Daniel F. Stone
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Daniel F. Stone has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jimmy Chan
NATL TAIWAN UNIV, Taipei, Taiwan
1 shared publication Joseph Price
Department of Economics, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA
1 shared publication- Joseph Price
Department of Economics, Brigham Young University
1 shared publication - Marc Remer
Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 5th St. NW, Washington DC 20530, United States
1 shared publication - Ryan M. Rodenberg
Florida State University
1 shared publication Zheng Cao
Department of Economics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 February 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 156 (3-4) , 467-490
Media proliferation and partisan selective exposure
- 28 February 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 156 (3-4) , 467-490
Media proliferation and partisan selective exposure
- 25 January 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 51 (2) , 1457-1474
TESTING BAYESIAN UPDATING WITH THE ASSOCIATED PRESS TOP 25
Most studies of Bayesian updating use experimental data. This article uses a non‐experimental data source—the voter ballots of the Associated Press college football poll, a weekly subjective ranking of the top 25 teams—to test Bayes' rule as a descriptive model. I find that voters sometimes underreact to new information, sometimes overreact, and at other times their behavior is consistent with estimated Bayesian updating. A unifying explanation for the disparate results is that voters are more responsive to information that is more salient (i.e., noticeable). In particular, voters respond in a “more Bayesian” way to losses and wins over ranked teams, as compared to wins over unranked teams, and voters seem unaware of subtle variation in the precision of priors. (JELD80, D83, D84)
- 25 January 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 51 (2) , 1457-1474
TESTING BAYESIAN UPDATING WITH THE ASSOCIATED PRESS TOP 25
Most studies of Bayesian updating use experimental data. This article uses a non‐experimental data source—the voter ballots of the Associated Press college football poll, a weekly subjective ranking of the top 25 teams—to test Bayes' rule as a descriptive model. I find that voters sometimes underreact to new information, sometimes overreact, and at other times their behavior is consistent with estimated Bayesian updating. A unifying explanation for the disparate results is that voters are more responsive to information that is more salient (i.e., noticeable). In particular, voters respond in a “more Bayesian” way to losses and wins over ranked teams, as compared to wins over unranked teams, and voters seem unaware of subtle variation in the precision of priors. (JELD80, D83, D84)
- 18 January 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 21 (1) , 271-300
Subperfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA Referees
This paper empirically investigates three hypotheses regarding biases of National Basketball Association referees. Identification of basketball referee bias is typically difficult as changes in observed statistics may be caused by either changes in referee bias or player behavior. We identify bias by exploiting the fact that referees have varying degrees of discretion over different types of a particular statistic‐turnovers. This allows us to conduct a treatment and control‐style analysis, using the less discretionary turnovers as the player behavior control. The results provide evidence that referees favor home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing in playoff series. All three biases are likely to increase consumer demand.
- 18 January 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 21 (1) , 271-300
Subperfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA Referees
This paper empirically investigates three hypotheses regarding biases of National Basketball Association referees. Identification of basketball referee bias is typically difficult as changes in observed statistics may be caused by either changes in referee bias or player behavior. We identify bias by exploiting the fact that referees have varying degrees of discretion over different types of a particular statistic‐turnovers. This allows us to conduct a treatment and control‐style analysis, using the less discretionary turnovers as the player behavior control. The results provide evidence that referees favor home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing in playoff series. All three biases are likely to increase consumer demand.
- 5 May 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 12 (3) , 231-252
Performance Under Pressure in the NBA
The authors analyze the effects of psychological pressure on performance using National Basketball Association (NBA) free throw data from the 2002-2003 through 2009-2010 seasons. The authors find evidence that players choke under pressure— they shoot on average 5-10 percentage points worse than normal in the final seconds of very close games. Choking is more likely for players who are worse overall free throw shooters, and on the second shot of a pair after the first shot is missed. In general, performance declines as pressure increases (as game time remaining decreases, and as the score margin decreases, whether the shooter’s team is winning or losing). However, the authors find no evidence of choking when games are tied in the final 15 seconds. The authors also fail to find evidence of performance under pressure being affected by home status, attendance, and whether or not the game is in the playoffs.
- 5 May 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 12 (3) , 231-252
Performance Under Pressure in the NBA
The authors analyze the effects of psychological pressure on performance using National Basketball Association (NBA) free throw data from the 2002-2003 through 2009-2010 seasons. The authors find evidence that players choke under pressure— they shoot on average 5-10 percentage points worse than normal in the final seconds of very close games. Choking is more likely for players who are worse overall free throw shooters, and on the second shot of a pair after the first shot is missed. In general, performance declines as pressure increases (as game time remaining decreases, and as the score margin decreases, whether the shooter’s team is winning or losing). However, the authors find no evidence of choking when games are tied in the final 15 seconds. The authors also fail to find evidence of performance under pressure being affected by home status, attendance, and whether or not the game is in the playoffs.
- 2 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Labor Research
- Vol. 32 (2) , 181-198
The Short and Long-Run Labor Market Effects of Age Eligibility Rules: Evidence from Women’s Professional Tennis
- 2 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Labor Research
- Vol. 32 (2) , 181-198
The Short and Long-Run Labor Market Effects of Age Eligibility Rules: Evidence from Women’s Professional Tennis
- 18 September 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 37 (3) , 397-424
A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research
- 18 September 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 37 (3) , 397-424
A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research