Jan-Henrik Steg
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jan-Henrik Steg has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christoph Kuzmics
Institute of Economics, University of Graz, Graz, Austria
3 shared publications - Frank Riedel
Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany
2 shared publications - Giorgio Ferrari
Department of Physics, Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy
2 shared publications - Jacco J. J. Thijssen
Department of Mathematics University of York United Kingdom
2 shared publications Elshan Garashli
1 shared publication- Elshan Garashli1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 161
Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives
- 5 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 161
Open AccessRobust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives
- Open Access
Strategic Irreversible Investment
This paper studies oligopolistic irreversible investment with closed-loop strategies. These permit fully dynamic interactions that result in much richer strategic behavior than previous studies with open-loop strategies allow. The tradeoff between preemption incentives and the option value of waiting becomes distinctly visible. Strategies that depend on present capital stocks enable credible reactions that deter from excessive preemption and support positive option values in equilibrium. Simpler strategies lead into a "preemption trap" with perfectly competitive outcome and zero net present values. To obtain these results, a novel concept of Markov perfect equilibrium is developed that copes with optimal investment taking the form of singular control.
Open AccessStrategic Irreversible Investment
This paper studies oligopolistic irreversible investment with closed-loop strategies. These permit fully dynamic interactions that result in much richer strategic behavior than previous studies with open-loop strategies allow. The tradeoff between preemption incentives and the option value of waiting becomes distinctly visible. Strategies that depend on present capital stocks enable credible reactions that deter from excessive preemption and support positive option values in equilibrium. Simpler strategies lead into a "preemption trap" with perfectly competitive outcome and zero net present values. To obtain these results, a novel concept of Markov perfect equilibrium is developed that copes with optimal investment taking the form of singular control.
- Open Access
Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives
For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are robust, but the sender-optimum is always achieved at some robust equilibrium.
Open AccessRobust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives
For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are robust, but the sender-optimum is always achieved at some robust equilibrium.
- Open Access
- 9 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 138, 1-21
Strategic investment with positive externalities
- 9 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 138, 1-21
Open AccessStrategic investment with positive externalities
- Open Access
- 6 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 135, 74-78
On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games
- 6 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 135, 74-78
Open AccessOn identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 110, 90-119
Preemptive investment under uncertainty
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 110, 90-119
Preemptive investment under uncertainty
- Open Access
Symmetric Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we analyse in turn. When there is a local second-mover advantage, the players may conduct a war of attrition with stopping rates that we characterize in terms of the Snell envelope from the theory of optimal stopping. This is a very general result, but it provides a clear interpretation. When there is a local first-mover advantage, stopping typically results from preemption and is abrupt. Equilibria may differ in the degree of preemption, precisely when it is triggered or not. We develop an algorithm to characterize when preemption is inevitable and to construct corresponding payoff-maximal symmetric equilibria.
Open AccessSymmetric Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we analyse in turn. When there is a local second-mover advantage, the players may conduct a war of attrition with stopping rates that we characterize in terms of the Snell envelope from the theory of optimal stopping. This is a very general result, but it provides a clear interpretation. When there is a local first-mover advantage, stopping typically results from preemption and is abrupt. Equilibria may differ in the degree of preemption, precisely when it is triggered or not. We develop an algorithm to characterize when preemption is inevitable and to construct corresponding payoff-maximal symmetric equilibria.
- Open Access
- 2 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 8 (4) , 918-938
On Preemption in Discrete and Continuous Time
- 2 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 8 (4) , 918-938
Open AccessOn Preemption in Discrete and Continuous Time
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 72, 36-50
Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 72, 36-50
Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games
- 1 July 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 170, 56-69
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
- 1 July 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 170, 56-69
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget