Michael Patrick Lynch
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Michael Patrick Lynch has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cailin O'Connor
University of California Irvine
1 shared publication - Chase Wrenn
The University of Alabama
1 shared publication Daniel Massey
University of Connecticut
1 shared publicationDavid Capps
University of Connecticut
1 shared publication- David E. Taylor
Department of Philosophy & Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, Minneapolis, USA
1 shared publication - Douglas Edwards
Utica University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences University of Rijeka in European journal of analytic philosophy
- Vol. 22 (1) , 1-9
Political narratives and concrete democratic hope
A central thesis of Manuel Almagro’s The Rise of Polarization concerns the power of narrative to drive the phenomenon known as affective polarization. Societies are affectively polarized to the degree that they are divided in their emotional attitudes towards each other—to the degree, in other words, they see the other side as untrustworthy, ignorant or hateful. While other views of polarization tend to emphasize the importance of identity politics and misinformation as drivers of affective polarization, Almagro argues that people’s rational engagement with, and commitment to, political narratives is a further dimension of polarized societies. As such, Almagro’s book is essential reading for anyone trying to understand our current political dynamics. Yet, Almagro’s focus on the importance of what he calls “abstract” political narratives also raises some complex questions about the nature of narratives, the possibility of political criticism and the power of authoritarian movements. In this essay, I ask some of these questions, exploring the extent to which Almagro’s account can answer them. I end by suggesting that, at least in the United States, the weaponization of narratives has reached a new turning point.
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences University of Rijeka in European journal of analytic philosophy
- Vol. 22 (1) , 1-9
Political narratives and concrete democratic hope
A central thesis of Manuel Almagro’s The Rise of Polarization concerns the power of narrative to drive the phenomenon known as affective polarization. Societies are affectively polarized to the degree that they are divided in their emotional attitudes towards each other—to the degree, in other words, they see the other side as untrustworthy, ignorant or hateful. While other views of polarization tend to emphasize the importance of identity politics and misinformation as drivers of affective polarization, Almagro argues that people’s rational engagement with, and commitment to, political narratives is a further dimension of polarized societies. As such, Almagro’s book is essential reading for anyone trying to understand our current political dynamics. Yet, Almagro’s focus on the importance of what he calls “abstract” political narratives also raises some complex questions about the nature of narratives, the possibility of political criticism and the power of authoritarian movements. In this essay, I ask some of these questions, exploring the extent to which Almagro’s account can answer them. I end by suggesting that, at least in the United States, the weaponization of narratives has reached a new turning point.
- 17 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 187-210
Truth and Polarization
- 17 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 19-56
On Douglas Edwards’ the Metaphysics of Truth: The Author Meets His Critics
- 17 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 19-56
On Douglas Edwards’ the Metaphysics of Truth: The Author Meets His Critics
- 3 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Society
- Vol. 61 (3) , 1-6
Chase Wrenn, The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth
- 3 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Society
- Vol. 61 (3) , 1-6
Chase Wrenn, The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Epistemology & Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 61 (3) , 158-174
Truth over Democracy or Democracy over Truth?
Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty were both famously suspicious of an objective concept of truth, in part because they shared the suspicion that concepts like truth and reason were irrevocably anti-democratic. As Feyerabend saw it, an overreliance on a naive objectivist conception of truth and rationality encouraged a “tyranny of truth”, one according to which science should have an overly privileged role to play in deciding what society ought to do. Similarly, Rorty believed truth was a concept ill-suited for democracy. In this paper, I offer some brief reflections on the view that political truth is ill-suited for democratic politics. I argue that Rorty and Feyerabend are right that the concepts of truth and knowledge have political meaning, and that as a result, the question of “who knows” (and who doesn't) are partly political questions. But while Feyerbеnd was right to think we cannot give priority to the epistemic over the political in democracy, neither, I conclude, should we reverse that priority.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Epistemology & Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 61 (3) , 158-174
Open AccessTruth over Democracy or Democracy over Truth?
Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty were both famously suspicious of an objective concept of truth, in part because they shared the suspicion that concepts like truth and reason were irrevocably anti-democratic. As Feyerabend saw it, an overreliance on a naive objectivist conception of truth and rationality encouraged a “tyranny of truth”, one according to which science should have an overly privileged role to play in deciding what society ought to do. Similarly, Rorty believed truth was a concept ill-suited for democracy. In this paper, I offer some brief reflections on the view that political truth is ill-suited for democratic politics. I argue that Rorty and Feyerabend are right that the concepts of truth and knowledge have political meaning, and that as a result, the question of “who knows” (and who doesn't) are partly political questions. But while Feyerbеnd was right to think we cannot give priority to the epistemic over the political in democracy, neither, I conclude, should we reverse that priority.
- 23 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 40 (5) , 971-982
Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement
- 23 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 40 (5) , 971-982
Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement
- 30 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 63-84
Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism, and the Problem of Double-Counting
- 30 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 63-84
Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism, and the Problem of Double-Counting
- 19 July 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 15 (3) , 283-296
ARROGANCE, TRUTH AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Democracies, Dewey and others have argued, are ideally spaces of reasons – they allow for an exchange of reasons both practical and epistemic by those willing to engage in that discourse. That requires that citizens have convictions they believe in, but it also requires that they be willing to listen to each other. This paper examines how a particular psychological attitude, “epistemic arrogance,” can undermine the achievement of these goals. The paper presents an analysis of this attitude and then examines four arguments for how its adoption – especially by the powerful – undermines the ideal of democracy as a space of reasons.
- 19 July 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 15 (3) , 283-296
ARROGANCE, TRUTH AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Democracies, Dewey and others have argued, are ideally spaces of reasons – they allow for an exchange of reasons both practical and epistemic by those willing to engage in that discourse. That requires that citizens have convictions they believe in, but it also requires that they be willing to listen to each other. This paper examines how a particular psychological attitude, “epistemic arrogance,” can undermine the achievement of these goals. The paper presents an analysis of this attitude and then examines four arguments for how its adoption – especially by the powerful – undermines the ideal of democracy as a space of reasons.
- 23 February 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Legacy
- Vol. 19 (2) , 163-173
Truth and Freedom
- 23 February 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Legacy
- Vol. 19 (2) , 163-173
Truth and Freedom
- 13 November 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 163 (2) , 385-401
Expressivism and plural truth
- 13 November 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 163 (2) , 385-401
Expressivism and plural truth