Francesca Marin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Francesca Marin has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Arianna Ferrari
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
2 shared publications - Alberto Mirandola
Fellow ASME Professor Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Padova, Via Venezia 1, Padova 35131, Italy
1 shared publication Federico Zilio
Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sociologia, Pedagogia e Psicologia Applicata (FISPPA), Università degli Studi di Padova
1 shared publication- Paolo Magaudda
University of Padova
1 shared publication - Simone Arnaldi
University of Padua
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 29 January 2024
- Published by PAGEPress Publications in Medicina e Morale
- Vol. 72 (4) , 459-476
Ripensare il concetto di “end-of-life decisions”: il contributo bioetico degli studi empirici ELDY ed ELDY-CARE
This paper aims to critically investigate the notion of “End-of-Life Decisions” (ELDs) in order to extend its current semantic range. In fact, this expression usually refers to those practices that imply the death of the patient or those acts that can potentially shorten the patient’s existence. Instead, we suggest including into the “end-of-life decisions” all the decisions made in the final phase of existence: killing (e.g., euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide), letting die (e.g., withholding or withdrawing treatments), keeping alive by any means, or keeping alive despite unfavorable prognosis (e.g., antibiotic therapy in an end-of-life subject with significant infection symptoms). Such an approach makes it possible to investigate ethical issues related to both practices that cause death or might affect the shortening of life and those aimed at procrastinating the fatal event. Following the conceptual analysis of the concept of ELDs, we discuss several empirical studies and the structure of questionnaires used in recent years to investigate end-of-life opinions and decisions among healthcare professionals, caregivers, and patients. In particular, we analyze the ELDY and ELDY-CARE studies, which are based on an extended concept of ELDs and thus focus not only on the anticipation of the death of the patient, but also on life-prolonging decisions.
- 29 January 2024
- Published by PAGEPress Publications in Medicina e Morale
- Vol. 72 (4) , 459-476
Ripensare il concetto di “end-of-life decisions”: il contributo bioetico degli studi empirici ELDY ed ELDY-CARE
This paper aims to critically investigate the notion of “End-of-Life Decisions” (ELDs) in order to extend its current semantic range. In fact, this expression usually refers to those practices that imply the death of the patient or those acts that can potentially shorten the patient’s existence. Instead, we suggest including into the “end-of-life decisions” all the decisions made in the final phase of existence: killing (e.g., euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide), letting die (e.g., withholding or withdrawing treatments), keeping alive by any means, or keeping alive despite unfavorable prognosis (e.g., antibiotic therapy in an end-of-life subject with significant infection symptoms). Such an approach makes it possible to investigate ethical issues related to both practices that cause death or might affect the shortening of life and those aimed at procrastinating the fatal event. Following the conceptual analysis of the concept of ELDs, we discuss several empirical studies and the structure of questionnaires used in recent years to investigate end-of-life opinions and decisions among healthcare professionals, caregivers, and patients. In particular, we analyze the ELDY and ELDY-CARE studies, which are based on an extended concept of ELDs and thus focus not only on the anticipation of the death of the patient, but also on life-prolonging decisions.
- 1 January 2019
- Vol. 39 (1) , 81-96
Placing Trust in Medicine by Dealing with Its Uncertainty
- 20 December 2017
- Published by PAGEPress Publications in Medicina e Morale
- Vol. 66 (5) , 617-632
Il fine vita e l’attribuzione di responsabilità morale / The end of life and the ascription of responsibility
L’odierno dibattito bioetico sulle questioni del fine vita sembra ancora caratterizzato da alcuni nodi problematici in merito alla responsabilità morale. Per esempio, certi approcci di stampo utilitaristico conferiscono a un medico che pratica l’eutanasia la medesima responsabilità morale attribuibile a chi non avvia o sospende dei trattamenti di sostegno vitale. Chiamiamo questo come l’argomento della “sempre uguale responsabilità”. La prospettiva opposta alla precedente riguardo all’attribuzione di responsabilità ritiene invece che vi sia una differenza morale assoluta tra uccidere e lasciar morire. Si definisca tale tesi nei seguenti termini: “mai la medesima responsabilità”. Dopo aver sottolineato come l’argomento della “sempre uguale responsabilità” equipari erroneamente all’eutanasia il non avvio o la sospensione dei trattamenti, l’articolo evidenzia le implicazioni sull’attribuzione di responsabilità derivanti sia dal rifiuto sia dalla difesa incondizionata della distinzione uccidere/lasciar morire. Nello specifico, mentre la tesi della “sempre uguale responsabilità” conduce a un’iper-responsabilizzazione del medico, l’altro argomento (“mai la medesima responsabilità”) ottiene l’effetto opposto, cioè de-responsabilizza l’agente morale. Richiamando altre distinzioni morali, il paper suggerisce quindi un approccio intermedio che distingue da un lato la causa dalle condizioni, dall’altro i doveri negativi da quelli positivi. Infine, attraverso la distinzione tra lasciar morire colpevole e lasciar morire per il bene del paziente, si rileva come in alcuni casi il lasciar morire sia moralmente equiparabile all’uccidere. Di conseguenza, affrontare le questioni del fine vita per attribuire la responsabilità significa confrontarsi con la complessità dell’agire morale, ma, per evitare approcci riduttivi, è necessario mantenere tutte le distinzioni appena menzionate. ---------- Nowadays the bioethical debate on end-of-life issues seems to still be characterized by some problematic interpretations of moral responsibility. For example, within certain utilitarian approaches, the same moral responsibility is ascribed to a physician who practices euthanasia and to another who withholds or withdraws life-sustaining treatments. Let’s call this point of view “the always equal argument”. An opposite approach to the ascription of responsibility emerges from the thesis that there is an absolute moral distinction between killing and letting die. Let’s call this thesis “the never equal argument”. After showing that the always equal argument erroneously describes the act of withholding or withdrawing treatments such as euthanasia, the paper addresses the implications that both a rejection and an unconditional defense of the killing/letting distinction could have in the ascription of responsibility. To specify, it is argued that while the always equal argument calls for an...
- 20 December 2017
- Published by PAGEPress Publications in Medicina e Morale
- Vol. 66 (5) , 617-632
Il fine vita e l’attribuzione di responsabilità morale / The end of life and the ascription of responsibility
L’odierno dibattito bioetico sulle questioni del fine vita sembra ancora caratterizzato da alcuni nodi problematici in merito alla responsabilità morale. Per esempio, certi approcci di stampo utilitaristico conferiscono a un medico che pratica l’eutanasia la medesima responsabilità morale attribuibile a chi non avvia o sospende dei trattamenti di sostegno vitale. Chiamiamo questo come l’argomento della “sempre uguale responsabilità”. La prospettiva opposta alla precedente riguardo all’attribuzione di responsabilità ritiene invece che vi sia una differenza morale assoluta tra uccidere e lasciar morire. Si definisca tale tesi nei seguenti termini: “mai la medesima responsabilità”. Dopo aver sottolineato come l’argomento della “sempre uguale responsabilità” equipari erroneamente all’eutanasia il non avvio o la sospensione dei trattamenti, l’articolo evidenzia le implicazioni sull’attribuzione di responsabilità derivanti sia dal rifiuto sia dalla difesa incondizionata della distinzione uccidere/lasciar morire. Nello specifico, mentre la tesi della “sempre uguale responsabilità” conduce a un’iper-responsabilizzazione del medico, l’altro argomento (“mai la medesima responsabilità”) ottiene l’effetto opposto, cioè de-responsabilizza l’agente morale. Richiamando altre distinzioni morali, il paper suggerisce quindi un approccio intermedio che distingue da un lato la causa dalle condizioni, dall’altro i doveri negativi da quelli positivi. Infine, attraverso la distinzione tra lasciar morire colpevole e lasciar morire per il bene del paziente, si rileva come in alcuni casi il lasciar morire sia moralmente equiparabile all’uccidere. Di conseguenza, affrontare le questioni del fine vita per attribuire la responsabilità significa confrontarsi con la complessità dell’agire morale, ma, per evitare approcci riduttivi, è necessario mantenere tutte le distinzioni appena menzionate. ---------- Nowadays the bioethical debate on end-of-life issues seems to still be characterized by some problematic interpretations of moral responsibility. For example, within certain utilitarian approaches, the same moral responsibility is ascribed to a physician who practices euthanasia and to another who withholds or withdraws life-sustaining treatments. Let’s call this point of view “the always equal argument”. An opposite approach to the ascription of responsibility emerges from the thesis that there is an absolute moral distinction between killing and letting die. Let’s call this thesis “the never equal argument”. After showing that the always equal argument erroneously describes the act of withholding or withdrawing treatments such as euthanasia, the paper addresses the implications that both a rejection and an unconditional defense of the killing/letting distinction could have in the ascription of responsibility. To specify, it is argued that while the always equal argument calls for an...
- 15 March 2017
- Published by PAGEPress Publications in Medicina e Morale
- Vol. 66 (1) , 31-43
La salute approda nel mercato. Le questioni etiche relative alla fornitura di informazioni sui rischi di salute / Putting health in the marketplace. Ethical issues about providing online health risk information
Nell’ottobre 2015 l’azienda 23andMe ha ottenuto da parte della Food and Drug Administration (FDA) l’approvazione a vendere direttamente ai consumatori alcuni test genetici, acquistabili quindi senza la supervisione di professionisti sanitari. I 36 test approvati forniscono informazioni sul rischio riproduttivo di malattie quali fibrosi cistica e Tay-Sachs. Al momento 23andMe non può commercializzare i test di suscettibilità genetica (GST), ma spera di ottenere l’approvazione della FDA per fornire informazioni anche sul rischio di insorgenza di malattia. L’idea è che, acquisendo tali informazioni, i consumatori possano intraprendere stili di vita più idonei per evitare che si sviluppi la patologia. “È in arrivo la sanità su misura dei consumatori”, ha esclamato Anne Wojcicki, co-fondatrice della 23andMe. Effettivamente, accanto ad altre modalità (quali mobile health, telemedicina, ecc.) di accesso online all’informazione sanitaria, i test genetici diretti ai consumatori incoraggiano un approccio consumistico alla salute. Tuttavia, questo è vantaggioso per la medicina e i consumatori? La promozione della salute richiede attitudini meramente consumistiche? Per discutere tali questioni, il paper affronterà innanzitutto i problemi di validità clinica e di utilità dei GST così come le loro implicazioni sul sistema sanitario: sebbene la ricerca continui, i GST hanno un potere predittivo limitato e le misure preventive o terapeutiche non sono sempre disponibili, comportando sovramedicalizzazione e minori risorse sanitarie per altri (i consumatori potrebbero richiedere ulteriori test per confermare o invalidare i risultati ottenuti). Verranno poi analizzate le questioni etiche relative alla commercializzazione della salute e al progressivo passaggio dal rapporto fiduciario medico-paziente al rapporto consumistico fornitore-fruitore. ---------- In October 2015 the company 23andMe gained the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s approval to market genetic tests directly to consumers, without supervision of healthcare professionals. The FDA approved 36 carrier tests to provide health information on inherited disorders, including cystic fibrosis and Tay-Sachs. 23andMe is still prohibited in marketing genetic susceptibility testing (GST), but the company hopes to gain the FDA’s approval to provide health risk information. The idea is that informing customers of their genetic susceptibility may motivate them to change their health-related behavior, reducing the risk of the disease’s onset. “Direct-to-consumer healthcare is coming!”, said Anne Wojcicki, co-founder of 23andMe, after the FDA’s approval. Actually, besides other ways (such as mobile health, telemedicine, etc.) of getting access to health information and services through internet, direct-to-consumer genetic tests fosters a consumerist approach to healthcare. Nevertheless, is such an approach advantageous for medicine and consumers? Can we consider health as a mere consumer good whose promotion requires consumerist attitudes? To discuss these issues, the paper will firstly address problems with clinical validity and utility of GST as well as their implications for healthcare systems: although research is ongoing, GST have limited predictive power and therapeutic or preventive measures are not always available, leading to overmedicalization and fewer healthcare resources for others (consumers could require follow-up tests to confirm or deny obtained results). Secondly, ethical concerns regarding putting health in the marketplace will be analyzed by examining the progressive shift from healthcare professional-patient fiduciary relationship to provider-user consumerist relationship.
- 15 March 2017
- Published by PAGEPress Publications in Medicina e Morale
- Vol. 66 (1) , 31-43
La salute approda nel mercato. Le questioni etiche relative alla fornitura di informazioni sui rischi di salute / Putting health in the marketplace. Ethical issues about providing online health risk information
Nell’ottobre 2015 l’azienda 23andMe ha ottenuto da parte della Food and Drug Administration (FDA) l’approvazione a vendere direttamente ai consumatori alcuni test genetici, acquistabili quindi senza la supervisione di professionisti sanitari. I 36 test approvati forniscono informazioni sul rischio riproduttivo di malattie quali fibrosi cistica e Tay-Sachs. Al momento 23andMe non può commercializzare i test di suscettibilità genetica (GST), ma spera di ottenere l’approvazione della FDA per fornire informazioni anche sul rischio di insorgenza di malattia. L’idea è che, acquisendo tali informazioni, i consumatori possano intraprendere stili di vita più idonei per evitare che si sviluppi la patologia. “È in arrivo la sanità su misura dei consumatori”, ha esclamato Anne Wojcicki, co-fondatrice della 23andMe. Effettivamente, accanto ad altre modalità (quali mobile health, telemedicina, ecc.) di accesso online all’informazione sanitaria, i test genetici diretti ai consumatori incoraggiano un approccio consumistico alla salute. Tuttavia, questo è vantaggioso per la medicina e i consumatori? La promozione della salute richiede attitudini meramente consumistiche? Per discutere tali questioni, il paper affronterà innanzitutto i problemi di validità clinica e di utilità dei GST così come le loro implicazioni sul sistema sanitario: sebbene la ricerca continui, i GST hanno un potere predittivo limitato e le misure preventive o terapeutiche non sono sempre disponibili, comportando sovramedicalizzazione e minori risorse sanitarie per altri (i consumatori potrebbero richiedere ulteriori test per confermare o invalidare i risultati ottenuti). Verranno poi analizzate le questioni etiche relative alla commercializzazione della salute e al progressivo passaggio dal rapporto fiduciario medico-paziente al rapporto consumistico fornitore-fruitore. ---------- In October 2015 the company 23andMe gained the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s approval to market genetic tests directly to consumers, without supervision of healthcare professionals. The FDA approved 36 carrier tests to provide health information on inherited disorders, including cystic fibrosis and Tay-Sachs. 23andMe is still prohibited in marketing genetic susceptibility testing (GST), but the company hopes to gain the FDA’s approval to provide health risk information. The idea is that informing customers of their genetic susceptibility may motivate them to change their health-related behavior, reducing the risk of the disease’s onset. “Direct-to-consumer healthcare is coming!”, said Anne Wojcicki, co-founder of 23andMe, after the FDA’s approval. Actually, besides other ways (such as mobile health, telemedicine, etc.) of getting access to health information and services through internet, direct-to-consumer genetic tests fosters a consumerist approach to healthcare. Nevertheless, is such an approach advantageous for medicine and consumers? Can we consider health as a mere consumer good whose promotion requires consumerist attitudes? To discuss these issues, the paper will firstly address problems with clinical validity and utility of GST as well as their implications for healthcare systems: although research is ongoing, GST have limited predictive power and therapeutic or preventive measures are not always available, leading to overmedicalization and fewer healthcare resources for others (consumers could require follow-up tests to confirm or deny obtained results). Secondly, ethical concerns regarding putting health in the marketplace will be analyzed by examining the progressive shift from healthcare professional-patient fiduciary relationship to provider-user consumerist relationship.
- Open Access
- 27 October 2015
- Published by Science Publishing Group in American Journal of Energy Engineering
- Vol. 3 (6) , 78-85
Ethics, Communication, and Propaganda About Energetic and Environmental Topics
This paper aims at disentangling and explaining the meaning of communication, which should not be confused with the mere transmission of information. The focus will be put on scientific and technological communication, mainly in the field of energetic and environmental topics. Communication is a profession practiced by speakers and writers working within the mass media (newspapers, television, internet, etc.), but other people are involved in communication issues, particularly when communication deals with scientific and technological topics. Scientists, technicians and professionals, and engineers in particular, have a great responsibility when participating in the spread of technical information, which should not be confused with propaganda, whose meaning is explained in the paper. The paper will be developed in two stages. Firstly, by offering a conceptual framework, it will be argued that communication, rightly understood, is a special kind of action that is characterized by an ethical commitment , which should permeate our daily life, in particular the professional experience. On the contrary, propaganda cannot constitute an authentic communicative context because it involves senders and receivers, and not interlocutors. Indeed, propaganda generally aims at influencing opinions, attitudes and actions of a specific target audience on the basis of senders’ personal interest or ideological thinking. Secondly, practical examples will be provided in the scientific and technical fields, with particular attention given to energetic and environmental issues. In fact, this is a critical context, because people are generally not prepared to deeply understand this matter and can easily be manipulated. Some examples will show how a given reality can be partially presented or misrepresented when speaking about the concept of sustainability, the evaluation of health or safety risks, the assessment of the potentiality of renewable energy sources, the difference between energy sources and energy carriers, the interpretation of climate changes, or the ideological opposition to industrial initiatives.
- 27 October 2015
- Published by Science Publishing Group in American Journal of Energy Engineering
- Vol. 3 (6) , 78-85
Open AccessEthics, Communication, and Propaganda About Energetic and Environmental Topics
This paper aims at disentangling and explaining the meaning of communication, which should not be confused with the mere transmission of information. The focus will be put on scientific and technological communication, mainly in the field of energetic and environmental topics. Communication is a profession practiced by speakers and writers working within the mass media (newspapers, television, internet, etc.), but other people are involved in communication issues, particularly when communication deals with scientific and technological topics. Scientists, technicians and professionals, and engineers in particular, have a great responsibility when participating in the spread of technical information, which should not be confused with propaganda, whose meaning is explained in the paper. The paper will be developed in two stages. Firstly, by offering a conceptual framework, it will be argued that communication, rightly understood, is a special kind of action that is characterized by an ethical commitment , which should permeate our daily life, in particular the professional experience. On the contrary, propaganda cannot constitute an authentic communicative context because it involves senders and receivers, and not interlocutors. Indeed, propaganda generally aims at influencing opinions, attitudes and actions of a specific target audience on the basis of senders’ personal interest or ideological thinking. Secondly, practical examples will be provided in the scientific and technical fields, with particular attention given to energetic and environmental issues. In fact, this is a critical context, because people are generally not prepared to deeply understand this matter and can easily be manipulated. Some examples will show how a given reality can be partially presented or misrepresented when speaking about the concept of sustainability, the evaluation of health or safety risks, the assessment of the potentiality of renewable energy sources, the difference between energy sources and energy carriers, the interpretation of climate changes, or the ideological opposition to industrial initiatives.
- 21 June 2014
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 21-36
Responsibility and Visions in the New and Emerging Technologies
- 21 June 2014
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 21-36
Responsibility and Visions in the New and Emerging Technologies
- 21 June 2014
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-17
Introduction: Nanotechnologies and the Quest for Responsibility
- 21 June 2014
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-17
Introduction: Nanotechnologies and the Quest for Responsibility
- 30 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 33 (6) , 443-446
Marc A. Rodwin: Conflicts of interest and the future of medicine: The United States, France, and Japan
- 30 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 33 (6) , 443-446
Marc A. Rodwin: Conflicts of interest and the future of medicine: The United States, France, and Japan
- 30 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 59-63
Barbara Maier and Warren A. Shibles: The philosophy and practice of medicine and bioethics: A naturalistic-humanistic approach
- 30 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 59-63
Barbara Maier and Warren A. Shibles: The philosophy and practice of medicine and bioethics: A naturalistic-humanistic approach