George Jones

Examines the overall pattern of different forms of control – oversight, mutuality, competition and contrived randomness – and suggests that each could be used more effectively to secure public objectives in regulation inside government. The regulators themselves appear not to apply the principles they apply in regulating to themselves. It is notable that there is little attempt to work out the costs to the public sector bodies of being regulated, and weak evidence of principles of competition and oversight, applied so assiduously to the regulatees, being applied to the regulators. The search for some consistency in approach offers a possible avenue for reform.

Examines the relationship between new public management (NPM) reforms and regulation inside government. It charts the changes in regulatory style over a 20‐year period. The relaxation of controls associated with NPM has often been accompanied by the tightening of other forms of control.

Examines European Union oversight of UK public sector activity, over compliance with EU norms and financial rules. EU regulators, and particularly those within the European Commission, possess financial sanctions to an extent unusual among domestic regulators over the UK public sector. However, the tendency towards politicization in many domains appeared to generate what, in terms of the rationality of the EU, looked like under‐enforcement.

Explores the complex institutional jungle of regulators involved in regulating state schools in England. In this sector, in contrast with the prisons sector, regulators were able to link their monitoring to sanctions as drastic as closing schools down. The study found no clear evidence of the benefits of the enhanced regulatory regime in terms of examination performance (the main performance indicator set by government for schools).

Examines regulation of prison standards by arms‐length oversight bodies, which generally had much stronger capacities for monitoring than enforcement. Prisons in England and Wales are subject to one of the densest patterns of oversight of any public sector activity. There has been a tendency to add new layers of regulation at various times without taking anything away, creating considerable overlap and duplication. Regulators who lacked formal powers were nevertheless observed to develop less formal mechanisms for seeking modification of behaviour.

Examines changes in patterns of central regulation over local government. It suggests that local government has been subjected to a wide range of more intrusive and more formal controls over its activities without the kind of associated loosening of other controls witnessed in other domains. Increases in oversight have been accompanied by processes of juridification.

Examines the practices of regulation over central government. It starts from the observation that control based on mutuality has traditionally been of central importance and assesses the extent to which recent initiatives have been introduced more by way of oversight, and control through competition and contrived randomness. The chapter concludes that though the Whitehall has not been so sharply affected by processes of re‐regulation as other sectors examined in the study, such as schools and prisons, nonetheless it has not been immune from such reforms.

Explores three interrelated themes: the tools and approaches regulators used to do their job; the extent to which regulation of government resembled regulation of business; and the extent to which regulatory behaviour and style were linked to the relational distance between the regulators and those they regulate. It argues that while there is no single style of regulation in government, the tools and approaches used by the regulators cut across the different institutional forms taken by the regulators.

Sets out the results of the quantitative assessment of regulation inside government in the UK and refers to the detailed table of budget and staffing levels contained in Appendix 2. It offers a method for defining what is meant by the term ‘public sector’, which is then deployed to capture the whole set of central regulators of public sector bodies. The pattern of growth in staffing and budgets over a 20‐year period point to nearly exponential growth in regulation inside government, and through highly diverse forms of oversight institution that include auditors, inspectorates, ombudsman, and central agencies.

Makes a case for reading from understanding and study of business regulation to study and analysis of ‘regulation inside government’ and offers a definition of the phenomenon and a taxonomy of the variety of forms of control that are involved. Three major findings from the project are set out. First, regulation inside government is a surprisingly large enterprise, measured in quantitative terms. Second, it appears to have been increasing in formality, complexity, intensity, and specialization over the last two decades. Third, there is considerable variety in the closeness of the regulators to those they oversee, and this affects, in particular, the relative formality of regulatory processes.