Wes Morriston
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 20 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 100 (2) , 10
Charity Anderson: Divine hiddenness and evidence for god
- 20 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 100 (2) , 10
Charity Anderson: Divine hiddenness and evidence for god
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 96 (2) , 177-186
Review: Draper, Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 96 (2) , 177-186
Review: Draper, Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion
- 11 April 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 100 (1) , 70-85
Infinity, Time, and Successive Addition
According to an influential line of argument, the past must be finite because no infinite series can be formed by successive addition. The present paper pinpoints the non sequitur at the heart of this argument, disentangles the ambiguities that disguise it, and dismantles the misleading picture of ‘traversing the infinite’ that gives the argument so much of its allure. Finally, the paper critically explores the related argument that a beginningless series of past events is impossible because there could be no explanation of its having been ‘completed’ at one time rather than another.
- 11 April 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 100 (1) , 70-85
Infinity, Time, and Successive Addition
According to an influential line of argument, the past must be finite because no infinite series can be formed by successive addition. The present paper pinpoints the non sequitur at the heart of this argument, disentangles the ambiguities that disguise it, and dismantles the misleading picture of ‘traversing the infinite’ that gives the argument so much of its allure. Finally, the paper critically explores the related argument that a beginningless series of past events is impossible because there could be no explanation of its having been ‘completed’ at one time rather than another.
- 12 August 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 52 (3) , 361-373
‘Terrible’ divine commands revisited: a response to Davis and Franks
If God commanded something that would ordinarily be classified as a terrible evil, would we have a moral obligation to obey? In two previous articles in this journal, I examined and evaluated several different ways in which a divine command theorist might answer this question. Richard Brian Davis and W. Paul Franks have now provided a vigorous rebuttal, in which they argue that my way of handling the relevant counterpossible conditionals is flawed, and that a divine command theorist who avails herself of the metaphysical platform of theistic activism can consistently say that if (per impossibile) God were to command some terrible evil, it would not be the case that we have a moral obligation to do it. In the present article, I clarify my own view and defend it against Davis and Franks's objections. I also argue that the core claim of theistic activism – that there would be nothing at all if there were no God – does not have all the dramatic implications that Davis and Franks claim for it.
- 12 August 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 52 (3) , 361-373
‘Terrible’ divine commands revisited: a response to Davis and Franks
If God commanded something that would ordinarily be classified as a terrible evil, would we have a moral obligation to obey? In two previous articles in this journal, I examined and evaluated several different ways in which a divine command theorist might answer this question. Richard Brian Davis and W. Paul Franks have now provided a vigorous rebuttal, in which they argue that my way of handling the relevant counterpossible conditionals is flawed, and that a divine command theorist who avails herself of the metaphysical platform of theistic activism can consistently say that if (per impossibile) God were to command some terrible evil, it would not be the case that we have a moral obligation to do it. In the present article, I clarify my own view and defend it against Davis and Franks's objections. I also argue that the core claim of theistic activism – that there would be nothing at all if there were no God – does not have all the dramatic implications that Davis and Franks claim for it.
- 2 April 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 49 (2) , 209-220
Is faith in the Ultimate rationally required? Taking issue with some arguments in The Will to Imagine
According to J. L. Schellenberg, sceptical faith in the Ultimate is not merely permitted, but is rationally required. It is, all things considered, the response that we should make. In this article, I assess just three of Schellenberg's arguments for this bold conclusion. I explain why I find each of them unpersuasive.
- 2 April 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 49 (2) , 209-220
Is faith in the Ultimate rationally required? Taking issue with some arguments in The Will to Imagine
According to J. L. Schellenberg, sceptical faith in the Ultimate is not merely permitted, but is rationally required. It is, all things considered, the response that we should make. In this article, I assess just three of Schellenberg's arguments for this bold conclusion. I explain why I find each of them unpersuasive.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 122 (485) , 311-315
God and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality, by Mark C. Murphy
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 122 (485) , 311-315
God and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality, by Mark C. Murphy
- 2 August 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Sophia
- Vol. 51 (1) , 117-135
Ethical Criticism of the Bible: The Case of Divinely Mandated Genocide
- 2 August 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Sophia
- Vol. 51 (1) , 117-135
Ethical Criticism of the Bible: The Case of Divinely Mandated Genocide
- 15 February 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 48 (1) , 15-34
God and the ontological foundation of morality
In recent years, William Lane Craig has vigorously championed a moral argument for God's existence. The backbone of Craig's argument is the claim that only God can provide a ‘sound foundation in reality’ for morality. The present article has three principal aims. The first is to interpret and clarify the account of the ontological foundation of morality proposed by Craig. The second is to press home an important objection to that account. The third is to expose the weakness of Craig's case for saying that without God morality would be groundless and illusory.
- 15 February 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 48 (1) , 15-34
God and the ontological foundation of morality
In recent years, William Lane Craig has vigorously championed a moral argument for God's existence. The backbone of Craig's argument is the claim that only God can provide a ‘sound foundation in reality’ for morality. The present article has three principal aims. The first is to interpret and clarify the account of the ontological foundation of morality proposed by Craig. The second is to press home an important objection to that account. The third is to expose the weakness of Craig's case for saying that without God morality would be groundless and illusory.
- 31 July 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 70 (1) , 85-89
Is goodness without god good enough? A debate on faith, secularism, and ethics
- 31 July 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 70 (1) , 85-89
Is goodness without god good enough? A debate on faith, secularism, and ethics
- 3 February 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 67 (2) , 107-111
J. L. Schellenberg: The will to imagine: a justification of skeptical religion
- 3 February 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 67 (2) , 107-111
J. L. Schellenberg: The will to imagine: a justification of skeptical religion