philosophy and cognitive science reissues. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford 1999, also distributed by Cambridge University Press, New York, vii + 174 pp.
- 1 September 2001
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 7 (3) , 379-380
John Etchemendy. The concept of logical consequence. An unaltered republication of JSL LVII 254. The David Hume series of philosophy and cognitive science reissues. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford 1999, also distributed by Cambridge University Press, New York, vii + 174 pp.
- 1 March 2001
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 7 (1) , 58-62
Logic, logic, and logic, by George Boolos, with introductions and afterword by John P. Burgess, edited by Richard Jeffrey, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1998, ix + 443 pp.
- 1 March 2001
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 7 (1) , 58-62
Logic, logic, and logic, by George Boolos, with introductions and afterword by John P. Burgess, edited by Richard Jeffrey, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1998, ix + 443 pp.
- 1 December 1997
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 62 (4) , 1371-1378
The complexity of the modal predicate logic of “true in every transitive model of ZF”
Robert Solovay [8] investigated the version of the modal sentential calculus one gets by taking “□ϕ” to mean “ϕis true in every transitive model of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF).” Defining aninterpretationto be a function * taking formulas of the modal sentential calculus to sentences of the language of set theory that commutes with the Boolean connectives and sets (□ϕ)* equal to the statement thatϕ* is true in every transitive model of ZF, and stipulating that a modal formulaϕisvalidif and only if, for every interpretation *,ϕ* is true in every transitive model of ZF, Solovay obtained a complete and decidable set of axioms.In this paper, we stifle the hope that we might continue Solovay's program by getting an analogous set of axioms for the modal predicate calculus. The set of valid formulas of the modal predicate calculus is not axiomatizable; indeed, it is complete.We also look at a variant notion of validity according to which a formulaϕcounts as valid if and only if, for every interpretation *,ϕ* is true. For this alternative conception of validity, we shall obtain a lower bound of complexity: every set which isin the set of sentences of the language of set theory true in the constructible universe will be 1-reducible to the set of valid modal formulas.
- 1 December 1997
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 62 (4) , 1371-1378
The complexity of the modal predicate logic of “true in every transitive model of ZF”
Robert Solovay [8] investigated the version of the modal sentential calculus one gets by taking “□ϕ” to mean “ϕis true in every transitive model of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF).” Defining aninterpretationto be a function * taking formulas of the modal sentential calculus to sentences of the language of set theory that commutes with the Boolean connectives and sets (□ϕ)* equal to the statement thatϕ* is true in every transitive model of ZF, and stipulating that a modal formulaϕisvalidif and only if, for every interpretation *,ϕ* is true in every transitive model of ZF, Solovay obtained a complete and decidable set of axioms.In this paper, we stifle the hope that we might continue Solovay's program by getting an analogous set of axioms for the modal predicate calculus. The set of valid formulas of the modal predicate calculus is not axiomatizable; indeed, it is complete.We also look at a variant notion of validity according to which a formulaϕcounts as valid if and only if, for every interpretation *,ϕ* is true. For this alternative conception of validity, we shall obtain a lower bound of complexity: every set which isin the set of sentences of the language of set theory true in the constructible universe will be 1-reducible to the set of valid modal formulas.