JRJun Ru

Jun Ru

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Jun Ru has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • When Does A Supply Chain Member Benefit from Vendor‐Managed Inventory?

    by Jun Ru, Ruixia Shi, Jun Zhang

    Enabled by the advances in information technology (IT), many supply chain partners have adopted the practice of vendor‐managed inventory (VMI) to improve operations efficiency. While the IT investment for VMI implementation can be significant, the benefits of VMI to different supply chain members are not obvious based on anecdotal evidences and empirical studies. This paper studies the effects of VMI on a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to shed light on when an IT investment for VMI adoption can be justified. We show that whether the two supply chain members benefit from VMI depends on how the holding or shortage cost increment from the manufacturer to retailer compares with two corresponding critical values. We then develop comparative statics results on how these critical values change with respect to different parameters. Interestingly, the retailer is more likely to benefit from the adoption of VMI when its inventory holding cost is low, and the manufacturer is more likely to benefit from VMI adoption when its inventory holding cost is high, contradicting what our intuitions would suggest and what has been prescribed in the literature.


  • Does a Store Brand Always Hurt the Manufacturer of a Competing National Brand?

    by Jun Ru, Ruixia Shi, Jun Zhang

    It is generally believed that store brands hurt the manufacturers of competing national brands while benefiting retailers. In this study, we challenge this notion by studying the impacts of a store brand when it is introduced by a power retailer. We show that a store brand may benefit the manufacturer when the interaction between the manufacturer and retailer is modeled as a retailer‐led Stackelberg game. This phenomenon occurs because the store brand changes the nature of the strategic interaction between the manufacturer and retailer in our model. In particular, while the interaction is always vertical strategic substitutability without a store brand, it may become vertical strategic independence with one. With the store brand, the demand for the national brand becomes larger, and the wholesale price for the national brand may increase, both of which benefit the manufacturer. Finally, the store brand may lessen the double marginalization problem of the supply chain for the national brand in the retailer‐led Stackelberg game, but does so in an unconventional way: The reduction in the double marginalization effect may come from a lowered retail markup instead of a lowered wholesale price. Our results reconcile some discrepancies between theoretical predictions and empirical findings regarding the impacts of store brands on manufacturers.


  • Optimal Procurement Design of an Assembly Supply Chain with Information Asymmetry

    by Xiang Fang, Jun Ru, Yunzeng Wang

    We study a decentralized assembly supply chain in which an assembler (she) assembles a set of n components, each produced by a different supplier (he), into a final product to satisfy an uncertain market demand. Each supplier holds private cost information to himself, for which the assembler only has a subjective estimate. Furthermore, the assembler believes that the suppliers' costs follow a joint discrete probability distribution. The assembler aims to design an optimal menu of contracts to maximize her own expected profit. The assembler's problem is a complex multi‐dimensional constrained optimization problem. We prove that there exists a unique optimal menu of contracts for the assembler, and we further develop an efficient algorithm with a complexity of O ( n ) to compute the optimal contract. In addition, we conduct a comprehensive sensitivity analysis to analyze how environmental parameters affect individual firm's performance and the value of information to the assembler, to each supplier, and to the supply chain. Our results suggest that each supplier's private cost information becomes more valuable to the assembler and each supplier when the average market demand increases or when the final product unit revenue increases. Surprisingly, when a supplier's cost volatility increases and its mean remains the same, the value of information to the assembler or to each supplier does not necessarily increase. Furthermore, we show that when the suppliers' cost distributions become more positively correlated, the suppliers are always worse off, but the assembler is better off. However, the value of information for the assembler might increase or decrease.


  • Impacts of Power Structure on Supply Chains with Uncertain Demand

    by Ruixia Shi, Jun Zhang, Jun Ru

    In this study, we use a game‐theory‐based framework to model power in a supply chain with random and price‐dependent demand and examine how power structure and demand models (expected demand and demand shock) affect supply chain members' performance. We demonstrate that whether a firm benefits from its power depends on the expected demand model but not on demand shock model. A firm benefits from its power only for linear but not for constant elasticity expected demand. The impact of power structure on supply chain efficiency depends on the models of both expected demand and demand shock. With additive shock, supply chain efficiency is highest (lowest) when neither firm dominates for linear (constant elasticity) expected demand. With multiplicative shock, the supply chain efficiency is highest with a power retailer (manufacturer) for linear (constant elasticity) expected demand. The manufacturer always benefits from a reduction in demand uncertainty. However, the retailer loses (benefits) from demand uncertainty reduction for linear (constant elasticity) expected demand. With a power retailer, the retail price is always on the higher end for linear expected demand, and the customer service level is the lowest for constant elasticity expected demand. Consequently, consumers do not necessarily benefit from a power retailer.