Patrick Tomlin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 36 (3) , 225-254
Innocence Lost: A Problem for Punishment as Duty
- 2 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 36 (3) , 225-254
Open AccessInnocence Lost: A Problem for Punishment as Duty
- 4 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 35 (S1) , 29-46
Saplings or Caterpillars? Trying to Understand Children's Wellbeing
Is childhood valuable? And is childhood as, less, or more, valuable than adulthood? In this article I first delineate several different questions that we might be asking when we think about the ‘value of childhood’, and I explore some difficulties of doing so. I then focus on the question of whether childhood is good for the person who experiences it. I argue for two key claims. First, if childhood wellbeing is measured by the same standards as adulthood, then children are worse off than adults. Second, if childhood and adulthood wellbeing are measured by different standards, then we cannot compare them, and children are neither better off nor worse off than adults. This has some counter‐intuitive implications, such as that we do not harm persons by depriving them of a childhood, nor by keeping them as children for elongated periods.
- 4 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 35 (S1) , 29-46
Saplings or Caterpillars? Trying to Understand Children's Wellbeing
Is childhood valuable? And is childhood as, less, or more, valuable than adulthood? In this article I first delineate several different questions that we might be asking when we think about the ‘value of childhood’, and I explore some difficulties of doing so. I then focus on the question of whether childhood is good for the person who experiences it. I argue for two key claims. First, if childhood wellbeing is measured by the same standards as adulthood, then children are worse off than adults. Second, if childhood and adulthood wellbeing are measured by different standards, then we cannot compare them, and children are neither better off nor worse off than adults. This has some counter‐intuitive implications, such as that we do not harm persons by depriving them of a childhood, nor by keeping them as children for elongated periods.
- 27 January 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 63 (3) , 663-678
Should Kids Pay Their Own Way?
Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised in such a way that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this article, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves.
- 27 January 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 63 (3) , 663-678
Should Kids Pay Their Own Way?
Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised in such a way that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this article, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves.
- Open Access
- 7 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 33 (5) , 655-682
Time and Retribution
- 7 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 33 (5) , 655-682
Open AccessTime and Retribution
- 31 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Criminal Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 8 (2) , 431-447
Could the Presumption of Innocence Protect the Guilty?
- 31 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Criminal Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 8 (2) , 431-447
Could the Presumption of Innocence Protect the Guilty?
- 22 May 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 24 (2) , 200-213
On Fairness and Claims
Perhaps the best-known theory of fairness is John Broome's: that fairness is the proportional satisfaction of claims. In this article, I question whether claims are the appropriate focus for a theory of fairness, at least as Broome understands them in his current theory. If fairness is the proportionate satisfaction of claims, I argue, then the following would be true: fairness could not help determine the correct distribution of claims; fairness could not be used to evaluate the distribution of claims; fairness could not guide us in distributing claims (or unowed goods); we could not have a claim to be treated fairly; and we would not be wronged when treated unfairly. These entailments mean that it is questionable that fairness is concerned with claims in the way Broome suggests. At the very least, the relationship between fairness and claims appears to be more complex than the picture painted by Broome.
- 22 May 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 24 (2) , 200-213
On Fairness and Claims
Perhaps the best-known theory of fairness is John Broome's: that fairness is the proportional satisfaction of claims. In this article, I question whether claims are the appropriate focus for a theory of fairness, at least as Broome understands them in his current theory. If fairness is the proportionate satisfaction of claims, I argue, then the following would be true: fairness could not help determine the correct distribution of claims; fairness could not be used to evaluate the distribution of claims; fairness could not guide us in distributing claims (or unowed goods); we could not have a claim to be treated fairly; and we would not be wronged when treated unfairly. These entailments mean that it is questionable that fairness is concerned with claims in the way Broome suggests. At the very least, the relationship between fairness and claims appears to be more complex than the picture painted by Broome.
- 4 February 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 16 (2) , 393-407
Choices Chance and Change: Luck Egalitarianism Over Time
- 4 February 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 16 (2) , 393-407
Choices Chance and Change: Luck Egalitarianism Over Time