Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Vincent Beroulle has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Thermal Attack on RO-PUFs: The Cases of Bulk 65 nm and FDSOI 28 nm

    by Aghiles Douadi, Elena-Ioana Vatajelu, Paolo Maistri, David Hely, Vincent Beroulle, Giorgio Di Natale

    Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) play a crucial role in enhancing the security of electronic devices by leveraging inherent manufacturing variations to generate unique and unclonable identifiers. This study explores the vulnerability of Ring Oscillator-based PUFs (RO-PUFs) to thermal attacks, focusing on two semiconductor technologies: Bulk 65 nm and Fully Depleted Silicon on Insulator (FDSOI) in 28 nm. Through detailed simulations, the effects of uniform and localized thermal variations on the stability of ring oscillator frequencies are analyzed. The results reveal that while the Bulk 65 nm technology shows resistance to uniform thermal attacks, it is highly sensitive to localized attacks. In contrast, the FDSOI 28 nm technology is vulnerable to both types of attacks due to its low variability. These observations underscore the need for robust countermeasures in the design of PUFs to ensure their reliability under varying thermal conditions.

  • Trust@TEE.TIME: a platform for embedded elapsed time schemes in trusted execution environments for blockchain

    by Quentin Jayet, Christine Hennebert, Yann Kieffer, Vincent Beroulle

    Consensus protocols and peer-provided proofs are the necessary components used to establish trust in blockchain systems. Verifiable proofs that guarantee an elapsed time based on security components h...

  • Open Access

    On Power-Off Temperature Attacks Potential Against Security Sensors

    by Maryam Esmaeilian, Vincent Beroulle, David Hély

    Embedded systems can be targeted by fault injection attacks (FIAs), which enable attackers to alter the system specified behavior, potentially gaining access to confidential information or causing unintended outcomes, among other effects. Although numerous security sensors and attack detectors have been proposed in the literature to detect different sources of FIAs, it is crucial to ensure that these mechanisms themselves have not been tampered. Hence, the integrity of these detectors is critical in maintaining the security of embedded systems. This study focuses on evaluating the robustness of delay-based digital detectors against a new type of FIA called power-off temperature attack (POTA). POTA occurs when the chip power is turned off, rendering the detectors inactive and allowing the attackers to bypass them. After a POTA, the circuit or its detectors may not function properly when the power is restored, potentially allowing other attacks to go undetected if the detectors are less sensitive. This study implements two attack detectors on Xilinx Artix-7 FPGAs and investigates the impact of heating cycles on theses detectors’ characteristics when the FPGA is in different states, including power-off, power-on, and inactive modes (such as clock-freezing mode). Our experiments reveal that heating cycles in power-off or inactive modes can alter the FPGA component delays and reduce the accuracy of its detectors, which highlights the vulnerability of these systems to POTA and potential risks to embedded system security.


  • Open Access

    Experimental Evaluation of Delayed-Based Detectors Against Power-off Attack

    by Maryam Esmaeilian, Aghiles Douadi, Zahra Kazemi, Vincent Beroulle, Amir-Pasha Mirbaha, Mahdi Fazeli, Elena Ioana Vatajelu, Paolo Maistri, Giorgio Di Natale

    Embedded systems are vulnerable to significant security threats from Fault Injection Attacks (FIAs), which allow attackers to gain access to confidential information. While various attack detectors have been proposed in the literature to detect different types of FIAs, these detectors themselves are susceptible to such attacks and can be compromised. Hence, the robustness of these detectors is critical in maintaining the security of embedded systems. The focus of this study is to evaluate the robustness of digital circuits and delay-based digital detectors against a new type of FIA called Power-Off Attack (POA). POA occurs when the power to the chip is turned off, and the detectors are not active. Following a POA attack, the circuit or its detectors may not function properly when the power is turned back on, which can allow other attacks to be applied without being detected if the detectors are less sensitive. This study implements two detectors on Xilinx Artix-7 FPGAs and examines the impact of heating cycles on detector characteristics when the FPGA is in various states, including power-off, power-on, and inactive states (such as clock-freezing mode). Our experiments reveal that heating cycles in power-off mode can alter the FPGA component delays and the accuracy of its detectors, which highlights the vulnerability of these systems to POA and potential issues for embedded system security.


  • Hardware Implementation of Secure scalar multiplication Algorithm

    by Souhir Gabsi, Yassin Kortli, Vincent Beroulle, Yann Kieffer, Hamdi Bilgacem

    ECC (Elliptic Curves Cryptosystems) are the most popular and efficient encryption systems used since 1985. They are being increasingly integrated in high security applications such as RFID devices, smart cards, bank-cards, etc. To be suitable for these applications, a lightweight implementation of the scalar multiplication operation is required. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to choose the parameters responsible for the cost reduction of the elliptic curve implementation. In this paper, we will first specify the elliptic curve parameters that are responsible for the optimization of the implementation of the scalar multiplication algorithm. Then, we will choose the most secure scalar multiplication algorithm to be implemented for security applications. The hardware implementation of our ECC architecture, using Virtex-7 board, requires a number of 6549 gates as total area requirement.

  • Open Access

    Sub-Space Modeling: An Enrollment Solution for XOR Arbiter PUF using Machine Learning

    by Amir Ali-Pour, David Hely, Vincent Beroulle, Giorgio Di Natale

    In this work we present sub-space modeling of XOR Arbiter PUF as a cost efficient solution for enrollment for the designers’ community. Our goal is to demonstrate a method which can reduce the overall cost in terms of number of CRPs required for training, training time and memory. Here we propose to reduce the complexity of the modeling target by dividing the PUF into smaller sub-components and model each sub-component of the PUF independently. Our early experimental assessment show that our sub-space modeling can significantly reduce the cost of training compared to some of the latest works, thus it is potentially a cost-efficient solution to enroll strong PUF with high complexity.


  • Open Access

    Strong PUF Enrollment with Machine Learning: A Methodical Approach

    by Amir Ali-Pour, David Hely, Vincent Beroulle, Giorgio Di Natale

    Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have become ubiquitous as part of the emerging cryptographic algorithms. Strong PUFs are also predominantly addressed as the suitable variant for lightweight device authentication and strong single-use key generation protocols. This variant of PUF can produce a very large number of device-specific unique identifiers (CRPs). Consequently, it is infeasible to store the entire CRP space of a strong PUF into a database. However, it is potential to use Machine Learning to provide an estimated model of strong PUF for enrollment. An estimated model of PUF is a compact solution for the designer’s community, which can provide access to the full CRP space of the PUF with some probability of erroneous behavior. To use this solution for enrollment, it is crucial on one hand to ensure that PUF is safe against a model-building attack. On the other hand, it is important to ensure that the ML-based enrollment will be performed efficiently. In this work, we discuss these factors, and we present a formalized procedure of ML-based modeling of PUF for enrollment. We first define a secure sketch which allows modelability of PUF only for a trusted party. We then highlight important parameters which constitute the cost of enrollment. We show how an ML-based enrollment procedure should use these parameters to evaluate the enrollment cost prior to enrolling a large group of PUF-enabled devices. We introduce several parameters as well to control ML-based modeling in favor of PUF enrollment with minimum cost. Our proposed ML-based enrollment procedure can be considered a starting point to develop enrollment solutions for protocols which use an estimated model of PUF instead of a CRP database. In the end, we present a use-case of our ML-based enrollment method to enroll 100 instances of 2-XOR Arbiter PUFs and discuss the evaluative outcomes.


  • Open Access

    Survey: Vulnerability Analysis of Low-Cost ECC-Based RFID Protocols against Wireless and Side-Channel Attacks

    by Souhir Gabsi, Vincent Beroulle, Yann Kieffer, Hiep Manh Dao, Yassin Kortli, Belgacem Hamdi

    The radio frequency identification (RFID) system is one of the most important technologies of the Internet of Things (IoT) that tracks single or multiple objects. This technology is extensively used and attracts the attention of many researchers in various fields, including healthcare, supply chains, logistics, asset tracking, and so on. To reach the required security and confidentiality requirements for data transfer, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is a powerful solution, which ensures a tag/reader mutual authentication and guarantees data integrity. In this paper, we first review the most relevant ECC-based RFID authentication protocols, focusing on their security analysis and operational performances. We compare the various lightweight ECC primitive implementations designed for RFID applications in terms of occupied area and power consumption. Then, we highlight the security threats that can be encountered considering both network attacks and side-channel attacks and analyze the security effectiveness of RFID authentication protocols against such types of attacks. For this purpose, we classify the different threats that can target an ECC-based RFID system. After that, we present the most promising ECC-based protocols released during 2014–2021 by underlining their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, we perform a comparative study between the different protocols mentioned regarding network and side-channel attacks, as well as their implementation costs to find the optimal one to use in future works.


  • Open Access

    A Review on Evaluation and Configuration of Fault Injection Attack Instruments to Design Attack Resistant MCU-Based IoT Applications

    by Zahra Kazemi, David Hely, Mahdi Fazeli, Vincent Beroulle

    The Internet-of-Things (IoT) has gained significant importance in all aspects of daily life, and there are many areas of application for it. Despite the rate of expansion and the development of infrastructure, such systems also bring new concerns and challenges. Security and privacy are at the top of the list and must be carefully considered by designers and manufacturers. Not only do the devices need to be protected against software and network-based attacks, but proper attention must also be paid to recently emerging hardware-based attacks. However, low-cost unit software developers are not always sufficiently aware of existing vulnerabilities due to these kinds of attacks. To tackle the issue, various platforms are proposed to enable rapid and easy evaluation against physical attacks. Fault attacks are the noticeable type of physical attacks, in which the normal and secure behavior of the targeted devices is liable to be jeopardized. Indeed, such attacks can cause serious malfunctions in the underlying applications. Various studies have been conducted in other research works related to the different aspects of fault injection. Two of the primary means of fault attacks are clock and voltage fault injection. These attacks can be performed with a moderate level of knowledge, utilizing low-cost facilities to target IoT systems. In this paper, we explore the main parameters of the clock and voltage fault generators. This can help hardware security specialists to develop an open-source platform and to evaluate their design against such attacks. The principal concepts of both methods are studied for this purpose. Thereafter, we conclude our paper with the need for such an evaluation platform in the design and production cycle of embedded systems and IoT devices.