Daniel L. Nielson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Daniel L. Nielson has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Michael J. Tierney
College of William and Mary
3 shared publicationsBradley Parks
College of William and Mary
2 shared publications- Austin Strange
Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
1 shared publication - Edwin Muchapondwa
University of Cape Town
1 shared publication - Helen V. Milner
Princeton University
1 shared publication - J. C. Sharman
Griffith University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 14 (4) , 685-715
The elusive sources of legitimacy beliefs: Civil society views of international election observers
- 3 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 14 (4) , 685-715
The elusive sources of legitimacy beliefs: Civil society views of international election observers
- 25 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 12 (2) , 157-169
International organizations and development finance: Introduction to the special issue
- 25 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 12 (2) , 157-169
International organizations and development finance: Introduction to the special issue
- Open Access
- 5 February 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 11 (2) , 219-245
Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda
- 5 February 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 11 (2) , 219-245
Open AccessCitizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda
- 24 November 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Development Studies
- Vol. 52 (6) , 780-796
‘Ground-Truthing’ Chinese Development Finance in Africa: Field Evidence from South Africa and Uganda
A new methodology, Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF), leverages open-source information on development finance by non-transparent, non-Western donors. If such open-source methods prove to be valid and reliable, they can enhance our understanding of the causes and consequences of development finance from non-transparent donors including, but not limited to, China. But open-source methods face charges of inaccuracy. In this study we create and field-test a replicable ‘ground-truthing’ methodology to verify, update, and improve open-source data with in-person interviews and site visits in Uganda and South Africa. Ground-truthing generally reveals close agreement between open-source data and answers to protocol questions from informants with official roles in the Chinese-funded projects. Our findings suggest that open-source data collection, while limited in knowable ways, can provide a stronger empirical foundation for research on development finance.
- 24 November 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Development Studies
- Vol. 52 (6) , 780-796
‘Ground-Truthing’ Chinese Development Finance in Africa: Field Evidence from South Africa and Uganda
A new methodology, Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF), leverages open-source information on development finance by non-transparent, non-Western donors. If such open-source methods prove to be valid and reliable, they can enhance our understanding of the causes and consequences of development finance from non-transparent donors including, but not limited to, China. But open-source methods face charges of inaccuracy. In this study we create and field-test a replicable ‘ground-truthing’ methodology to verify, update, and improve open-source data with in-person interviews and site visits in Uganda and South Africa. Ground-truthing generally reveals close agreement between open-source data and answers to protocol questions from informants with official roles in the Chinese-funded projects. Our findings suggest that open-source data collection, while limited in knowable ways, can provide a stronger empirical foundation for research on development finance.
- 9 October 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 67 (4) , 657-693
Using Field Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation1
Efforts to fight international money laundering, corruption, and terrorist financing depend crucially on the prohibition barring the formation of anonymous shell companies. To study the effectiveness of this prohibition, we perform the first international relations (IR) field experiment on a global scale. With university institutional review board (IRB) clearance, we posed as consultants requesting confidential incorporation from 1,264 firms in 182 countries. Testing arguments drawn from IR theory, we probe the treatment effects of specifying (1) the international standards (managerialism), (2) penalties for noncompliance with these standards (rationalism), (3) the desire to follow norms through complying with international standards (constructivism), and (4) status as a U.S. customer. We find that firms prompted about possible legal penalties for violating standards (rationalism) were significantly less likely to respond to inquiries and less likely to comply with international law compared to the placebo condition. Some evidence also suggests that the constructivist condition caused significantly greater rates of noncompliance. The U.S. origin condition and the managerial condition had no significant effects on compliance rates. These results present anomalies for leading theories and underscore the importance of determining causal effects in IR research.
- 9 October 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 67 (4) , 657-693
Using Field Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation1
Efforts to fight international money laundering, corruption, and terrorist financing depend crucially on the prohibition barring the formation of anonymous shell companies. To study the effectiveness of this prohibition, we perform the first international relations (IR) field experiment on a global scale. With university institutional review board (IRB) clearance, we posed as consultants requesting confidential incorporation from 1,264 firms in 182 countries. Testing arguments drawn from IR theory, we probe the treatment effects of specifying (1) the international standards (managerialism), (2) penalties for noncompliance with these standards (rationalism), (3) the desire to follow norms through complying with international standards (constructivism), and (4) status as a U.S. customer. We find that firms prompted about possible legal penalties for violating standards (rationalism) were significantly less likely to respond to inquiries and less likely to comply with international law compared to the placebo condition. Some evidence also suggests that the constructivist condition caused significantly greater rates of noncompliance. The U.S. origin condition and the managerial condition had no significant effects on compliance rates. These results present anomalies for leading theories and underscore the importance of determining causal effects in IR research.
- 10 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 8 (1) , 117-120
Mark Copelovitch. 2010. The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, bonds, and bailouts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
- 10 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 8 (1) , 117-120
Mark Copelovitch. 2010. The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, bonds, and bailouts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
- 13 January 2011
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55 (2) , 219-232
Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict
- 13 January 2011
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55 (2) , 219-232
Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict
- 10 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 4 (4) , 407-433
Controlling coalitions: Social lending at the multilateral development banks
- 10 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 4 (4) , 407-433
Controlling coalitions: Social lending at the multilateral development banks