RDRudy Douven

Rudy Douven

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Rudy Douven has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Price transparency in the Dutch market-based health care system: did price dispersion for similar hospital services reduce over time?

    by Frédérique Franken, Rudy Douven, Stéphanie van der Geest, Marco Varkevisser

    In market-based health care systems, insurers negotiate prices of hospital care products with providers. While few countries disclose these negotiated prices, in 2016, the Dutch government required the disclosure of insurer-provider negotiated prices for hospital products up to €885 – the maximum deductible in the Netherlands – to enhance price transparency. This aimed to increase price awareness among and price transparency for consumers, insurers, and providers, fostering price competition. We study if price dispersion for relatively homogeneous hospital care products decreased post-publication, resulting in price convergence. We used negotiated price data from three major Dutch health insurers on over 200 hospital products. Using descriptive statistics and linear regression, with the coefficient of variation (a measure of dispersion) regressed on the year, we examined the development of price dispersion and the occurrence of price convergence. Price dispersion for the studied sample of hospital products decreased by an average of 29% between 2016 and 2022. This decrease was not accompanied by a price level increase that was larger than expected based on general inflation. Regression analysis showed a significant negative association between year and the coefficient of variation, indicating price convergence. These findings support our hypothesis that price dispersion decreased after mandatory price disclosure. The government mandate potentially increased awareness of largely unexplainable price differences for products priced below €885, encouraging insurers and providers to reduce these through the negotiation process. The observed price convergence likely benefits patients, as it results in less random out-of-pocket payments across providers for the same hospitals products.

  • Open Access

    Heteroscedasticity of residual spending after risk equalization: a potential source of selection incentives in health insurance markets with premium regulation

    by Michel Oskam, Richard C. van Kleef, Rudy Douven

    Many community-rated health insurance markets include risk equalization (also known as risk adjustment) to mitigate risk selection incentives for competing insurers. Empirical evaluations of risk equalization typically quantify selection incentives through predictable profits and losses net of risk equalization for various groups of consumers (e.g. the healthy versus the chronically ill). The underlying assumption is that absence of predictable profits and losses implies absence of selection incentives. This paper questions this assumption. We show that even when risk equalization perfectly compensates insurers for predictable differences in mean spending between groups, selection incentives are likely to remain. The reason is that the uncertainty about residual spending (i.e., spending net of risk equalization) differs across groups, e.g., the risk of substantial losses is larger for the chronically ill than for the healthy. In a risk-rated market, insurers are likely to charge a higher profit mark-up (to cover uncertainty in residual spending) and a higher safety mark-up (to cover the risk of large losses) to chronically ill than to healthy individuals. When such differentiation is not allowed, insurers face incentives to select in favor of the healthy. Although the exact size of these selection incentives depends on contextual factors, our empirical simulations indicate they can be non-trivial. Our findings suggest that – in addition to the equalization of differences in mean spending between the healthy and the chronically ill – policy measures might be needed to diminish (or compensate insurers for) heteroscedasticity of residual spending across groups.


  • Open Access

    Should administrative costs in health insurance be included in the risk-equalization? An analysis of five countries

    by Rudy Douven, Lukas Kauer, Sylvia Demme, Francesco Paolucci, Wynand van de Ven, Jürgen Wasem, Xiaoxi Zhao

    Most countries that apply risk-equalization in their health insurance market(s) perform risk-equalization on medical claims but do not include other components of the insurance premium, such as administrative costs. Using fixed effects panel regressions from individual insurers in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the US, we find evidence that health insurers with a high morbidity population on average have higher administrative costs. We argue that administrative costs should also be included in risk-equalization and we show that such equalization results in additional equalization payments nontrivial in size. Using examples from Germany and the US, we show how in practice policymakers can include administrative costs in risk-equalization. We are skeptical about applying risk-equalization to other components of the insurance premium, such as profits or costs related to solvency requirements of insurers.


  • Open Access

    Payment schemes and treatment responses after a demand shock in mental health care

    by Rudy Douven, Minke Remmerswaal, Tobias Vervliet

    We study whether two groups of mental health care providers—each paid according to a different payment scheme—adjusted the duration of their patients' treatments after they faced an exogenous 20% drop in the number of patients. For the first group of providers, self-employed providers, we find that they did not increase treatment duration to recoup their income loss. Treatment duration thresholds in the stepwise fee-for-service payment function seem to have prevented these providers to treat patients longer. For the second group of providers, large mental health care institutions who were subject to a budget constraint, we find an average increase in treatment duration of 8%. Prior rationing combined with professional uncertainty can explain this increase. We find suggestive evidence for overtreatment of patients as the longer treatments did not result in better patient outcomes, i.e. better General Assessment of Functioning scores.


  • Open Access

    Prices and market power in mental health care: Evidence from a major policy change in the Netherlands

    by Chiara Brouns, Rudy Douven, Ron Kemp

    In the Dutch health care system of managed competition, insurers and mental health providers negotiate on prices for mental health services. Contract prices are capped by a regulator who sets a maximum price for each mental health service. In 2013, the majority of the contract prices equaled these maximum prices. We study price setting after a major policy change in 2014. In 2014, mental health care providers had to negotiate prices with each individual health insurer separately, instead of with all insurers collectively as in 2013. Moreover, after a cost‐price revision, the regulator increased in 2014 maximum prices by about 10%. Insurers and mental health providers reacted to this policy change by setting most contract prices below the new maximum prices. We find that in 2014 mental health providers with more market power, that is, a higher willingness‐to‐pay measure, contracted significantly higher prices. Some insurers negotiated significantly lower prices than other insurers but these differences are unrelated to an insurers' market share.

  • Open Access

    Can your house keep you out of a nursing home?

    by Maaike Diepstraten, Rudy Douven, Bram Wouterse

    We examine the impact of the accessibility of an older individual's house on her use of nursing home care. We link administrative data on the accessibility of all houses in the Netherlands to data on long‐term care use of all older persons from 2011 to 2014. We find that older people living in more accessible houses are less likely to use nursing home care. The effects increase with age and are largest for individuals aged 90 or older. The effects are stronger for people with physical limitations than for persons with cognitive problems. We also provide suggestive evidence that older people living in more accessible houses substitute nursing home care by home care.


  • Open Access

    Does managed competition constrain hospitals' contract prices? Evidence from the Netherlands

    by Rudy Douven, Monique Burger, Frederik Schut

    In the Dutch health care system, health insurers negotiate with hospitals about the pricing of hospital products in a managed competition framework. In this paper, we study these contract prices that became for the first time publicly available in 2016. The data show substantive price variation between hospitals for the same products, and within a hospital for the same product across insurers. About 27% of the contract prices for a hospital product are at least 20% higher or lower than the average contract price in the market. For about half of the products, the highest and the lowest contract prices across hospitals differ by a factor of three or more. Moreover, hospital product prices do not follow a consistent ranking across hospitals, suggesting substantial cross-subsidization between hospital products. Potential explanations for the large and seemingly random price variation are: (i) different cost pricing methods used by hospitals, (ii) uncertainty due to frequent changes in the hospital payment system, (iii) price adjustments related to negotiated lumpsum payments and (iv) differences in hospital and insurer market power. Several policy options are discussed to reduce variation and increase transparency of hospital prices.


  • Do Altruistic Mental Health Care Providers Have Better Treatment Outcomes?

    by Rudy Douven, Minke Remmerswaal, Robin Zoutenbier

    We study heterogeneity in provider altruism between self-employed mental health care providers in the Netherlands. Using a large administrative data set, we exploit the discontinuities in the compensation scheme to separate altruistically motivated providers from financially motivated providers. We find strong heterogeneity in provider altruism. Moreover, we find that more altruistically motivated providers treat mental health patients shorter and report better treatment outcomes, as measured by the improvement in Global Assessment of Functioning. These results suggest that provider altruism is positively related to treatment outcomes.


  • Open Access

    Switching gains and health plan price elasticities: 20 years of managed competition reforms in The Netherlands

    by Rudy Douven, Katalin Katona, Frederik T. Schut, Victoria Shestalova

    In this paper we estimate health plan price elasticities and financial switching gains for consumers over a 20-year period in which managed competition was introduced in the Dutch health insurance market. The period is characterized by a major health insurance reform in 2006 to provide health insurers with more incentives and tools to compete, and to provide consumers with a more differentiated choice of products. Prior to the reform, in the period 1995–2005, we find a low number of switchers, between 2 and 4% a year, modest average total switching gains of 2 million euros per year and short-term health plan price elasticities ranging from −0.1 to −0.4. The major reform in 2006 resulted in an all-time high switching rate of 18%, total switching gains of 130 million euros, and a high short-term price elasticity of −5.7. During 2007–2015 switching rates returned to lower levels, between 4 and 8% per year, with total switching gains in the order of 40 million euros per year on average. Total switching gains could have been 10 times higher if all consumers had switched to one of the cheapest plans. We find short-term price elasticities ranging between −0.9 and −2.2. Our estimations suggest substantial consumer inertia throughout the entire period, as we find degrees of choice persistence ranging from about 0.8 to 0.9.