John Douglas Wilson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
John Douglas Wilson has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Roger H. Gordon
University of California, San Diego
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 30 May 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 19 (4) , 539-553
Should remittances be taxed or subsidized?
- 30 May 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 19 (4) , 539-553
Should remittances be taxed or subsidized?
- 23 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 15 (2) , 105-107
Introduction: Special Issue on Education
- 23 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 15 (2) , 105-107
Introduction: Special Issue on Education
- 1 December 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 53 (4) , 618-636
The Welfare State versus the Common Labor Market: Which to Dismantle?
Migration by low-income workers limits the ability of a country to redistribute income, since more generous income supplements attract additional workers into the country, reducing wages and raising the cost of the program. This article studies the role of immigration controls, which allow the government to raise the real incomes of existing immigrants without causing additional immigration. Paradoxically, immigration controls may lead to higher equilibrium levels of immigration in a common labor market, and those low-income individuals left behind in the source countries may be better off. Simply stated, a host country benefits more from immigrants when they are not impoverished, and immigration controls enable the country to eliminate impoverishment. Thus, the country is willing to increase the number of immigrants that it allows within its borders. After obtaining this insight from the basic model, the article discusses some extensions and qualifications.
- 1 December 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 53 (4) , 618-636
The Welfare State versus the Common Labor Market: Which to Dismantle?
Migration by low-income workers limits the ability of a country to redistribute income, since more generous income supplements attract additional workers into the country, reducing wages and raising the cost of the program. This article studies the role of immigration controls, which allow the government to raise the real incomes of existing immigrants without causing additional immigration. Paradoxically, immigration controls may lead to higher equilibrium levels of immigration in a common labor market, and those low-income individuals left behind in the source countries may be better off. Simply stated, a host country benefits more from immigrants when they are not impoverished, and immigration controls enable the country to eliminate impoverishment. Thus, the country is willing to increase the number of immigrants that it allows within its borders. After obtaining this insight from the basic model, the article discusses some extensions and qualifications.
- 1 February 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 14 (1) , 3-5
Introduction: Contributions to political economy
- 1 February 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 14 (1) , 3-5
Introduction: Contributions to political economy
- 14 March 2003
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 5 (2) , 399-417
Expenditure Competition
Given the temptation by government officials to use some of their budget for “perks,” residents face the problem of inducing officials to reduce such “waste.” The threat to vote out of office officials who perform poorly is one possible response. In this paper, we explore how the competition for residents induced by fiscal decentralization affects “waste” in government. We find that such competition reduces waste, raises the utility of residents, and increases the desired supplies of public goods (potentially above the levels that jurisdictions would choose if they could coordinate). These results are in sharp contrast to the presumed effects from “tax competition,” and suggest an additional advantage of fiscal decentralization.
- 14 March 2003
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 5 (2) , 399-417
Expenditure Competition
Given the temptation by government officials to use some of their budget for “perks,” residents face the problem of inducing officials to reduce such “waste.” The threat to vote out of office officials who perform poorly is one possible response. In this paper, we explore how the competition for residents induced by fiscal decentralization affects “waste” in government. We find that such competition reduces waste, raises the utility of residents, and increases the desired supplies of public goods (potentially above the levels that jurisdictions would choose if they could coordinate). These results are in sharp contrast to the presumed effects from “tax competition,” and suggest an additional advantage of fiscal decentralization.